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1.1 Statement of Research Problems
1.2 The Cases of Korea and Taiwan
1.3 Organisation of the Research
1.1 Statement of Research Problems
One of the most notable features in the development of
the study of social policy, 1 as an academic discipline
with distinctive identity, lies in the historical fact
that it has developed in tandem with the development of
universal social provisions, occasioned by the ambitious
launch of welfare states in the second half of the twen-
tieth century. On the basis of the widespread consensus
about the principles of social democracy and the Keyne-
sian tradition of the mixed economy, the welfare state
thereafter has been in full flourish, has become the
spirit of the times of affluent economies, and also has
been a useful yardstick to measure the level of economic
and political development in a given society, at least
until the rise of New Right. True, it vividly reflects
the basic nature of the society, not only because it can
be considered as the by-product of a society, but also
because it functions as an agent of change in a dynami-
cally changing society. In this regard, the study of so-
1 Different scholars in different countries may name social policy differently. In
American universities, for example, it has been called as `social work', `social
welfare , and `social planning', whilst, in Germany, it has recently developed as
`Sozial Politik , . Social policy as an academic discipline with distinctive identity
truly is of the British origin. Until very recently, welfare is often identified with
the Social Administration tradition in Britain. In the present research, the study of
social policy will be used as the main terminology which indicates 'the systematic
study of discrete social problems and their solution by way of piecemeal reforms'. R.
Mishra,  Society and Social Policy: Theories and Practice of Welfare (London: Macmillan,
1981), P. 3.
2
cial policy is largely a phenomenon of the second half of
the twentieth century.2
Herein, however, lie the seeds of uncertainty of, and
criticisms about the study of social policy, unlike other
mature social science disciplines such as Sociology, Pol-
itics, and Economics. The historical fact that the sub-
ject has developed in accordance with the enlargement of
practical social provisions for the needy inevitably has
led to the ' 'lack of theoretical premises' on the one
hand, and the 'ethnocentrism' or 'parochialism' on the
other hand. 3 The former is, from the outset, generally
derived from the pragmatic orientations of the subject,.
coupled with its normative commitment, whilst the latter
stems from the historical fact that welfare states have
emerged exclusively in Western societies. Being a scien-
tific discipline, it should formulate a conceptual frame,
sufficiently abstract and theoretical to be virtually and
universally applicable to the development of welfare sys-
tems in any cultural context to which it belongs. How-
ever due . to both the 'subject-matter of social adminis-
tration' 4 and the parochial focus on Western advanced
welfare systems, more specifically on the British welfare
state, it seemingly fails to present the general accounts
of the development of welfare system in most abstract
2 Martin Bulmer, Jane Lewis, and David Piachaud, ‘Social Policy; Subject or Object?' in
The Goals of Social Policy, ed. by Martin Bulmer, Jane Lewis, and David Piachaud
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 3-24.
3 For more details, refer to R. Pinker, Social Theory and Social Policy (London:
Heinemann, 1971); P. Townsend, Sociology and Social Policy (London: Allen Lane, 1975);
R. Mishra (1981), op. cit. 
4	 R. Pinker (1971), op. cit. 
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terms. 5 Truly, it has had no equivalent to the works of
Karl Marx, Max Weber and Herbert Spencer to serve as the
main theoretical grounds on which further academic scru-
tinisation could be based, and through which social phe-
nomena could be recognised and analysed.
However, no one would deny that these two interrelated
weaknesses provide a good starting point for development
of the subject, though the approaches may be different
from one writer to another. Taking the 'lack of theory'
theme first, explanation of this theme lies in large part
with its normative commitment to social reform, strongly
influenced by the Fabian tradition since the last cen-
tury. As is clearly indicated by Mishra, 6 'The Fabian
approach is noted for its distrust of theory and specula-
tion and its preference for an empirically based, common-
sensical study of social and economic issues', and thus
l a striking characteristic of social administration was
the virtual absence of a body of theory or even con-
cepts'. Lacking a universally accepted set of theory or
a conceptual framework, the subject also has shown highly
5 Amongst plenty of papers and books about the failure of the study of social policy to
deliver the general accounts on the development of welfare state, special attention
should be paid to two subsequent papers, J. Carrier and I. Kendall, `Social Policy and
Social Change: Explanation of the Development of Social Policy', Journal of Social 
Policy 2:3 (1973); `The Development of Welfare State: The Production of Plausible
Accounts', Journal of Social Policy, 6:3 (1977).
6 R. Mishra, `The Academic Tradition in Social Policy: The Titmuss Years', in The Goals
of Social Policy, ed. by Martin Bulmer, Jane Lewis, and David Piachaud, pp. 65-6. The
author enumerates the following characteristics of-social administration at Titmuss
times: a focus on British social services; a problem-centred and meliorist approach;
concern with statutory services; empiricism, or concentration on the factual study of
social problems; ..., the virtual absence of a theoretical approach to its subject-
matter'.
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normative attitudes toward social phenomena even in the
'value-neutral' days of social science. 7 Its value-laden
trend, it is widely accepted, has definitely restricted
further academic development.
Yet, it would be more reasonable to say that this
value-laden problem is not peculiar to the study of so-
cial policy but to all disciplines dealing with 'policy'.
Policy sciences including social policy are likely to
place more emphasis on the 'value' aspect, although they
should be approached on the basis of research into the
'fact' aspect. Anderson argues about this issue as fol-
lows8 ; 'there is a normative element at the very heart of
any effort to develop a systematic, comparative study of
public policy. ,..., It is a conscious contrivance, re:
flecting human purposiveness, and it is in some sense a
moral act'. But it does not necessarily mean that there
is not a need to develop social policy to the status of
scientific discipline.
It would be a natural course of academic development,
specifically for the newly independent discipline like
the study of social policy, to borrow its main theoreti-
cal achievements from the neighbouring disciplines at the
outset, and in the course of time, it would seek the
7 Martin Hewitt argues that `Social administration arose from the practicalities of
empirical investigation and problem-solving, whence normative principles emerged in
piecemeal fashion'. (My own emphasis) See, M. Hewitt, Welfare Ideology and Need: 
Developing Perspectives on the Welfare State (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1992), p. 19.
8 C. Anderson, `The Logic of Public Problems: Evaluation in Comparative Research', in
Comparing Public Policies: New Concepts and Methods, ed. by D. Ashford (Beverly Hills:
Sage, 1978), p. 20.
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identity of the research field and methodology. And, if
furthered, it would eventually produce its own way of
thinking like the `legal mind' of legal studies, `logical
thinking' of mathematics, and so forth, as a full-fledged
academic discipline. The `lack of theory' theme in this
understanding is not disappointing, nor is it particular
to this subject, but is largely understood as an in-
evitable phenomenon in shaping the course of the disci-
pline. This theme, as was the case in other disciplines,
has endeavoured to bridge the subject with neighbouring
social sciences. Major scientific concepts and method-
ologies developed in Sociology, for instance, have been
actively borrowed in the hope that these would develop
more rational and scientific approaches to the field of
social policy.
The latter theme, the parochial 9 nature of the subject,
as was indicated previously, is grounded in the histori-
cal fact that the welfare state is a phenomenon not only
of the second half of the twentieth century, but also of
Western societies. Welfarisation proper, like industri-
alisation, has taken a long time, has undergone the im-
pact of wide historical events such as war and rev-
olution, and has been greatly influenced by ideologies
such as Utilitarianism, Fabianism, Pragmatism, Feminism,
and Socialism all of which have come to bloom in the
9 Originally, the parochial nature of the subject was indicated by many writers in the
reason that it has too much devoted to the British welfare state alone, not the Western
welfare state in general. However, due to the voluminous comparative researches across
Western welfare systems in recent years, I will mainly use the nature of parochialism
meaning the dichotomy between the Western world and non-Western world.
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Western world. 10 In general, Western societies commonly
have had a high level of production which financially has
enabled them to maintain comprehensive welfare systems
for their whole population, relatively stable political.
regimes in which various interest groups can actively
participate in the policy-making process, and the shared
philosophical and religious tradition, so to speak, of
Jesuit-Christianity.
Not surprisingly, the welfare systems of the Third
World countries, for example, have been virtually left
out of analysis in the study of social policy, 12 mainly
because the scholars of social policy believe that the
scale of problems such as poverty, level of development
and the economic structure of developing countries are
thoroughly different from those of the Western coun-.
10 The post-war British welfare state, for example, is able to trace its original
thoughts back to the thinkers of the last and the early twentieth century such as
. Senior and Chadwick (Utilitarianism), Mackay (Laissez-faire or Individualism), Webb
(Fabianism), Booth and Rowntree (Social Reform and Empiricism), Martin (Feminism), and
so forth. For more details, refer to J. Clark, A. Cochrane, and C. Smart, Ideologies 
of Welfare: From Dreams to Disillusion (London: Hutchinson, 1987). Special attention
to Part One, 'The Birth of the Welfare State (1900-1914) 1 . However, it does not
necessarily mean that the equivalent thoughts of those enumerated ideologies have not
developed in the non-Western world.
11 Some would indicate the fact that welfare system or programs have not been fully
developed in the non-Western societies where their socio-economic situations are, at
least in appearance, more favoured than those of Britain around 1945 when the Beveridge
. Reform was instituted. This issue renders us serious speculation about the origins of
welfare state in developing countries.
, 12 Analysis of the contents of the Journal of Social Pot icy, one of the main academic
journal of the subject, from 1972 to 1982, indicates that of 158 articles only 3 were
on topics directly related to issues of development and underdevelopment, and only 2
were concerned with Third World countries. See S. MacPherson, 'The Underdevelopment of
Social Administration', in Approaches to Welfare, ed. by P. Bean and S. MacPherson
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
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tries. 13 Consequently, major academic achievements of the
subject have been exclusively devoted to Western welfare
systems.
It is very noteworthy in recent years, however, that
social policy researches are more likely to focus on com-
parative study which may be of great interest to all
those committed to coping with the two shortcomings of
the subject, `lack of theory' and `parochialism', which
still endure today. Actually comparative study as middle
range theorizine merits special attention for its rela-
tively balanced views in contemporary social science. To
compare one thing with the other, whether they are simi-
lar or different in nature, is a general and strong way
of recognising social phenomena including welfare states
and their programs. Everything in contemporary society
is recognised only in relative terms. It is neither a*
field of research nor a set of knowledge, but an `engine
of knowledge'. 15 As well it is a very strong research in-
strument for escaping from ethnocentrism. As Dogan and
Pelassy argue:
It is a natural risk, ... , to fall into
ethnocentrism; and comparison may be the best
antidote to this danger. Irresistibly, the
perception of contrasts makes researchers sen-
13 A. B. Atkinson and John Hills, `Social Security in Developed Countries: Are There
Lessons for Developing Countries?' A revised version of a paper presented at the
STICERD/WIDER Workshop on Social Security at LSE, 1988.
14 Generally, scholars interested in building a grand or mature theory would not employ
the comparative case study as the chief methodological orientation, because they are
usually trying to use high level of abstraction and, sometimes, intuition.
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sitive to the relativity of knowledge and
consequently helps liberate them from cultural
shells. 16
One of the classic examples of comparative research in
social policy may be that dealing with the salient dif-
ferences between Great Britain and Germany in the process
of welfare state development. Whilst Great Britain, as a
forerunner of industrialisation, is exemplified as the
welfare state borne out by the natural expanding fran-
chise, Germany, where industrialisation was imposed by
the ruling force, seems to be more in line with the au-
thoritarian welfare state implemented by the ruling elite
in order to generate sufficient public loyalty." This
pioneering work has paved the way of and has served as a
cornerstone of the further development of comparative so-
cial policy. Even today, it is true that many of the
differences in the early phase of their welfare state de-
velopments have their parallels.
On the basis of this work, the number of countries and
content of welfare systems being compared has increased
dramatically and research methodologies have developed
sharply as well since then. Although comparative studies
15 M. Dogan and D. Pelassy, How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics
(Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1984), p. 8.
16 Ibid., p. 9. Special attention should be paid to chapter one, 'Comparing to Escape
from Ethnocentrism'.
17 As for relationship between welfare state development and industrialisation, Pinker
indicates that 'We must also take account of societies in which industrialisation was
originally imposed by governments ruling by force rather than popular consent and where
it frequently happens that the, government defines industrialisation not as an end in
itself but as a means to creating or conforming a new kind of political order'. See,
R. Pinker, The Idea of Welfare (London: Heinemann Education Books, 1979), pp. 223-31.
Please denote that the Bismarkian social insurances were established together with the
anti-Communist law in the late of the nineteenth century in Germany.
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attest to some contributions for coping with the two
weaknesses of the subject, it should be pointed out that
they are primarily focused on Western countries. When we
compare, we find enormous differences across Western
countries. It should be emphasized, however, that these
differences may not seem to be so apparent from the view-.
point of developing countries. The point is to compare
the differences of the two worlds to increase mutual
understanding and development, though it is still very
far from realisation. It is reality that Third World
welfare systems have scarcely been dealt with even in the
realm of comparative research. 18 Thus it seems urgently
necessary to shed light on the empirically based
interpretation of the Third World welfare states in
comparison with the Western advanced ones.
The formation of the Third World bloc, mainly consist-
ing of newly independent countries, has been one of the
most distinct features of international relations since
the Second World War. Amidst the militant antagonism be-
tween the First and Second Worlds, they have strived to
maintain their own political autonomies and thereafter
their political influence has grown remarkably in the in-
ternational political structure. As the welfare state is
a phenomenon of the second half of twentieth century, the
18 Spalding indicates that the comparative studies 'concentrate heavily on policymaking
in advanced industrial states, neglecting processes that may be more characteristics of
late-developing dependent countries , . See R. Spalding, 'Welfare Policymaking:
Theoretical Implications of a Mexican Case Study', Comparative Politics, 12 (July
1980), p. 419.
10
emergence of Third World countries in World politics is
truly a phenomenon of that time as well.
However its importance is not based on their political
power, as have been frequently exercised in the voting
processes of the United Nations, but on the fact that
they are the lands of the future. A recently published
working paperw of the World Bank clearly indicates that
the population of developing countries is around five
times as much as that of developed countries and their
projected growth rate of population (1990-2000) will be
over three times as high as that of developed countries.
It further implies that ninety-five percent of the growth
in the world's labour force will take place in the
developing world over the next quarter of a century. 20
Thus their nutrition,	 education,	 health,	 income
maintenance, and political freedom will get more and more
important in the future. Accordingly, it can be argued,
the survival of the world depends not on the further
development of high technology in developed countries,
but on the successful modernisation of developing
countries. If they fail to modernise their own
societies, 21 it would be an overwhelming burden to every
nation in the world ecologically as well as economically.
19 The World Bank, World Development Report 1991: Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991), p. 181.
20 L. H. Summers and V. Thomas, 'Recent Lessons of Development', The World Bank Research
Observer, 8:2 (July 1993), p. 241.
21 Here modernisation is used to refer to the whole process of industrialisation,
population control and rational-Legal institutions to cater for their own people.
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Accordingly, many attempts have been made to explain
the development of the Third World welfare system. For
example, Chan, in his doctorate thesis 22 about the de-
velopment of welfare system in three Chinese societies
(Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), attempts to testify
whether Functionalism or Marxism could be applied to ex-
plain the development of welfare system of those soci-
eties. His conclusion is that neither Functionalism nor
Marxism provides a plau isible framework to define and ac-
count for the `society-welfare' relationship of those so-
cieties. Furthermore, similar views can be obtained from
the case of Latin American countries as well. Wilson, in
his doctorate thesis, concludes that neither modernisa-
tion nor the conflict model of the welfare state ade-
quately accounts for the special conditions and circum-
stances surrounding the evolution of social security in
Mexico. 23 Their results imply that the existing theoreti-
cal framework developed in the West has a clear limita-
tion to explain the development of welfare systems in de-
veloping countries. We need more case studies of the in-
dividual welfare states in developing countries to devise
and propose an alternative approach to the study of Third
World welfare systems, as is argued by MacPherson. 24
 Ob-
22 Gordon Hou-sheng Chan, IA Comparative Study of the Development of Social Welfare in
the Developing countries - With Special Reference to Three Chinese Societies: Hong
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Wales, 1984).
23 R. R. Wilson, 'The Corporatist Welfare State: Social Security and Development in
Mexico' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Yale University, 1981).
24 He claims that 'There is an urgent need for new approaches which break with the
inappropriate legacy of the past'. See, S. MacPherson, 'Social Security in Developing
Countries', Social Policy & Administration, 21:1 (1987), p. 3.
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viously, in order to develop the scientific status of the
discipline, the alternative approach, based on the par-
ticular situation of individual developing countries,
should be discussed and devised.
Meanwhile, Norman Ginsburg argues in his recently pub-
lished book that the study of social policy involves
analysis of three basic elements: the origins, the sub-
stance and the impact of policy. 25 These three components
have to be analysed together should any research expect
the sensible research result, because they are closely
linked to one another. Amongst them the origins of the
policy merit a particular attention, because it renders
us a deeper understanding about the later development of
the policy; how has it evolved, to what extent have its
contents increased or decreased, what effects has it had
on society. 26 Hence in this research, major academic ef-
forts will be devoted to identifying the origins of the
social policies • of Korea and Taiwan relative to their
unique industrialisation processes and political
situations of these countries, and duly purports
25 N. Ginsburg, Divisions of Welfare: A Critical Introduction to Comparative Social 
Policy (London: Sage, 1992), p. 2.
26 N. Ginsburg takes more emphasis on the impact of policy than the other two elements in
terms of critical parameters such as class, race and gender inequality. However in
this research the origin of policy will be dealt with more significance because, first
of all, to measure the welfare effect onto the society is extremely difficult.
Secondly, if one measures the welfare effect, it is even more difficult to identify the
specific welfare effects amongst other variables. Lastly and probably most
importantly, welfare systems of Korea and Taiwan have been introduced very recently.
The welfare itself is very newly developed concept in these countries. Thus it is
either impossible or, if so, fruitless to indicate the welfare effect. For the dif-
ficulties of measuring welfare outcomes, see H. Uusitalo, 'Comparative Research on the
Determinants of the Welfare State; The State of the Art , , European Journal of Political 
Research, 12 (1984), p. 407.
13
deliver the view that political crises, amongst other
variables, have the most significant effects on the de-
velopment of their welfare systems, while the
industrialisation and accompanied societal changes
provide general context with which they have developed
and been implemented. Results of the research would give
us a clue as to how, why and in what way the welfare
systems of Korea and Taiwan are different from those of
advanced welfare states. It will be argued that the
welfare systems of Korea and Taiwan are basically
designed to cope with political crises, and henceforth to
achieve political legitimacy for the regime.
Finding out some regularities or patterns of the devel-
opment of welfare systems of Korea and Taiwan, this re-
search, hopefully, would contribute to overcome the two
shortcomings of the study of social policy: 'lack of the-
ory' and 'parochialism'.
14
1.2 The Cases of Korea and Taiwan
In all respects, the cases of Korea27
 and Taiwan merit the
particular attention of those interested in the Third
World welfare systems. Amongst the newly independent
countries after the Second World War, Korea and Taiwan,
without disputes, have marked the highest economic growth
rate in the world economy during the past three or four
decades and, what is more, their economies are still
growing very fast even in the present world-wide reces-
sion.28	In this regard, the industrialisation process
of the two East Asian NICs, Korea and Taiwan, is held
central to understanding the general situations of Third
World countries, not only because they manifested impres-
sive economic development during the past three decades,
but also because they show both possibilities and
limitations of Third World development.
According to their impressive economic development,
both Korea and Taiwan have transformed their society from
an agriculture-based rural society to a modern industrial
27 All references to Korea are to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) throughout this
thesis, unless otherwise stated.
28 Of the poor tradition-oriented agricultural countries, Korea and Taiwan commonly mani-
fested the impressive economic growth, by any standard, over the past three or four
decades. The total exports of four East Asian NICs have recorded over double the total
exports of all other developing countries since the mid-eighties, and their economic
growth rates are the highest in the world. For example, the Taiwan economy achieved 9%
of the average economic growth rate during 1950-1985, the Korean economy performed
around 8.5% during 1962-1986 as well. See B. Cumings, 'The Origins and Development of
the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and
Political Consequences', International Organisation, 38:1 (Winter 1984), p. 1.
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one very quickly. Seen in this light, it is worthy to
examine their welfare systems, since the cases of Korea
and Taiwan, as societies undergoing rapid industrial-
isation, give a unique opportunity to gain insights into
the dynamics of welfare in industrialising societies.29
Furthermore, we would hopefully find some patterns or
regularities of the welfare state development in dynami-
cally developing societie6. It is a reality, however,
compared with the bulk of literature about the
industrialisation of the four East Asian NICs, their wel-
fare systems have been virtually left out of analysis in
the academic circle of social policy, and more specifi-
cally, 'relatively little attention has been accorded the
related issue of the state's role in provision for wel-
fare i . m In a similar vein, Chow argues:
... attention has so far been focused on their
industrialising experiences and little has been
documented about their social security provision,
which is often seen in the West as part and parcel
of the industrialisation process.31
The more significant aspect of the cases of Korea and
Taiwan, however, lies in the historical fact that their
socio-economic transformations have been made under seri-r.
ous political crises. Interestingly enough, the cases of
29 J. Midgley, 'Industrialism and Welfare: the Case of the Four Little Tigers', Social
Policy and Administration, 20:3 (Aug. 1986), p. 227.
30 F. C. Deyo, `The Political Economy of Social Policy Formation: East Asia's Newly
Industrialized Countries' in States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, ed. by R.
P. Appelbaum and J. Henderson (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992), P. 289.
31 N. Chow, `Social Security Provision in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea: A
Comparative Analysis', A working paper presented to the Social Administration
Association Conference, 1985, p. 1.
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Korea and Taiwan show that welfare systems have developed
.••
remarkably during or just after the political crises. It
also provides good examples as to the degree of Third
World welfare system impact upon the society to which it
belongs.
17
1.3 Organisation of the Research
This research consists of seven chapters.
Chapter one identifies the major shortcomings of the
discipline (lack of theory and parochialism), and
accordingly sets out the main research problems of this
research. It also discusses the reasons for selecting
the two countries concerned: Korea and Taiwan.
Chapter two discusses 'what is meant by welfare?' and
'what is a welfare system?' in modern capitalist state.
For this purpose, this chapter, first of all, examines
the determinants of welfare state development; welfare
enactment and welfare expenditure with a view to present
the theory of social welfare relevant for the cases of
Korea and Taiwan. Secondly, it presents two models of
social welfare: UK and Third World.
Chapter three is based on a thorough review of the
literature and covers the political, social and economid
changes that accompanied the development of welfare in
Korea and Taiwan.
Chapters four and five deal with the welfare systems of
both Korea and Taiwan. They briefly sketch both welfare
systems respectively with a view to present what is going
•on in them, and secondly to identify the main
determinants of welfare enactments and welfare
expenditures.
18
Chapter six specifies two main issues of the welfare
state development regarding the cases of Korea and
Taiwan: 'industrialisation and welfare' and 'politics and
-
welfare'. It, first of all, discusses two apparently
irreconcilable views of the relationship between welfare
and industrialisation: 'aversion to welfarism' and 'human
capital development'. Secondly, it proposes a political
crisis thesis which explicates the development of welfare
systems of Korea and Taiwan.
Chapter seven concludes that politics not only matters
but decides the timing of welfare enactments and trends
of welfare expenditures in the cases of Korea and Taiwan.
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CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL WELFARE IN MODERN SOCIETY
-THEORIES AND MODELS-
2.1 Theories of Social Welfare Development: Towards an
Explanation on Adoption and Expansion of Welfare
Programmes
2.2 Models of Social Welfare: UK and Third World
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2.1	 Theories of Social Welfare Development: Towards
an Explanation on Adoption and Expansion of
Welfare Programmes
In accordance with the post-war consensus on social
democracy and mixed economy, the welfare state has devel-
oped remarkably and welfare programmes have been widely
Implemented in Western societies. Ever since its remark-
able expansion at the end of the Second World War, the
welfare state has been held central to intellectual argu-
ments of Western societies, and has been widely used to
understand the post-industrial societies. Accordingly,
numerous accounts have been made to manifest causes and.
effects of the development of the welfare state. How-
ever, for those interested in the subject, there has
never been clear agreement on the origins of the welfare
state, and its effects on the society to which it be-
longs. Different scholars of different academic back-
grounds and ideological preferences interpret the post-
war welfarisation differently. This subject, it can be
argued, may be the study about the differences. However,
if a research question could be clearly and more univer-
sally formulated, we might explore the common elements
which make up the welfare state, or at least describe the
specific welfare state in a more comprehensive way. In
this regard, Therborn proposes three central explanatory
hypotheses as follows:
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1. under what circumstances should we expect
major welfare-state institutions to be
installed, to grow rapidly, to stagnate, and
to be cut back or abolished?
2. under what circumstances should this or that
kind of welfare-state organization be expected?
3. under what conditions should we expect welfare
states to have this or that effect upon social
relations and upon relations of distribution?1
It seems obvious that these three research questions
are closely related to one another, and thus, unless the
first question is solved, or at least clearly answered,
it would be hard to approach the other two questions.
The first question is about patterns of development under:
the circumstances within which the welfare state has de-
veloped and it progrmmes have been implemented. Looking
back to the history of welfare development since the
Second World War, though it is not prominent, there have
been some regularities and laws of the changes engendered
from the changes of circumstances. The academic
attempts, which aim to spell out these changes on the
basis of their own theoretical framework or ideological
preferences, are generally devoted to the clarification
of determinants of welfare states.2
1 G. Therborn, `Karl Marx Returning: The Welfare State and Neo-Marxist, Corporatist and
Statist Theories', International Political Science Review, 7:2 (April 1986), p. 137.
2 Before the uprising of New Right Movement notably in Britain and United States, and
generally in Western societies in the early eighties, welfare programmes, with few
exceptions, had increased continuously throughout the sixties and seventies. Thus the
dismantlement or abolitions of some programmes often seen throughout the eighties are .
the expression of the New Right politics. However, it would be more reasonable to say
that welfare programmes has modified, rather than that they have dismantled or
abolished, according to changes of social needs not necessarily from the welfare
recipients but from the society as a whole. For example, the British welfare system
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If the first question is fittingly answered, the next
two questions would be properly explored. Whilst the
first question formulates the main dependent variable as
the `welfare efforts' relative to the changes of circum-
stances, the third one is concerned with the `welfare
outcomes' onto the society. Welfare efforts are further
divided into `adoption' and `expansion' of which central
indicators, generally accepted by most scholars, are the
enactment of welfare programmes (Adoption) and the
welfare expenditure relative to GNP or whole government
expenditure (Expansion) .3
Meanwhile welfare outcomes indicators usually vary
widely and are very difficult to be measured as well.
The following indicators are most commonly assumed as
welfare outcomes: `income inequality, degree of redistri-
bution, social mobility, educational opportunity, infant
mortality, ... , quality of employment and housing poli-
cies'. 4	Compared with the relatively easily measured
remained almost intact during the first two terms of Thatcher Government (1979-87).
Some reports claiming the end of lwelfarism' are somewhat exaggerated. For more
:details of `irreversibility' thesis, refer to R. Mishra, The Welfare State in
Capitalist Society: Policies of Retrenchment and Maintenance in Europe. North America
and Australia (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 103-19. It is in this
regard that the determinants of stagnation and abolitions of welfare programmes are
duly excluded in this section.
3 Such scholars as Schneider and Ingraham use `programme enrollment', instead of
'welfare expenditure', to measure the indicators of dependent variables in the welfare
expansion model. See, S. K. Schneider and P. Ingraham, `The Impact of Political
Participation on Social Policy Adoption and Expansion: A Cross-national, Longitudinal
Analysis',  Comparative Politics.  17 (1984),_pp. 107-22.
4 H. Uusitalo, `Comparative Research on the Determinants of the Welfare State: The State
of Art', European Journal of Political Research, 12 (1984), p. 407. See also, M.
Shalev, `Class Politics and the Western Welfare State', in Evaluating the Welfare
State: Social and Political Perspectives, ed. by M. Shelves (London: Academic Press,
1983), pp. 27-50.
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indicators of welfare efforts, analysing the growth of
the welfare state by welfare outcomes is extremely diffi-
cult because, in the first place, some indicators can
hardly be measured quantitatively and, thus comparative
data about welfare outcomes are very rare. Secondly and
probably more importantly, it is very difficult to iden-
tify the specific effect of the welfare state on a given
outcome. It is in this regard that some research docu-
ments using the welfare outcomes show inconsistent re-
sults to each other. 5 Hence more attention will be paid
to the researches which have formulated the welfare ef-
forts as dependent variables.
Categorisation of explanations or factors (independent
variables) affecting the determinants of welfare state6
vary very widely from one writer to another. For exam-
ple, Cameron7 proposes five types of explanations, while
Uusitalo8 explains them just by two theories: 'Political
Theories' and 'Structural-functional Theories'. Schnei-
der and Ingraham9 examine the enactment and expansion of
social welfare programmes by the following factors:
'industrialisation', 'social mobilisation', 'government
5 For more details, H. Uusitalo (1984), op. cit., p. 408.
6 Some of them do not directly focus on welfare state alone, but public services, public
economy, for example, as a wider context within which welfare state has developed.
However, in this section, they will be dealt equally because they shows strong
implications for researches of welfare state development.
7 D. Cameron, 'The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis', The
American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), pp. 1243-61. They are economic growth,
fiscal policy, political variables, structural factors, and openness to world economies
respectively.
8 H. Uusitalo (1984), op. cit. 
9 S. K. Schneider and P. Ingraham (1984), op. cit. 
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structure', 'protest', 'voting', and 'national bureau-
cratic institutions', respectively. Tarschys 10 attempts
to analyse the growth of public expenditure by nine modes
of explanation. And Hicks and Swank" specify them as
'institutional action by political parties',
'institutional action by economic organisations',
l extrainstitutional 	 political	 action'	 and
s extrainstitutional economic actions'. Undoubtedly cate-
gorisations as such ultimately depend on how a researcher
understands the welfare state development, what he or she
wants to know, and what sort of data he or she uses.
This section is designed to examine the existing re-
searches about the determinants of welfare state, to re-
capitulate them according to their basic themes, and to
derive some research implications for the thesis. In
this research, factors affecting welfare state develop-
ment are divided into three sets of explanations: the po-
litical-institutional context, socio-economic context,
and international context.12
10 D. Tarschys, 'The Growth of Public Expenditures: Nine Modes of Explanation',
Scandinavian Political Studies, 10 (1975), pp. 9-31. The author classify them into
three levels (socio-economic, ideological cognitive, and political institutional) in
the first place, and tries to explain them with three perspectives (consumer, finance
and producer) respectively.
11 A. Hicks and Du Swank, 'On the Political Economy of Welfare Expansion: A Comparative
Analysis of 18 Advanced Capitalist Democracies, 1960-1971', Comparative Political 
Studies, 17:1 (April 1984), 81-149.
12 Different scholars would divide them differently. Heidenheimer and others, for
example, propose six different sets of approaches: socioeconomic theories, cultural
value approach, party government, political class struggle, neo-corporatist, and
institutional political process. See, A. J. Heidenheimer, H. Helco and C. T. Adams,
Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in America. Europe. and Japan
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 3rd edn., pp. 6-9. However, these approaches can





Until very recently, researches into welfare state devel-
opment, relative to adoption and expansion of welfare
programmes, have paid little attention to the
characteristics of politics or political theories. It is
mainly due to the results of the cross-national aggregate
data analysis carried out in the late sixties and the
early seventies that regime characteristics were not able
to account for the differences in policy-making processes
across nations. 13
 Accordingly, the research is much more
concerned with whether or not politics matters, than what
kind of politics has this or that effect on welfare state
development. 14 Voluminous writings from the mid-seventies
and throughout the eighties, have presented a number of
caveats to the initial idea that priorities should be
given to socio-economic factors as explanatory variables
in the welfare state development. These writings draW
attention to the political variables.
institutional and Socio-economic. In addition these two integrated approaches, this
thesis will deal extra-societal explanations: International approach.
13 T. J. Bossert, 'Can We Return to the Regimes for Comparative Policy Analysis?: or, the
State and Health Policy in Central America', Comparative Politics, 15 (July 1983), 419-
41. Even in the researches about comparison between military regime and non-military
one, Mckinlay and Cohan conclude that there have been little variances between these
two regimes. See also R. D. McKinley and A. S. Cohan, 'Performance and Instability in
Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems', American Political Science Review, 70 (Sep.
1976), 805-64.
14 G. Therborn (1986), op. cit., p. 137.
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They have focused on such political variables as
`Ideology', `Riots', `Political Decision Making',
`Indirect Tax Rate', and `Regime Types', and so on, al-
though as to which political variable amongst them is
most significant is still controversial. Most impor-
tantly, more recently published articles pay more atten-
tion to the causal relation between regime types and wel-
fare state.
2.1.1.1 Ideology
The theme of ideology5 relative to welfare state devel-
opment has been virtually left behind in the study of so-
cial policy since the post-war consensus. Along with the
belief in value-free social science and rapid technologi-
cal development, ideology has no longer been important,
nor necessary, for the advanced Western societies. More-
over, the historical lessons that the political ideolo-
gies such as `Nazism' of Germany, `Stalinism' of the for
mer USSR and various forms of `Fascism' in Third World
military regimes, all of which resulted in totalitarian-
ism, might stimulate the notion of l end of ideology'
widespread in the post-war affluent societies.
15 Ideology is traditionally defined as 'a set of belief or doctrine used to justify a
group's action in pursuing its own interests', and I will follow the definition in this
section. See M. Spenser, Foundations of Modern Sociology, 2nd edn (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), Ch. 3.
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One of the most straightforward illustration of this
intellectual trend may be Wilensky and Lebeaux's Indus-
trial Society and Social Welfare, m
 which argues that the
Western welfare states are largely outcomes of increased
needs for social welfare engendered by industrialisation.
Wilensky's later work, with more statistical evidence,
clearly mentions that nations with the same level of eco-
nomic development commonly have shown the same level of
welfare state development, irrespective of their ideolog-
ical position; whether they are socialist or capitalist,
democratic or totalitarian, and collectivist or individu-::
alist. 17 However, in recent years, the proponents and the
opponents of this view, with varying degrees, altogether
recognise that the ideology of either elite or party
systems has had effects on welfare state development.
In contrast with the Wilensky's resultm that elite
ideology does not contribute to the welfare efforts,
Mishra claims that different kinds of elite ideology led
to different patterns of social policy, at least in the
early stages of industrialisation. 	 The middle class
16 H. Wilensky and C. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Free
Press, 1965).
17 H. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of 
Public Expenditure (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). However, he
claims that the government of the Catholic dominance has some effects on social
security expenditure. See H. Wilensky, 'Leftism, Catholism, and Democratic
Corporatism: The Role of Political Parties in Recent Welfare State Development', in The
Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, ed. by P. Flora and A.
Heidenheimer (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 345-382. See also T.
Dye, 'Book Review', Journal of Politics, 37:4 (Nov. 1975), 1065-67; J. Barnes and T.
Srivenkataramana, 'Ideology and the Welfare State: An Examination of Wilensky's
Conclusions', Social Service Review, 56 (June 1982), 230-245.
18 H. Wilensky (1975), op. cit. 
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elite is likely to develop a 'residual' system of wel-
fare, whereas the dynastic elite to 'paternalistic' one,
and the Communist elite to far more 'institutional' one.19
However his argument of ideology is just preliminary
logic for his further debates of Convergence theory, and
thus has no important implications for the present
welfare system.
Since Parkin has found that social democratic govern-
ments are likely to provide more educational opportunity20
for their populace, there have been many attempts to
explain the welfare state development in terms of ide-
ology of governments or party system. They begin witW
the self-evident historical fact that mono-ideological
societies like the USA and the former USSR have lagged
far behind multi-ideological societies like Sweden among
European countries where debate on substantial issues
abounds in welfare state development.21
Thus the Scandinavian welfare state has been a case in
point. Furniss and Tilton in their comparative research
into Sweden, the USA and the Great Britain22 ascertain
that social democracy government has played more decisive
role in the making of the welfare state. In a similar
19 R. Mishra, Society and Social Policy: Theories and Practice of Welfare, 2nd edn
(London: Macmillan, 1981). Special attention to chapter three, `Industrialisation and
Social Welfare: Convergence Theory or Technological Determinism'.
20 However he maintains that social democracy governments have no direct effects on
social expenditure. See F. Parkin, Class Inequality & Political Order (London:
Paladin, 1971).
21 J. Barnes and T. Srivenkataramana (1982), op. cit., p. 240.
22 N. Furniss and T. Tilton, The Case for the Welfare State: From Social Security to
Equality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).
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vein, Scase in his study of Great Britain and Sweden,23
argues that a more social democratic regime (Sweden) has
shown more egalitarian policies.
Meanwhile Cameron provides a very impressive explana-
tion on the partisanship of government issues. From a
comparative study of eighteen developed countries, he
suggests that the dominance in government in leftist par-
ties was a sufficient condition for relatively huge in-
creases in public a expenditure and activities, albeit it
is not a necessary condition. 24 Only if it is coupled
with open economies, it would fully contribute to the ex-
pansion of public activities.25 However, whether the left
government is more favourable for social development
policies is still a matter of debate, because Kohli finds
out that social transfer expenditure increases under Cen-
tre-Right and Centre coalition governments more rapidly
than that of under conservative majority governments and
leftist governments as wel1.26
Moreover, different analyses have emerged from the
Scandinavian countries themselves, which of course is
quite different from the anti-ideological positions as
well. Therborn and others in their study of the Swedish
23 R. Scase, Social Democracy in Capitalist Society: Working Class Politics in Britain
and Sweden (London: Croon Helm, 1977). See also F. Castles, The Social Democratic
Image of Society: A Study of the Achievements and Origins of Scandinavian Social 
Democracy in Comparative Perspective (London: Rouledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
24 D. R. Cameron (1978), op. cit., p. 1253.
25 This argument is further discussed in `Openness' thesis.
26 J. Kohl, 'Trends and Problems in Postwar Public Expenditure Development in Western
Europe and North America', in P. Flora and A. Heidenheimer (1981), op. cit. pp. 307-
344.
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society in 1932-1976 under social democracy, 27 claim that
the parliamentary hypothesis which presumes societal de-
velopment is determined by the constellation and struggle'
of forces in parliament, is not much in accord with ex-
plaining the Swedish society in these periods. Rather,
they argue, the class hypothesis, in contrast, which as-
sumes that societal development is determined by the con-
stellation and struggle of class forces is much more rea-
sonable. In a similar vein, Schmidt 'argues that there is
no clear-cut relationship between the partisan composi-
tion of government and the indicators of social and eco-
nomic performance. 28 He adds that `the crucial point is,
, that the political composition of governments pro-
duces different policies if, only if, some additional
conditions are fulfilled 1 . 29 He exemplifies these addi-
tional conditions as the structure of class politics, po-
litical culture, economic strength, and economic produc-
tivity.
Obviously, we cannot explain welfare state development
simply by analysing the partisan composition of govern-
ment or parliament, though it can be the most significant
factor in some political contexts. The average annual
rates of real public health expenditure growth in
Britain, for example, illustrates that there is no ground
27 G. Therborn and others, 'Sweden before and after Social Democracy: A First Overview',
Acta Sociolooica, 21 (1978), 37-58.
28 M. Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A
Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations', European Journal of Political 
Research, 11 (1983), p. 8.
29  Ibid., p. 8.
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that the leftist party is more favourable to welfare
state development.
<Table 2-1> Annual Health Expenditure Growth (1949-1989)












Source: D. K. Whynes, 'The Growth of UK Health Expendi-
ture', Social Policy & Administration, 16:4 (Dec. 1992),
p. 292.
Above all, since there are such huge variations across
leftist governments, they cannot be classified into one
singular ideological spectrum. They can differ from one
party to another, and even in one leftist party, there is
a wide range of ideological preferences amongst their
members. In this regard, the ideology thesis does hardly
fit for the quantitative cross-national analysis. Proba-
bly, the single case time-series historical analysis is
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more appropriate for the study of causal relationship be-
tween ideology and welfare state development.30
2.1.1.2 Riots: Unconventional Types of Political
Activity
Whereas the ideology thesis, implicitly or explicitly,
assumes the government or parliament as the main source
of welfare enactment and expansion, the riots thesis hy-
pothesizes political activity of populace. Quite simply,
whilst the former postulates the 'welfare from the
above', the latter, in contrast, posits the 'welfare from
the below'. In this regard, the riots thesis may provide
a more resourceful perspective specifically for the wel-
fare state development in the Third World countries..
However the problem is not so simple. It can occur in
relation with the racial problems, regional differentia-
tions, and sometimes misinformation given to the popu-
lace. Truly, riots or any other types of unconventional
political activity is a world-wide phenomena occurring in
the transformation process of a traditional society to a
modern industrial society, whether it be in the north or
south, and capitalist or socialist.
30 Clark and others provide excellent example for the study of ideologies of welfare in
their research into the British welfare state since the ages of Laissez-faire. See J.
Clark, A. Cochrane, and C. Smart, Ideologies of Welfare: From Dreams to Disillusion
(London: Hutchinson, 1987).
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Types of unconventional political activity includes
riots, protest, organised labour movements, social un-
rest, demonstrations, all of which are generally borne
out by unmet needs of populace. According to the
premises of structural-functionalism, conflicts, strug-
gles, and sometimes strifes are seen as the results of
industrialisation which not only brings prosperity of hu-
man being, but inevitably accompanies the collapse of so-
cial integration. It creatively breaks down the tradi-
tional values, traditional way of life, and at last the
community with which social members were duly expected to
identify themselves. Thus throughout industrialising
processes, there might be huge social frustration,
disharmony and disintegration which tend to be trans-
formed into riots, strifes and, very rarely but consider-
ably, revolution. However, the point is, according to
this line of thinking, these conflicts borne out by rapid.
social change are likely to be integrated into conven-
tional political activity like party system, representa-
tive democratic elections, and so on. It has been the
belief held in the affluent post-industrial societies
that the social conflicts are resolved through the proce-
dure of 'institutionalisation'.
However, the basic proposition that citizens are ex-
pected to express fully their demands and needs, and the
state readily accepting their needs through conventional
political channels, has been seriously called into ques-
tion. Especially when their demands are directly related
34
to politically sensitive issues which might be held to
other group's interests, the `institutionalisation' of
social conflicts is hardly to be realised.
Piven and Clowardm attempt to explain the welfare ex-
plosion of the sixties in the United State in relation
with the widespread civil right movements. They claim
that the only possible way for the poor to increase their.
social conditions is to protest, because they are under-
privileged in the political structure as well as in the
economic system. However, according to their arguments,
mainly due to the modern electoral system, l one man, one
vote', the political parties have to accept their demands
in order to garner the votes, and the result is the rapid
welfare explosion in the sixties. In alignment with the
Piven and Cloward thesis, Beti32 finds out that riot
cities had larger increase of welfare budgets the year
following their riots, whilst the non-riots cities had no
parallel increase. Meanwhile Hibbs argues that `Strike
activity has declined dramatically in nations where So-
cial Democratic or Labour parties assumed power in the
1930s or just after the Second World War and created the
modern welfare state'. 33 It seems clear that the mass
riots do not by itself make welfare enactment or expan-
31 F. Piven and R. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New
York: Pan Theon, 1971).
32 M. Betz, `Riots and Welfare: Are They Related?', Social Problems, 21 (1974), 345-55.
33 D. Hibbs, `On the Political Economy of Long-run Trends in Strike Activity', British
Journal of Political Science, 8 (1978), p. 165.
35
sion. It should be mediated by a conventional political
system like election.m
However, the problem still is whether their riots
strike direct to welfare reforms or expansion. If the
masses recognises their welfare rights, and exercises
their welfare demands through mass strikes, and the gov-
ernment enacts or expands welfare programmes according to
their needs, the riots thesis would be appraised as one
of the most substantial explanation of the welfare state
development. Conclusively, if any researcher attempts to
claim that mass riots and welfare expansion are not just
related by chance, he or she definitely needs more empir-
ically based investigation about the welfare demands in
mass riots in a given political context. In this regard,
the assumption of Skocpol and Amenta is quite noteworthy,
the riots thesis is most suitable to times and places
where working classes and other organized populace lack
access to conventional political channels for affecting
social policies.35
34 Piven and Cloward clearly argue that the relationship between mass volatility and the
welfare explosion was indirect, and was mediated by complex national electoral
conditions. See F. Piven and R. Cloward, 'Electoral Instability, Civil Disorder, and
Relief Rises: A Reply to Albritton', American Political Science Review, 73:4 (1979),
1013-23.
35 T. Skocpol and E. Amenta, 'States and Social Policies', Annual Review of Sociology, 12
(1986), pp. 138-9.
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2.1.1.3 Election: Conventional Type of Political
Activity
Whereas the riots thesis is in line with the `social con-
trol' perspective, the election thesis is more akin to
the `social choice' perspective; the government adopts
and expands welfare programmes as an answer to the needs
and demands of the populace expressed through the conven-
tional channel of political activities such as election.36
In a liberal parliamentary democracy, where citizens
exercise their political influence on the decision-making
processes of public policies, the election thesis seems
to provide more sensible accounts for the welfare state
development. It is closely related to the `citizenship
rights' of Marshal137 which comprise the civil, political
and social rights. According to this line of thinking,
the development of social services can be understood as
the outcome of the blooming of social rights of the twen-
tieth century, and, it should be pointed out, it is on
the basis of the political rights established in the
nineteenth century.
Implicit in this thesis is the idea that Western lib-
eral democratic politics encourages the early adoption of
and extensive use of social programmes because it is more
susceptible to the demands of populace. Liberal demo-
36 S. K. Schneider and P. Ingraham (1984), op. cit., p. 119.
37 T. Marsatl, Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays (London: Heinemann, 1963).
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cratic politics is based on the election process through
which political demands are freely exerted, and the elec-
tion contenders are likely to promise the fulfilment of
the demands, however much they will cost, in order to
garner the votes. Thus welfare programmes in this under-
standing are the straightforward output of elections in
the Western-typed representative democracies.
Cutright finds that the political representativeness is
closely related to the adOption of social insurance
programme, when the economic development is controlled
for. He further implies that the more representative
governments adopt social programmes earlier than the less
representative governments. 38 In alignment with this line
of arguments, Flora and Alber find that the extension of
suffrage clearly increased the propensity to introduce
insurance system in the European parliamentary democra-
cies in 1880-1920. 39
 In addition, Schneider and Ingraham
argue that one of the strongest influence on the welfare
state development is conventional political participa-
tion. They assert; 'governments develop social welfare
programmes in response to the citizenry's expression of
their demands and preferences through conventional chan-
nels of participation'.40
38 P. Cutright, 'Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Social Security
Programmes', American Journal of Sociology, 70 (1965), 537-50.
39 P. Flora and J. Alber, 'Modernisation, Democratisation, and the Development of Welfare
States in Western Europe', in P. Flora and A. Heidenheimer (eds.) (1981), op. cit., pp.
37-80.
40 S. K. Schneider and P. Ingraham (1984), p p. cit., p. 119. However Wilensky claims
that there has been no significant relationship between representative characteristics
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This argument has further developed into a 'political
business cycle' as evidenced in increased spending and
other inflationary policies momentarily before and after
an election.° It takes a direct focus on the correlation
between the timing of an election and increase of social
benefits. Tufte clarifies the administrative creation of
gaps between the increase of social benefits of pre-
election period and tax increase of post-election period,
and indicates that the periodic election produces a
cyclinical influences on the economy. 42 From this argu-
ment, one may derive the hypothesis that 'the more fre-
quent electoral competition is, the larger increase in
public spending will be'. This hypothesis definitely
needs to be burked by empirical-based studies, and the
cross-national time series analysis is probably most ap-
propriate for evaluating it.
2.1.1.4 Indirect Tax Rate
One of the most distinguishing features of the modern
state probably is the unified channel of taxation. In
of politics (democracy or totalitarian) and the social security expenditure of the
government. See, H. Wilensky (1975), op. cit. 
41 See, W. Nordhaus, 'The Political Business Cycle', Review of Economic Studies, 42
(1975), 160-90. See also D. Cameron (1978), op. cit., pp. 1246-48; T. Skocpol and E.
Amenta (1986), op. cit., pp. 137-38.
42 E. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1978). See also D. Cameron (1978), op. cit., p. 1246; T. Skocpol and E. Amenta (1986),
op. cit., p. 138.
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contrast with the pre-capitalist society in which feudal
landlords were eligible to collect levies according to
their own laws and regulations, the modern state, by con-
stitution, operates a unified tax system as the main
sources of government's finance. Quite simply, the gov-
ernment can administer the public sector more uniformly
on the basis of the unified taxation system.
In a modern representative democratic society, the tax
rate has been held central in the modern political arena
because it is determined in the power structure of polit-
ical decision making amongst bureaucracies, political
parties and so on. Especially in an election year, the
debate of taxation is much more intensified amongst them
because the tax rate is closely related to the voting be-
haviour. Herein lies the dilemma of election contenders,
because the constituencies are likely to expect more ben-
efits through public services, but less taxes for those
services. Moreover, for the part of tax-payers, the
amount of tax they pay seems to exceed the amount of ben-
efits they would receive. Thus public officials have to
conceal the costs of public policies in a `fiscal illu-
sion' to avoid agitation of the electorate.43
One of the effective ways to conceal the cost of public
policies is to increase the indirect tax rate." From the
above tax concealment theme, DeViney derived the
hypothesis that `the greater the state reliance on
43 D. R. Cameron (1978), op cit.. p. 1246.
44 Indirect tax generally includes value-added tax, special consumption tax, liquor tax,
commodity tax and others, though it varies country to country.
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indirect taxes, the greater the expansion of public ex-
penditures for social programmes'. 45 However, he found
the inverse relationship between the indirect tax rate
and expansion of public expenditure from his empirical
study of twenty industrialised countries."
2.1.2	 Socio-economic Context
Compared with the political accounts on welfare state de-
velopment, the socio-economic explanations commonly re-
gard the welfarisation of modern society as a natural
course of industrialisation, accompanied by demographic
changes, urbanisation, technological development, bureau-
cratisation and ultimately rational-legal institutionali-
sation. Implicit in this line of thinking is the idea
that social structure is basically designed to adapt the
changes of both internal and external environments, and
thus its arrangement is accordingly understood in terms
of the functions in shaping the course of a society.
Seen in this light, the growth of welfare system since
the ages of industrial revolution has contributed to the
sound existence of the society to which it belongs. In
spite of fierce criticisms from the outset, it is hardly
45 S. DeViney, 'Characteristics of the State and the Expansion of Public Social
Expenditure', Comparative Social Research, 6 (1983), p. 155.
46 Ibid., pp. 167-68.
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to deny that the basic theme of this line of thinking has
had a great effect on almost every social science
discipline: Economics, Politics, Anthropology, Sociology
and so forth.
Logic-of-industrialism, or technological determinism in
other words, is best exemplified in the literature of
convergence theory which presumes the similar institu-
tional patterns, engendered by technological development
and overwhelming industrialisation, amongst highly indus-
trialised countries, irrespective of their diverse ideo-
logical orientations. Mishra47 argues that huge differ-
ences seen in the initial phase of industrialisation be-
tween capitalist and communist societies have been con-
siderably narrowed as technology has become more and more
-
developed. He understands this narrowing as synthesizing
processes between 'laissez-faire of capitalist societies'
and `state-monopoly of communist societies'. Due to the
functional motivation, both apparently irreconcilable so-
cieties move forward middle way, and the result is a com-
mon institutional pattern.
47 For more details, see R. Mishra, `Welfare and Industrial Man: A Study of Welfare in
Western Industrial Societies in Relation to a Hypothesis of Convergence', Sociological 
Review, 21 (1973); `Convergence Theory and Social Change: The Development of Welfare in
Britain and the Soviet Union', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 18 (1976).
It includes the discussions with Reinhard Skinner about the convergence theory. For
more details please refer to Society and Social Policy: Theories and Practice of 
Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1981). For critics on the convergence theory, see I.
Weinberg, `The Problem of the Convergence of Industrial Societies: A Critical Look at
the State of a Theory', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11 (1969); R.
Skinner, `Technological Determinism: A Critique of Convergence Theory', Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 18 (1976).
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When this logic is applied to the welfare sector, the
explanation is rather simple; all highly industrialised
societies adopt statutory welfare programmes according to
the functional motivation of industrialisation. They
maintain similar contents of the welfare system and thus
the political variables, including ideological prefer-
ences and partisanship of politics have little effects on
welfare state development. However, recent changes in
the former Soviet bloc prove that the middle way between
capitalist society and communist society has never ex-
isted in history.
It is worthy of notice that some attempts have been
made to account for the welfare state development on the
basis of this thinking of structural functionalism. They
commonly draw attention to demographic structure, age of
welfare programmes and economic development as
independent variables affecting the adoption and
expansion of welfare programmes. However, since the
logic-of-industrialism which assumes the welfare system
as a by-product of industrialism is deeply rooted in
their literature, they inherently are unable to answer
the research questions of Therborn raised previously.
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2.1.2.1 Economic Development
This thesis is based on the assumption that 'The welfare
state is a product of the needs generated by the develop-
ment of industrial societies'. 0 In fact, no one would
deny that economic development"' is a prerequisite which
provides the basic resources for governments to operate
their welfare systems. In this regard, Kerr and others
attempt to explain the increase of social expenditure by
the logic of industrialism that origins of the welfare
state can be seen as the secular changes associated with
the broad processes of industrialisation." Cutright
finds that the level of social security coverage is most
powerfully correlated with the level of economic develop-
ment especially for less-developed countries." Wilensky
also ascertains that economic growth is the most signifi-
cant variable for welfare state development. 52 In addi-
tion, Kohl argues that GDP growth significantly affects
the growth of public expenditures.2
48 C. Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State ?: The New Political Economy of Welfare
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 16.
49 Various indicators of economic development can be taken into consideration. To name a
few examples; GNP growth rate, GNP per capita, personal disposable income per capita,
energy consumption per capita, steel production per capita, electrical power production
per capita, export and import per capita, ratio of work force in manufacture and
service sector, labour force participation rate and so forth.
50 C. Kerr and others, Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labour and
Management in Economic Growth (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964). For more details
about the relationship between `welfare , and 'industrialisation', refer to C. Pierson
(1991), op. cit., pp. 14-21.
51 P. Cutright (1965), op. cit. 
52 H. Wilensky (1975), op. cit.
53 J. Kohl (1981), op. cit. 
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However as was shown in Flora and Alber l s study of
twelve European countries, the economic development vari-
able fails to explain the timing of welfare adoption.54
That is to say, when the proponents of 'economic develop-
ment' thesis are asked about the causes of different tim-
ing of adoption and different speed of expansion of
fare systems amongst affluent societies, where level of
their economic developments is similar to one another,
they do not seem to explain them quite satisfactorily.
Thus it is quite clear that the economic development
variable alone is no longer the case for explaining the
welfare state development.
2.1.2.2 Age of Programme
The basic idea of 'age of programme' thesis is that;*
since government budget is fundamentally incremental, the
earlier adopted programmes are more mature; level of
coverage and provision is more advanced. 55 Moreover the
first adoption of welfare programme has important
implications in the later history of welfare state
development in any country because it has presented a
54 P. Flora and J. Alber (1981), op. cit. pp. 37-80.
55 For the incremental nature of government activities, refer to Wagner's law which
suggests the inevitability of public sector growth according to economic affluence of a
nation. See A. Wagner, 'The Nature of the Fiscal Economy' in Classics in the Theory of
Public Finance, ed. by R. Musgrave and A. Peacock (London: Macmillan 1958). See also
D. Cameron (1978), op. cit., p. 1245.
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major break with the anti-welfare tenets of traditional
liberalism.56
Pryor argues that the age of social security system is
the most significant variable to explain the welfare ex-
penditure. 57 Aaron, in his study of twenty two advanced
countries, also ascertains that the most powerful ex-
planatory factor affecting programme coverage and
benefits level is the years of experiences with the
programme. 58 Taira and Kiiby propose the length and
intensity of experience in social security programmes as
one of the significant factors affecting the differences
amongst the industrialised, capitalist countries of the
West and of Western origin. 59 Wilensky, in his study of
sixty countries of both developed countries and
developing ones, argues that the level of social security
expenditure is determined by the age of social security
system.° However, Stephens finds that, once political
variables are taken into account, the age of social
security programme does not account for the expansion of
public spending across advanced countries.m
56 D. Collier and R. Messick, 'Prerequisites versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative
Explanations of Social Security Adoption', American Political Science Review, 69
(1975), P- 1299'
57 F. Pryor, Public Expenditure in Communist and Capitalist Nations (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1968).
58 H. Aaron, 'Social Security: International Comparisons', in Studies in the Economics of
Income Maintenance, ed. by 0. Eckstein (Washington: Brookings Institution).
59 K. Taira and P. Kilby, 'Differences in Social Security Development in Selected
Countries', International Social Security Review, 22:1 (1969), 139-53.
60 H. Wilensky (1975), op. cit. 
61 J. Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (London: Macmillan, 1979).
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Meanwhile critics of Uusitalo about the age of
programme thesis is of particular importance. He argues
that since 'both the age of the social security system
and social expenditure are two aspects of the welfare
state itself' la it is not worthwhile explaining one by
the other.
2.1.2.3 Age of Population
The age of population thesis begins with the simple fact
that nations with more aged populations (generally over
sixty five) are likely to spend more social security ex-
penditures. Undoubtedly, demographic changes affect the
pattern of social security systems, especially expendi-
ture of pension scheme. Wilensky ascertains that the
proportion of people over sixty five is significantly
correlated with social security expenditure in sixty
countries.° Miller also argues that national welfare.
effort is shown to be related with the proportion of aged
in the population."
It should be emphasized, however, that the proportion
of aged in the population implies no more than a simple
62 H. Uusitalo (1984), pp. cit., p. 407.
63 H. L. Wilensky (1975), op. cit. 
64 He also proposes real resources, military efforts, political systems as statistically
significant independent variables. See L. Miller, 'The Structural Determinants of the
Welfare Efforts: A Critique and a Contribution', Social Service Review, 50 (March
1976).
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causal relationship, unless it is analysed in the broad
structural context. The point is not just whether it is
the sole or most significantly correlated factor with the
welfare state development but whether the aged population
is politically strong enough to force the government to
act for their welfare. In other words, under what condi-
tion and to what extent will the proportion of aged peo-
ple variable have most significant effects on welfare
state development.
2.1.3 International Context
What is common in the above two sections certainly is
that they deal with intra-societal factors affecting wel-
fare state development. This section, in contrast, draws
attention to the extra-societal factors: the 'diffusion'
of welfare from outside and the 'openness' of economy to-
wards the world market. It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that it would be too naive to divide factors af-
fecting welfare state development simply into intra- and
extra-societal ones. In the increasingly shrinking
Global Village by rapidly developing information tech-
nologies and transportations, it is of no use discerning
indigenous elements from extraneous ones in a given soci-
ety.
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To name a few examples, when economic development is
perceived as the most significant factor in the adoption
of welfare programmes, no one would definitely say that
the economic development is solely an intra-societal
factor. Interestingly enough, even if the diffused
technology and skills are believed by many to be the most
significant factor affecting the welfare state
development in a given society, it is hardly assumed that
the diffused ones are working without synthesizing
indigenous ones. Undoubtedly, the basic driving forces
for the making of the welfare state in any society should
be sought in intra-societal structure, though external
factors to some extent might contribute to that process.
However, it is also true that under certain circum-
stances external factors may act as the major driving
force for welfare state development, though it is not a
sufficient condition. Looking back at the history of the
welfare state, some experiences and lessons of forerunner
countries had been seriously taken into consideration,
specifically when one nation adopted the first welfare
system. Thus what is promptly needed is to probe more
deeply into what extent and under what condition external
factors affect welfare state development.
2.1.3.1 Diffusion
49
-Whilst the concept of diffusion stems from the Germanic
Kulturhistorische school of anthropology, meaning the
`spread of culture' from the advanced centre to the less-
advanced ones, it is mainly associated with the Third
World development in the contemporary social science.65
Implicit in the diffusion theory is that, once the seeds
of superior culture are diffused into less developed cul-
tural context, it has come to survive and moreover pro-
liferate itself. Quite interestingly, it has had a con-
siderable affect equally on both the Modernisation School
and the Dependency School. Whereas the former utilized
this concept in order to describe the flow of knowledge;
innovation, technology and rational-legal institutions as
main force of industrialisation, the latter emphasized
that diffused ideology and technology from the centre es-
tablished the dependency situation.
Viewed in a historical context, amongst European coun-
tries as well as between centre and periphery, the diffu-
sion of basic idea and technology of welfare system has
greatly contributed to the overall welfarisation at the
end of the last century in this region.66 However, too
little attention has been devoted to the study of the
patterns of diffusion and their effects on them. 67 Taira'
and Kilby utilized the `geographical proxy' index in
their study of nineteen countries of social security ex-
65 J. Midgley, 'Diffusion and the Development of Social Policy: Evidence from the Third
World', Journal of Social Policy, 13 (1984).
66 D. Collier and R. Messick (1975), op. cit., p. 1305.
67 Ibid., p. 1305.
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penditure, and find that the geographical variable is
very useful for accounting for the international differ-
ence in social security development. 68 Collier and Mes-
sick's concept of hierarchical diffusion merits particu-
lar attention. Using the data from the Social Security
Programmes Throughout the World, 69
 as is exemplified in
the following table, they classify the countries into
three groups: the earliest adopters, the middle group of
adopters (1908 or later), and the late adopters (after
1922).
<Table 2-2> Enactment Years of Major Welfare Programmes
U.K. U.S.A. Germany Sweden Japan
Old Age, Inval-
idity, Death
1908* 1935 1889 1913 1941
Sickness and 1911 1965 1883 1891 1922
Maternity
Work Injury 1897 1908 1884 1901 1911
Unemployment 1911 1935 1927 1934 1947
Family Allowance 1945 n.a.** 1954 1947 1971
1908 (old age pensions), 1911 (invalidity insurance),
and 1925 (old-age and survivors' insurance).
** Federal-State system of aid (cash payments and social
services) to indigent families with dependent
children (AFDC).
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Social Security Programmes Throughout the World 1989, Re-
search Report 62. May 1990.
68 K. Taira and P. Kilby (1969), op. cit. 
69 U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Programmes
Throughout the World, 1971.
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They duly find that the social security system diffuses
LIR a hierarchy of nations amongst earliest adopters,
social security is diffused amongst middle group of
adopters at widely differing levels of modernisation, and
finally and probably most significantly, amongst late
adopters, the combination of hierarchical diffusion and
prerequisites accounts may provide the most satisfactory
explanation 70
2.1.3.2 Openness
The basic idea inherent in the openness thesis is that
nations with a highly dependent economy towards world
market are likely to run more active social security
policies. Mainly due to the severe competition of world
markets, these nations have to concentrate their re-
sources on a number of huge corporations, and conse-
quently labour forces are apt to unite effectively, that
is, the high unionisation. The crucial point is that
their united voice is penetrated into the political
arena, namely, the establishment of left-dominated gov-
ernments which are inclined to operate a more universar
social security scheme. 71	Schmidt also finds that the
70 D. Collier and R. Messick (1975), op. cit., pp. 1308-14.
71 D. Cameron (1978), op. cit., pp. 1249-51.
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open economy is one of the most significant explanations
for welfare state development in twenty one developed na-
tions.72
It should be pointed out, however, that models of the
openness thesis are generally limited to highly corpo-
ratist regimes like Scandinavian countries which seem to
have almost every favourable condition for the welfare
state development. They commonly have the high level of
economic development, left-dominated or left-coalition
government, frequent elections, high proportions of aged
population, relatively earlier adopted welfare
programmes, high labour density, corporatist state, and
so forth. Thus it is not surprising, nor impressive, to
see that they have far developed social security scheme,
and accordingly it is not clear whether openness of these
economies is the most significant determinants of the
welfare state development.
For this thesis to be fruitful for the study of deter-
minants of welfare state development in any given soci-
ety, the research attention must be extended to the cases
of relatively less developed but highly dependent
economies like Korea and Taiwan.
72 M. Schmidt, 'The Role of the Parties in Shaping Macroeconomic Policy', in The Impact 





Models of Social Welfare: UK and Third World
2.2.1	 The British Welfare State
In general, the welfare system explains much to us about
the society within which it has developed and been imple-
mented. It vividly reflects the economic structure, po-
litical situation, and cultural inheritance of the soci-
ety. Accordingly, we can assume that the research into
the development of the welfare state - experiment, con-
solidation, expansion and retrenchment - enables us to
recognise the basic nature of its society in more con-
crete and practical terms. In other words, it is
possible to argue that we cannot grasp welfare state
development in the second half of the ' twentieth century
without keen sense about what was really happening in the
post-war period.
Undoubtedly the welfare state, as a superstructural
expression of post-war society, was not necessarily con-
fined to the British experience. Most of all advanced
countries, with the exceptions of United States and
Japan, moved towards overall welfarisation, and at the
present time no one would argue that the welfare state is
solely a British phenomena any longer; it is seen instead
as a common feature of all advanced capitalist
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societies .73 Moreover it still is a matter of debate
exactly which country has taken the most prominent
leading role in welfare state development, because each
country has developed its own welfare system with a
similar timing, and furthermore they have been highly
interdependent to one another in the development of
welfare state.74
However it is quite clear that the British welfare
system, like any social institutions of British origin
such as the parliamentary system, legal system and so
forth, has paved a way toward the ages of the welfare
state, and still has a more advanced and systematic form
of welfare system. m In other words, Great Britain, as
home of the welfare state, obviously has played a pio-
neering, though not dominant, role to sow the seeds of
the welfare state, not only to her neighbouring European
countries, but also to her former colonial ones. In fact'
the term 'welfare state' was originally applied to
Britain during and after the Second World War.76
73 N. Johnson, The Welfare State in Transition: The Theory and Practice of Welfare
Pluralism (Hemel Hempstead: Wheatsheaf, 1987), p. 29. Until the middle of sixties,
academics seemed to assume that the welfare state was uniquely British institution.
However, since then, they have voiced that the welfare state is no longer the
exclusively British one, but a common features of all capitalist states. See, for
example, D. Wedderburn, 'Facts and theories of the welfare state', in The Socialist 
Register, ed. by R. Miliband and J. Saville (London: Merlin, 1965).
74 No one would deny, for instance, the important influence of the Bismarkian social
insurance scheme to the British welfare system before the Second World War.
75 However, it has one of the lowest levels of social benefits in the western world,
despite its well designed welfare system. For further details of failure of the
British social security system, see A. W. Dilnot, J. A. Kay and C. N. Morris, The
Reform of Social Security (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
76 A. Briggs, 'The welfare state in historical perspective', in The Welfare State, ed.
by C. Schottland (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 25. See also N. Johnson (1987),
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Moreover, it should be pointed out that Britain has
unprecedentedly developed the study of welfare systems,
namely Social Administration, which has progressed in
tandem with universal welfare provisions, and its
influence on the rest of the world is still convincing.
Truly, until the sixties, the history of the social
policy as an academic discipline was widely identified.
with that of the Department of Social Science and Admin-
istration at the London School of Economics and Political
Science. 77 It probably is a unique British phenomena that
the academic tradition has had considerable effects on
the making of social policy in the real world.78
Meanwhile, the imperative task to be sorted out clearly
before entering the main content of this section is
related to the question of whether the British welfare
state stands proxy for the welfare system of all advanced
countries. It is quite clear that there have been huge
variations about welfare state development across na-
tions; they have different level of benefits, different
op. cit., p. 3; M. Hill and G. Bramley, Analysing Social Policy (Oxford: Blackwell,
1986), reprinted, p. 22.
77 This Department has presumed its prime prestige from its outset of 1912 amongst the
academics and commentators involved in studying social welfare phenomena. It has
developed under the full influence of the traditional British thoughts such as
Pragmatism, Utilitarianism, Fabianism and so forth. It also has produced a large
number of respected academics like William Beveridge, T. H. Marshall, Richard Titmuss,
and more recently Brian Abel-Smith, and a politician like Clement Attlee who used to
work for the Department as a lecturer. For more details about the history of the
Department, see N. Bulmer, J. Lewis, and D. Piachaud (eds), The Goals of Social Policy
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
78 It does not necessarily mean that other countries like Germany and Sweden, for
example, have had no equivalent of the British academic tradition on the welfare state
development. It rather emphasises the pivotal role of the Social Administration in the
making of social policy in Britain.
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scope of coverages and, most importantly, different po-
litical attitudes toward welfare. An imprecise view
would be given if the British welfare state only is taken
into account.
Nevertheless, this research selects the British welfare
state as a model case of advanced welfare states for the
following reasons; first of all, Britain, as a forerunner
of industrialisation, undoubtedly manifested the liberal
state of competitive capitalism, and accordingly the
development of the welfare state in Britain should be
appraised as a response of that sort of state. It tells
us very important things about the study of social policy
in broader fashion; the relationship between the welfare
state development and the role of the state, where prior-
ity is usually given to market economy. Thus the study
of the British welfare state would provide us a general
paradigm through which other welfare states may be com-
pared, whether it be similar or different, and explained.
Secondly, the British welfare state has been closely
observed and well documented in command of its unique
academic tradition, Social Administration, and it is of
great advantage for us to understand what was really go-
ing on in welfare sector.
In spite of these rationalisations enumerated above,
the research should manifest its limitations for select-
ing the Britain alone as a model case of advanced welfare
state. Quite simply, the research does not aim to pre-
sent full synopsis of advanced welfare states, but to
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deals with welfare phenomena only to the extent that it
is applied to welfare systems of Korea and Taiwan.
2.2.1.1 Origins of Post-war British Welfare State
According to Derek Fraser, the welfare state was not born'
but had gradually evolved." Implicit in his famous
phrase is the idea that the welfare state should be re-
searched in historical context within which it has duly
grown. He further argues that 'Our intellectual diffi-
culties are perhaps resolved if we treat the Welfare
State not as a theoretical definition of a particular set
of policies but as a shorthand historical means of refer-
ence to the social policy of a particular period t . m
 A
rapid development of the welfare state in the post-war
Britain therefore needs historical analysis about the
overall shift of the British society during and after the
Second World War.
Ironically, the total overthrow of existing social or-
der such as war and revolution sometimes turns out to be
conducive to societal development which might not be re-
alised by conventional processes in peace time. Some
sort of social reform is possible under such circum-
79 D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy
since the Industrial Revolution, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1984).
80	 Ibid., p. 239.
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stances, because sectional interests of different groups,
which sometimes cause severe struggles, could be chan-
nelled into one paramount goal, and more significantly,
the vision of future would be widely shared amongst so-
cial members regardless of religion, ideology, class, ed-
ucational background, and career. Historically, Idealism
or Utopianism takes its root deeply under the ground and
flourishes in harsh time rather than in peace time. Peo-
ple who endure hard time are doomed to imagine the better
situation and, in due course, have a faith in the bettef
future as well. Kathleen Jones succinctly describes the
war-time community spirit as follows:
'If dangers were to be shared, then resources
should be also shared'. War had unexpectedly
turned out to be l a great engine of social
advance'. There was a new altruism, and a new
passion for social justice.m
The British have taken a great pride, during and after
the Second World War, in defending Western civilisation
from Nazism. 82 When they had been undergoing the miser-
able situations of war such as massacre, plunder, whole
destruction of human civilisation, and thus of human na-
ture, they dreamed about the ideal post-war society in
which civilisation would have come into full bloom. Ac-
81	 Kathleen Jones, The Making of Social Policy in Britain 1830-1990 (London: Athlone,
1991), p. 121.
82 Undoubtedly, Britain's war experience was very unique in all respects; it was the only
sovereign country that fought against the Nazism from the beginning to the end, was
often attacked in her mainland, and eventually achieved victory without serious social
and political disorganisation. T. H. Marshall, Social Policy: In the Twentieth 
Century, 2nd edn (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1968), p. 75.
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cordingly, their desire to live and to bring up their
younger generation in the civilised society, 83 based on
human reason and common sense, was realised by making of
the welfare state, which they understood as a way of en-
hancement of civilisation to prevent from reappearance of
totalitarian regime like Nazism and Fascism. The welfare
state in this understanding is an expression of the war-
time idealism. In a similar vein, Norman Johnson argues:
Fascism was seen as a direct consequence of
economic dislocation; and full employment
policies, improved social security provisions and
better housing, education and health services were
seen as one possible way of preventing the re-
emergence of fascist regimes.m
Besides, the war seemed to contribute to dissolution of
the stable class structure. People with the different
social backgrounds gathered together in air raid shel-
ters, in the Forces and in the war-time factory. Chil-
dren with under-nourished and ill-clothed from the less-
privileged class were exposed to the public and their
destitute situation motivated the conscience of privi-
leged class. 85 Moreover the British, who traditionally
83 Free school meals and milk were universally provided to the children because they
represented the future of the race. See, Ibid., p. 124.
84 N. Johnson (1987), op. cit., p. 17.
85 D. Fraser (1984), op. cit., p. 210. Fraser maintains the view that 'evacuation' and
'rationing' were twin pillars on which l a consensus of social democracy' was built.
See also Kathleen Jones (1991), op. cit., p. 121-22. H. Glennerster presents that
geographical, gender and class inequalities of accessing to services, prevalent in the
1930s, were lessened by the principle of citizen's universal right embodied during the
war. See H. Glennerster, 'Social Policy since the Second World War', in The State of 
Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974, ed. by J. Hills (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990), pp. 12-15.
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-had tended towards liberalism, were accustomed to greater
state intervention and higher rates of taxation, during
the war, both of which may be required for post-war de-
velopment of the welfare state.86
The Beveridge Report, 87 one time best seller but long
time classic of social policy, can be appraised as a true
embodiment of this war-time idealism. In the late 1942
the report was published to the public and encountered
the warm welcome from almost all sectors of population,
although the ministers of the Coalition Government were
cautious about the practical operation of the Beveridge
plan on account of unknown economic situation after the
war. 88 It should be noted, however, the report was not an
original invention of Beveridge himself, but a result of
accumulated studies and discussions throughout the twen-
ties and thirties; l it was a very British evolution f , 89 as
is noted by Glennerster. Yet the report can be highly
estimated on account of its attempts to simplify and
unify the existing welfare systems and to realise the
ideas discoursed previously."
The report is based on three guiding principles:
86 N. Johnson (1987), op. cit., p. 17.
87 W. Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services (London: HMSO, 1942), Cmnd. 6404.
88 DHSS,  Reform of Social Security: Background Papers, Cmnd. 9519 (London: HMSO, 1985),
para. 3.42.
89 H. Glennerster (1990), op. cit., p. 11.
90 Fraser indicates that simplicity and symmetry of the Report overshadowed the fact that
it was no more than a rationalisation of the existing insurance scheme. See, D. Fraser
(1984), op. cit., p. 215. See also P. Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: 
Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), pp. 116-34.
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1. Any proposals made were to take account of the
experience of the past, but to ignore sectional
interest.
2. There were five `giants on the road to
reconstruction': Want, Disease, Ignorance,
Squalor, and Idleness.
3. Social security should be achieved by co-
operation between the state and the
individual 91
The first principle, of course, was set up in
accordance with the ideas discussed before the war and
the community spirit during the war. As well, it gives
weight to the view that social reform is more feasible
when sectional interest is, for whatever reason, duly
ignored. 92 Although the second principle covers the five
giants, the social insurance scheme deals with `Want'.
only.
	
Thus it should be viewed as a part of
comprehensive social policy.° The third principle
precisely manifests the legacy of a liberal state. This
twin pillar of the individual and the state has been
deeply rooted throughout the history of the British
welfare state since the Poor Law Amendment Act which
embodied the principle of 'less-eligibility'. 94 Beveridge
91 K. Jones (1991), op. cit., p. 126. All these three principles were great buttress of
the Report in tandem with six fundamental principles; adequacy of benefit, flat rate of
benefit, flat rate of contribution, unification of administrative responsibility,
comprehensiveness and classification.
92 Jones exemplifies the National Insurance Act of 1911, which showed uneasy compromises
with the approved societies and the doctors, and stressed the relatively favourable
condition for social reform during the war. See Ibid., p. 126.
93 D. Fraser (1984), op. cit., p. 215.
94 The principle of less-eligibility was clearly proclaimed in the New Poor Law as
follows; 'The first and most essential of all conditions, a principle which we find
universally admitted, ... , is, that his (recipient's) situation on the whole shall not
be made really or apparently so eligible as the situation of the independent labourer
of the lowest class.' Report of the Poor Law Commissioners, XXVII (1834), 228, 261-2.
Quoted from 'Documentary Appendix' in Ibid. p. 254.
62
himself clearly manifested the view that it should leave
room and encouragement for voluntary action by each indi-
vidual to provide more for himself and his family in
establishing a national minimum.95
Meanwhile, it is highly questionable whether the main
recommendations of the Report would be realised by legis-
lation, if the post-war political situation would not be
favourable to overall welfarisation. It is frequently
seen in developing countries that the advices of welfare
experts are not put into operation in their political
processes.
The next section delves into the political situation of
the post-war Britain, which became the age of the welfare
state.
2.2.1.2 Political Consensus and the Social Legislations
in the Post-war Britain
It is commonly argued amongst political commentators and
academics that the best-fitted term to describe the po-
litical situation of the post-war Britain would be
'consensus'. Although the consensus was consolidated by
the Attlee Government (1945-51), it should be pointed out
•that its origins can be traced back to the community
spirit of the Second World War. 96 On the basis of the un-
95 W. Beveridge (1942), op. cit.,
96 Anthony Seldon points out six main ingredients of the post-war consensus; they are
*(1) six years of war united the country, (2) Coalition Government, (3) Acceptance of
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precedented consensus from the conservative party, the
then opposition party, the Attlee Government could Winch
a considerable number of social reform measures. Anthony
Seldon succinctly lists six main aspects of the post-war:
consensus:
1. Full employment.
2. Mixed economy and Keynesianism.
3. Welfare state universal services.
4. Trade unions as partners in government.
5. Equality as objective of social policy.
6. Pro-US Foreign policy.97
The commitment to full employment in post-war Britain
was mainly due to the historical lesson that the mass un-
employment in the inter-war period had brought about the
fascist regimes in the European continent. The basic re-
,
quirement of this commitment, of course, was a sustain-
able economic growth which allowed enough jobs to the
people who wished to work. It was a true example of the
political consensus of the post-war affluent society, be-
tween the Conservative party and the Labour party, as was
symbolised by the term, I Butskellism t , 98
 and gave a firm
Keynesianism, (4) Planned economy, (5) Trade unions, and (6) Welfare/. A. Seldon, 'The
rise and fall of the post-war consensus/ in Politics UK, ed. by B. Jones and others
(Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 1991), pp. 41-42.
97 Ibid., p. 43-44.
98 After the victory of the Conservative party in the election of 1951, newly appointed
Chancellor Butler maintained the full employment policy which was very similar to that
of the Labour Chancellor Gaitskell. The Economist named this consensus of the economic
policy as 'But-skellism , which reflected the attitudes shared by the two parties about
the welfare state, public spending and full employment. See P. Riddel, The Thatcher 
Government (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), revised edn, p. 2; A. Gamble, The Free
Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism (London: Macmillan, 1988),
Chapter Three 'From Butler to Thatcher'; B. Jones (1991), pp. cit., p. 47.
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buttress for the Keynes-Beveridge orthodoxy which aims to
maintain effective demands through wide ranges of state
intervention including welfare system. Full employment
was also a main suggestion of the Beveridge report which
aimed to transform the inter-war selectivity" to the
post-war universalism. The welfare state, under the con-
text of Keynesianism, was supposed to be geared to rein-
force the control of effective demands in the economy.
Moreover, it was reckoned to be an effective institution
to develop human capital by improving health condition
and educational qualifications, and at last to tranquil-
lise the labour unrest.
Quite simply, explanation for the welfare state devel-
opment of the second half of the twentieth century lies
in large part with the unique political situation, the
political consensus. It gives weight to the view that
politics matters in welfare state; it tells us why post-
war Britain embarked upon universal social provisions, to
what extent it was eventually put into operation, and
most importantly, how it has modified according to
changes of political surroundings. It attests to the ar-
gument that politics is of analytical value to the study
of social policy. Now we turn out attention to the
social legislations in the post-war Britain.
Viewed in historical context, it is interesting to note
that welfare rights have extended from the less-privi-
99 Fraser maintains the view that the welfare measures of the inter-war period is best
described as `selectivity'. See D. Fraser (1984), op. cit. 
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leged class (selectivity) to whole population
(universalism), in contrast to political rights which
have developed from the landed class to ordinary people.
In the history of the British welfare state, the Bev-
eridge report can be regarded as a turning point from the
Victorian tradition of Selectivism to the modern Univer-
salism.
The first major legislation of universal benefit ac-
cording to the Beveridge proposal was the Family Al-
lowance Act of 1945, which introduced the allowance at
the weekly rate for each child after the first. m
 It was
extended to Child Benefit which includes the first child
in 1975. The National Insurance Act of 1946 can be esti-
mated as a sheer embodiment of the Report; it set out the
limited period of unemployment benefit, full-rate old age
pensions and twenty years of phasing-in period to spread
the increased expenditure. 101 The National Health Servicd
Act of 1946 was designed to aim at 'Disease' amongst the
five giants. It was also regarded as an essential to any
scheme for improving living standard, and therefore
should be available to all citizen whenever he/she
needs. 102 The National Assistance Act of 1948 was a main
partition from the Victorian origin of the Poor Law. It
100 DHSS (Department of Health and Social Security), Cmnd. 9519, para. 3.44.
101 In the post-war economic situation, most unemployment was considered as a short-term.
Ibid., para. 3.45.
102 R. Levitt and A. Wall, The Reorganised National Health Service (London: Chapman and
Hall, 1984), 3rd ed. Revised., p. 5.
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established the single means-tested"3 allowance scheme
available to all those in unemployment and whose finan-
cial resources fell below a standard set by Parliament.1"
No one would dispute that these subsequent social leg-
islations truly reflected the Keynes-Beveridge orthodoxy
which had remained almost intact until the challenge of
the New Right in the late seventies. However, it is also
true that we cannot explain these processes of legisla-
tion simply by the orthodox as such, nor can we explain
them merely by the unique political situation. Probably
what is really needed is to examine the values and as-
sumptions on which they may be deemed to rest. Glenner-
ster prominently specifies three principles that `the
principle of a citizen's universal right of access to
services of an equal standard regardless of geography or
income', `setting a minimum standard' and `stronger
central power and administrative rationalisation'. 05
According to Marshall, there are three different staged'
of citizenship development:	 civil, political and
social. 106	 Civil rights, which had developed since the
103 For the debates of `means-test' benefits of the post-war years, refer to A. Deacon,
`An End to the Means-test?: Social Security and the Attlee Government', Journal of 
Social Policy, 11:3 (1982).
104 J. Hills (1990), op. cit., p. 13.
105 H. Glennerster (1990), op. cit., pp. 11-15.
106 T. H. Marshall, `Citizenship and Social Class', in Sociology at the Crossroads, ed.
by T. H. Marshall (London: Macmillan, 1963). However the Marshallian citizenship
reeled under a barrage of criticism on account of its Anglocentric and evolutionist
nature. For more detailed criticisms on the Marshallian citizenship, refer, for
example, to A. Giddens, Profiles and Critique in Social Theory (London: Macmillan,
1982); M. Mann, `Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship', Sociology, 21:3 (August
1987); B. Turner, `Outline of a Theory of Citizenship', Sociology, 24:2 (May 1990); R.
Plant, `Citizenship, Rights, and Welfare', in The Welfare of Citizens: Developing New
Social Rights, ed. by A. Coote (London: Rivers Dram Press, 1992), pp. 17-20.
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seventeenth century, duly guarantees the 'freedom of
speech, rights to a fair trial and equal access to the
legal system, ,M7 and have been embodied to 'law court'.
Political rights, which had developed since eighteenth
century, are the direct results of the political
struggles of the working class, and assures the free
election through which various interests of population
can be articulated in the parliament. 108 Whereas these
civil and political rights were `treated as immunities
and (being) seen in terms of procedures such as due
process of law or fair election', `it was in the modern
period that rights came to be seen in terms of rights to
resources (to welfare, health, education, income, and
social security)'. 109
 In fact, until the twentieth
century, such resources as enumerated above remained in
the private market system, and thus there was no rights
to access to the resources. In this regard, the first
principle was brought about by virtue of the enlargement
of comprehensive citizenship throughout the twentieth
century, but particularly intensified and universally put
into operation by the community spirit in the Second
World War.
Secondly, post-war legislation was clearly based on the
concept of `national minimum', which was strongly
proclaimed by Beveridge to ensure that the living stan-
dard of any citizen should not fall below a minimum level
107 B. Turner (1990), op. cit., p. 191.
108 Ibid. p. 191.
109 R. Plant (1992), op. cit., p. 15.
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of living. Undoubtedly it was based on the Marshallian
tradition of citizenship, but it did not necessarily ex-
tend to the resource redistribution between classes.
Rather, the legislation was 'designed to achieve redis-
tribution through a family's or individual's lifetime, to
even out periods of misfortune or non-earning
capacity' In fact the welfare state aims to lessen
social inequality, not by 'redistributing wealth ' but by
'reapportioning the costs of risks and mischance. ,111
Thirdly, one of the main recommendations of the Bev-
eridge report was to unify and simplify the existing
schemes into a stronger centralised administration, and
it was realised into the creation of the Ministry of So-
cial Security. Accordingly, service delivery and finance
of insurance and assistance went through transformation:
from the responsibility of local authorities and some-
times, of friendly societies to that of central govern-
ment. In many respects, this administrative change might
be necessary to operate the universal social provisions
for all in need, irrespective of his or her income, geog-
raphy, race, education and so forth. This sort of stan-
dardisation of services, it can be assumed, was the true
exemplar of the post-war era which can be appraised as
the days of Fordism, firmly connected with Keynesianism.
Fordism was based on mass production and mass consump-
tion of such commodities as cars, shipbuilding, electri-
110 H. Glennerster (1990), op. cit., p. 14.
111 P. Baldwin (1990), op. cit., p. 1.
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cal goods and so on, and accordingly transformed the pat-
terns of individual life into 'standardisation'. This
change of the mode of production and the pattern of con-
sumption duly extended to human needs, and thus they were
seen to be handled by centralised control mechanism. Un-
der such circumstances, both human needs and labour power
became commodities and our well-being came to depend on
our relationship to the cash nexus." 2
 Thus, as far as
the nationwide welfare system was concerned, the
-
centralised control of service delivery and finance
seemed to be absolutely needed for more effective
administration.
In sum, until the consensus was seriously challenged by
the New Right in the late seventies, the Keynes-Beveridge
orthodox had remained unimpaired at least in welfare
sector. The embodiment of the Beveridge report by
subsequent legislations was a very mirror of the post-war
consensus of the British politics. Thus we can duly draw
the assumption that politics decisively mattered on the
development of the British welfare state. The next sec-
tion will deal with the emergence of the new trend of
welfare state occasioned by the change of political cli-
mate: the rise of New Right.
112 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three World of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1990), p. 35.
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2.2.1.3	 New Right and the Reform of Social Security
In the last section we come to the view that 'politics',
among other variables, not only mattered but also was de-
cisive in the development of the welfare state in post-
war Britain. In due course, the Keynes-Beveridge ortho-
doxy, which has theoretically buttressed the post-war
welfare state, had remained virtually intact throughout
the sixties and seventies. However, mainly due to the
recent change of political climate, the welfare system
has gone through radical transformation throughout the
eighties. This section deals with how this recent polit-
ical change is turned into policy, and exemplifies the
salient impact of politics on the changes in the British
welfare system.
Since the main recommendations of the Beveridge Report
had been put into operation by subsequent legislations in
post-war Britain, many attempts have been made to change
the social security scheme in the hope that the amend-
ments would bring the development of welfare to the whole
population as well as less-privileged people. Although
s
the present British social security scheme can be under-
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stood as the result of those accumulated attempts, it is
particularly based on the recommendations of `Reform of 
Social Security' published by Department of Health and
Social Security (DHSS) in 1985.
No report can escape the influence of social, economic
and political circumstances to which it belongs. The Re-
form of Social Security, of course, is not an exception.
It is largely influenced not only by the overall socio-
economic situation of the society but also by the recent
change of political climate. Hence we can assume that to
examine the reports is one of effective ways to under-
stand the present British social security in particular,
and to comprehend the present British welfare situation
as a whole. The reports will be examined in terms of
ideology, principles and practical policies.
Ideology
In terms of ideology, 1980s witnessed a dramatic change
in attitudes to poverty, which was largely occasioned by
the uprising of New Right"3 which, in general, strives to
revive the principle of `competition' in a given society.
Accordingly, more emphasis on `self-reliance', `work in-
-.
113 Like any ideological groups, the New Right encloses wide range of groups and ideas,
and thus there are huge variations within the group. However, they commonly reject
many ideas, practices and institutions, which have been a characteristic of social
democracy for over sixty years. See, A. Gamble (1988), op. cit., pp. 27-31.
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five truly mirror what the far




centives', `market function', `privatisation' has been
paid in the process of policy-making.
This far right-wing current permeated into welfare
sector as well, and can be best exemplified by Needs Re-
form114 published by the Adam Smith Institute. The report
indicates five major weaknesses of the existing social
security system before the reform. These five are:
`excessive costs', `outmoded and inappropriate in a
modern society', `its ideological incompatibility with an
enterprise culture', `its ineffectiveness', and `its
destructive effects on people, by creating welfare
they would maintain the welfare system only to the extent
that it does not conflict with the principle of market
economy.
Meanwhile ideology itself is not only seen in the terms
of abstract and philosophical level, but is being
realized and duly permeated into the concrete level of a
certain policy. It supervises general direction to which
concrete policies pursues and are actualized. Once the
general direction is determined, the details of policies
have come to duly correspond to the basic tenets of ide-
ology . Truly ideology is very central to understand the
enactment and practical operation of social policy. How-
ever we also have to be more cautious to recognise effect
114 Adam Smith Institute, Needs Reform (London: AS!, 1989).
115 Ibid., p. 1.
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of ideology on details of policy because ideology tells
only in a broader fashion. It is in this regard that we
have to continuously examine the interaction between ide-
ology and details of policy.
The rise of right wing ideology relative to social se-
curity scheme is partly due to the firm belief that the
absolute poverty widespread in the first half of twenti-
eth century has been considerably alleviated according to
the national development in general, and the development
of social security scheme in particular. The Green Re-
port clarifies that 'the living standards of those most
dependent on social security benefits can therefore be
seen to have improved over the post-war period and in
this respect a prime object of the social security system
has been achieved, .116 This reflects the recent changes
of attitudes to poverty that poverty is no longer solely
attributed to unequal social structure but to the
individual failure to cope with a changing environment."7
Until recently, a majority of social scientists and
politicians, generally classified into collectivism,
firmly believed that poverty could be considerably pre-
vented and even abolished by the universal provisions of
social security scheme. Hence they commonly give more
weight to the state function, rather than the market
,
function, to solve the poverty problem. In contrast with
this orthodox view on poverty, the Green Paper argues
116 DHSS, Reform of Social Security, Cmnd. 9517 (London: HMSO, 1985), para. 4.4.
117 It is best exemplified by the principle of twin pillars (state and individual)
addressed in the report.
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that `the Government are conscious that social security
cannot provide a cure-all' , 118 and it continues that
`social security can not prevent the causes of poverty,
it can only alleviate the symptoms, 	 , This can only
be done by creating the conditions for sustained and real
economic growth' •h19
It is widely accepted that the intellectual tradition
of the New Right is derived from the juxtaposition be-
tween two interrelated, but often antagonistic, thoughts:
Liberalism and Conservatism. Whilst the former takes
more emphasis on `free will of the individual' (free
economy), the latter gives more weight to `law and or-
der' 120 and I patriotism 121 (strong state).
However, the New Right tends more toward Conservatism,
though many policies of New Right politics are relied on
Liberal ideas and associates. Andrew Gamble denotes the
118 OHSS, Cmnd. 9517, para. 6.14
119 Ibid., para. 6.15
120 The Conservative's faith in 'law and order' seems to be in conflict with the 'free
will of individual' of Liberalism. However, they would argue: 'but that freedom which
would exist outside the law - the unregulated freedom of all to pursue their ends at
the expense of others - would be excessive and destructive. By accepting the
limitations of the law man can enjoy an infinitely greater freedom. The authority of
the law is thus the precondition of liberty' B. Jones, "The Anatomy of Conservative
Thought', in Topics in British Politics, ed. by L. Robins (London: Political Education
Press, 1987), P. 83.
121 As well, the other pillar on which the Conservatism is rested is 'appeal to
patriotism'. They reject ideal internationalism, and seek to unite into one nation
. beyond geographical, class and ethnic differences amongst people. However, the
essential nature at their heart is 'inequality'. According to the definition by P.
Norton and A. Aughey, 'Conservatism may be deemed the intellectual justification of
inequalities in society and the preservation of the privileges that such inequalities
entail'. See, P. Norton and A. Aughey, Conservatives and Conservatism (London: Temple
Smith, 1981), p. 47.
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reasons why the state should be strong in the recent New
Right politics:
1. to unwind the coils of social democracy and
welfarism which have fastened around the free
economy;
2. to police the market order;
3. to make the economy more productive;
4. to uphold social and political authority. U2
On the basis of the strong state strategy, m
 they
pursue to retain the authority of law and institutions of
the Government on the one hand, and to keep up the high
productivity in the economy on the other hand.
Undoubtedly, their dual-pursuit would be realised only
through the implementation of the efficient and
legitimate policies. However, the difficulties that they
face is 'how that ideal is to be realised in the world
they actually inhabitf.124
In this regard, the Reform of Social Security of 1985
specifies us how their ideas get turned into the policy,
and how they try to implement it in the real world.
Principles
Principles underlying the Green Paper can be divided into
three categories: firstly, the principle of 'twin p11-
122 A. Gamble (1988), op. cit., p. 32.
123 They duly reject the revival of the Laissez-faire
124 A. Gamble (1988), op. cit., p. 32.
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lars'	 (state and individual); secondly, that of
'targeting'; and thirdly, that of 'effectiveness'.
Taking the first principle first, the twin pillars ap-
proach is one of the most fundamental motives to change
the overall existing social security scheme. Accordins
to the Green Paper, 'fundamental to this approach (twin
pillars approach) is a belief that the system of social
security provision should be based on a clear understand-
ing of the relative roles and responsibilities of the in-
dividual and the state'. It continues, 'in building for
the future we should follow the basic principle that so-
cial security is not a function of the state alone. It is
a partnership between the individual and the state a
system built on twin pillars'. 125
 The basic aims of this
principle are to encourage the work incentives and sav-
ings of individuals, and accordingly to improve the self-
responsibility, self-reliance, and probably most impor-
tantly, the independence of them from the state provi-
sions.
The basic logic of the principle of twin pillars can be
justified on the ground that most people are willing to
be independent from state provisions. As the report
says, 'The spread of home ownership among those previ-
ously relying on public provision of housing underlines
the wish of most people for greater independence'.
125 DHSS, Cmnd 9517, para. 1.5.
126 Ibid., para. 1.8.
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In accordance with this principle, the Green Paper
recommends to retain a contributory system for . contingen-
cies like retirement, unemployment and long-term sick-
ness. As well, in regard to housing benefit, the Green
Paper thoroughly agrees to the Government's view, 	 • • •
every household should be required to make some contribu
tion toward them. This would mean that the maximum level
of rate rebate in a reformed scheme would be set at less
than 100 per cent. The Government have in mind a figure
of the order of 80 per cent' . 127 It means that 20 per
cent of rate should be financed by contribution.
Meanwhile, to encourage the savings and work incen-
tives, the Green Paper recommends to increase the limita-
tion of maximum of savings (up to £6,000) entitled to re-
ceive Income Support. 128
 And to encourage the work incen-
tives of young people, a low rate is recommended to be
applied to those under 25 years old in Income Support.
Scheme.129
Accordingly, the most serious losers occasioned by the
reform of social security would be young people without
children. The Green Paper recommends and proposes the
alternative way, namely the Youth Training Scheme;
'There will be a major expansion of the Youth Training
Scheme from April 1986 to provide two years of work-re-
lated training for 16 year-old school leavers and one
127 Ibid., para. 9.20.
128 However, the benefit will be reduced on a simple sliding scale for those with savings
between £3,000 and £6,000. See, Ibid., para. 9.7.
129 Whilst those over 25 years old can receive full provision (£30.60 p.w.), age group
18-24 can receive £24.00 p.w., and age group 16-17 can receive only 08.20 p.w.
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year for 17 years old school-leavers, leading to a recog-
nised vocational qualification'
Interestingly enough, the prospect of this principle
would be threatened by criticisms from far-right wings.
According to the recent proposals from No Turning Back
Group of Tory MPs, `The welfare state should be replaced
by a system of social insurance run by private agen-
cies'. 131 It is very evident that their approach is not
only unpopular to the public but also too radical to be
realized. However its major importance is laid on the
fact that some groups, which advocate the welfare scheme
run by the principle of market economy, are actively par-
ticipating in policy-making processes, and their politi-
cal influences have been growing very fast, according to
the nationwide process of privatisation. Hence the suc-
cess of this principle largely depends on the question of
how to deliberately harmonise the sectional group inter-
ests and keep the balance between twin pillars, the state
and individual.
The second principle is the principle of `targeting'.
It is designed and proposed on the ground that `the so-
cial security system must be capable of meeting genuine
need'. 132 It goes without saying that the social security
scheme should be based on needs, aim to meet needs, and
duly be elaborated in accordance with the changes of
need. Accordingly, the Green Paper clearly suggests that
130 Ibid., para. 9.27.
131 Financial Times, 17 September 1990.
132 DHSS, Cmnd 9517, para. 1.12.
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resources be focused on the low-income families with
children, `Now the position has changed again and in 1985
it is families with children who face the most difficult
problems'. 133
 Accordingly, it argues that `We believe
that resources must be directed more effectively to areas
of greatest need, notably low-income families with chil-
dren' .U4
Meanwhile this principle is closely related to the ar-
gument of `Universalism versus Selectivity' which hag
been traditionally influenced by political agenda and,
more broadly, ideology. Borrowing from the terms of Vic
George and Paul Wilding, such anti-collectivists as Mil-
ton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics are tra-
ditionally advocates of selectivity, whilst Fabians and
Marxists largely prefer to universal provisions. This
debate is particularly important in the study of poliCy-
making process because the ideology is deeply rooted in
any detailed form of policy. In terms of the principle
of targeting, we can find plausible examples of how ef-
fectively the ideology has come to influence a certain
policy. The `targeting' is undoubtedly a pure form of
selectivism which inevitably brings `stigma' to targeted
133 It argues that the group of people with most difficult problems has changed according
to the changes of socio-economic situations; the working-age families in the 1930s to
pensioners by the 1950s and 1960s, and the low-income families with children. Ibid.,
para. 1.12. The single most important cause of this shift of most suffered group is
higher unemployment. And the number of families with children on low incomes, one-
parent families and single unemployed people has increased greatly. See, Ibid., para.
4.8.
134 DHSS, Reform of Social Security: Programme for Action Cmnd. 9691 (London: HMSO,
1985), para. 1.6
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people. However we have to be more cautious to classify
a certain policy into `universalism' or `selectivity'.
Actually there has been no purely universal social wel-
fare provisions in practice. For example, child benefit,
which has been frequently regarded as universal benefit,
is paid only to the families with dependent children. As
well, the National Health Service seems to be more in
line with universalism, but a prescription card is now
selectively provided to specific groups and many cate-
gories of people are exempt from charges. 135
 Hence what
is at issue in this principle is to recognise the overall
direction of value system (universalism or selectivity)
inherent in the social security reform.
The third principle, the principle of I simplication' or
`effectiveness' in administration is based on the as-
sessment of the existing social security scheme before
April 1988. According to Green Paper, `the complexity in
benefit rules has meant that social security is difficult
to administer and at times impossible for the public to
understand', 136
 and thus `the social security system must
be simpler to understand and easier to administer'. 137
 It
evidently reflects the recent issues held central to re-
form of social security, how to efficiently deliver the
benefit to recipients, how to effectively inform the de-
135 K. Jones, J. Brown and J. Bradshaw, Issues in Social Policy (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1983), revised ed. Special attention to chapter three 'Universality and
Selectivity,.
136 DHSS, Cmnd. 9517, para. 1.2. The report illustrates the overlap between social
security and income tax.
137 DHSS, Cmnd. 9517, para. 1.12.
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tails of provisions to recipients, and how to economi-
cally cut down the administration costs through utiliza-
tion of modern technology, `computer'.
The Green Paper recommends the computerisation of all
clerical and manual works of social security from DHSS to
local offices. To utilise computers in the field of so-
cial security corresponds not only to the notion of
`effective and small government' but also to modern way
of life. As a matter of fact, technological advance, in-
cluding computers, telecommunication networks and so on,
rapidly increases the effectiveness of all sectors of
modern society, and moreover, considerably changes the
nature of society itself. Seen in this light, there is
no doubt about that `there is absolutely no reason why
social security should be left behind'. 138 Here the Green
Paper clarifies Government's intention to utilise modern
technology in order to administer the system more effi-
ciently: `We are now to embark on a strategy to make full
use of information technology in bringing the system up
to the standards of the late twentieth century'.139
Meanwhile the Green Paper indicates the possible side-e'
effects of utilising modern technology to the social se-
curity scheme; `Computerized records and procedures on
such a massive scale could be open both to misuse and
fraud', uo
 and `It (computerisation) can also increase the
138 DHSS, Reform of Social Security: Programme for Change, Cmnd. 9518 (London: HMSO,
1985), para. 6.20.
139 DHSS, Cmnd. 9517, para. 6.5.
140 DHSS, Cmnd. 9518, para. 6.36.
82
vulnerability of the system to internal fraud/Y0
 Hence
how to protect individual right of confidentiality is
particularly important not only because it is connected
with technological advance to devise safeguard method but
also because it is thoroughly dependent on professional
ethics of civil servants and social workers. The success
of this principle largely depends on how skilfully they
prepare for the possible probleis which might be borne
out by computerisation. Above all, it has very valuable
implications for the development of welfare system in de-
veloping countries.
Policies
The aim of this section is to examine how the principles
of the reform of social security have been implemented in
the present British pension schemes. In this regard, the
changes of State Earnings-Related Pension (SERP), Income
Support, Social Fund, Family Credit, and Housing Benefit
will be discussed in detail.
(i) State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme.
The British pension scheme has developed since the begin-
ning of this century. In 1908, state pension scheme,
based on the non-contributory and means-tested, was
141 DHSS, Cmnd. 9518, para. 6.38.
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firstly introduced as a national pension scheme for the
elderly (over 70). The first contributory old age pen-
sion without a means tests was introduced in 1926. In
1940, supplementary means-tested pensions were introduced
as wel1. 142 However it is the Beveridge Report of 1942 on
which the main framework of current insurance scheme is
based.
Actually his plan for social security was essentially a
plan of insurance. In return for contribution, benefits
would be given as of right and without a means test.143
However his proposal went through absolute modification.
-
First of all, the transitional period of twenty years has
not been kept on account of the pressure to provide a
benefit on the full scale at once, and accordingly the
pensions were financed purely on a pay-as-you-go basis by
the end of 1950s. 144
 Secondly, the principle of flat-rate
contribution has changed to the earnings-related
contributions by the National Insurance Act of 1959.145
The importance of 1959 Act is laid on the fact that it
recognised the role of the private sector in providing
second tier pensions by allowing occupational pension
schemes to 'contract out f . 146 Based on these amendments
142 For brief explanations of the historical background of the provisions for retirement,
refer to DHSS, Cmnd. 9518, para. 1.2 - para. 1.11.
143 DHSS, Cmnd. 9517, para. 2.6.
144 DHSS, Cmnd. 9518, para. 1.5.
145 Ibid., para. 1.6.
146 The `contract out' was newly developed method that, `if an employer could demonstrate
that he offered employees pensions equivalent to the maximum available under the state
graduated scheme, his employees did not have to join the state scheme , . See Ibid.,
para. 1.8.
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and changes, the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme
(SERPS), which built an earnings-related pension onto the
existing basic pension.147
However, the existing SERPS (before April 1988), un-
derwent a siege on account of these following defects.
According to the Reform of Social Security, first of all,
the cost of the scheme is extremely high. The report
projects that the spending on pensions which is £15.4
billion today will have reached £17.9 billion by 1993 and
£45 billion by 2033, if basic pensions are uprated in
line with prices. 145 Furthermore, the report indicates
the increasing burden of the contributor that in 2035 the
number of national insurance contributors paying for each
pensioner's benefits will be 1.6 (now 2.3 per pen-
sioner). 149 Besides, the scheme neglected the pensioners
who retired before 1978, has done nothing to encourage
the spread of the occupational pension cover, and most
importantly, is remarkably expensive and badly targeted
as a way of reducing reliance on supplementary benefit."°
Hence it is very evident that the SERPS should be
changed, whether be it thoroughly abolished or modified.
Meanwhile the government approaches this problem very de-
liberately by way of modifying it as follows:151
147 Ibid., para. 1.12.
148 The report projects that the spending on pensions which is £15.4 billion today will
have reached 07.9 billion by 1993, ..., £45 billion by 2033, if basic pensions are
uprated in line with prices. DHSS, Cmnd. 9517, para. 7.7
149 DHSS, Cmnd. 9691, para. 2.4.
150 DHSS, Cmnd. 9517, para. 7.7.
151 The White Paper clearly argues that it would modify the SERPS, rather than phasing it
out to reduce the cost. DHSS, Cmnd. 9691, para. 2.13.
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1. the state additional pension should be based
on life time earnings,
2. occupational scheme contracted out of the
state scheme should be responsible for increasing
guaranteed minimum pensions after award in line
with prices up to a maximum of 3 percent.
3. additional pensions will be calculated on the
basis of 20 per cent of earnings, rather than 25
per cent.
4. the amount of state earnings-related pension
that can be inherited by a spouse will be one
half, rather than up to the full amount as now.152
Undoubtedly, the very central theme of modifying SERPS
is held on the encouragement of occupational and personal
pension scheme. To fulfil this purpose, the Government
intends that various incentives for occupational and per-
sonal pension schemes be devised and introduced.
Favourable tax for savings through pension schemes and
contract out rebate are in force to increase the incen-
tives for them.
(ii) Income Support
As has been examined previously, the complexity and inef-
fectiveness are the main reasons to introduce the new
scheme. The Green Paper indicates the main problems of
Supplementary Benefit as follows, 'first, it is too com-
plex, second, the basic purpose of the scheme tends to be
swamped by the extra addition to it, third, the scheme
does not target resources to those who need help most as
152 Ibid., para., 2.15.
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effectively as it could,.153 Hence it might be inevitable
to replace the complex Supplementary Benefit with Income
Support which can be as 'a non-contributory benefit,
(which) is payable to anyone aged 18 (or in some circum-
stances 16) or over who has left school and is not in a
remunerative (24 hours a week or more on average) work to
the extent that their income and capital (if any) fall
short of their requirements'.154
Undoubtedly, the Income Support appears to be the typ-
ical form of social assistance scheme in all respects.
However, compared with other social assistance schemes,
Income Support has a number of characteristics which are
normally distinguished from them, especially from Supple-
mentary Benefit. Firstly, in regard to personal al-
lowances, only two variables, age and marital status, are
taken into consideration to decide the amount of al-
lowances. Thus the householder / non-householder dis-
tinction and the ordinary / long-term rate distinction
are no longer applied in calculating the allowances.
Secondly, in addition to personal allowances, premium is
paid to specific groups, pensioners, disabled, and lone
parents. This basic structure (personal allowance + one
premium ) of Income support is very effective to adminis-
ter, and to direct resources to the people who have the
greatest needs. Thirdly, Income Support generally pro-
poses more generous eligibility. In terms of capital,
153 DHSS, Cmnd. 9517, pares. 9.2., 9.3., and 9.4.
154 The Family Welfare Association, Guide to the Social Services 1990 (London: FWA,
1990), 78th ed., p. 143.
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whereas those who had excess of £3,000 of capital of Cap-
ital were not eligible to receive Supplementary Benefit,
those who have below £6,000 of capital are now able to
receive Income Support.
In the making of the main framework and the details of
Income Support, we have come to draw attention to the
fact that three principles (twin pillars, targeting, ef-
fectiveness) have thoroughly permeated to the objectives
of income support in more detailed form. 155
 In a broader
fashion, the Income Support can be estimated as an ad-
vanced scheme of social assistance, for it is basically
designed to align with computerisation, to direct re-
sources to most needed people, and to encourage work-in-
centives of poor people. Its basic structures, main con-
tents, and major orientations can be very good references.
to the building of social assistance in developing coun-
tries.
(ii)	 Family Credit
Family Credit which replaced Family Income Supplement
from April 1988 is payable to the families with one or
more children where at least one partner is working a
minimum 24 hours a week. 156 As was examined previously,
one of the fundamental aims of reform of social security
155 Refer to the six objectives in the making of the Income Support. See, DHSS, Cmnd.
9518, para. 2.70.
156 The Family Credit is available to both the employed and the self-employed. The
Family Welfare Association (1990), op. cit., p. 142.
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is to direct resources to those who are in greatest
needs. The Government clearly identified them with low-
income families with children. In line with the Income
Support which also takes attention to low-income families
(who are normally out of work) with children, Family
Credit purports to help 'those in work and to ensure that
families on relatively low earnings are better off in
work than when unemployed'.157
Generally the family whose net income is below a cer-
tain level of threshold (£57.60, 1990) is eligible to re-
ceive maximum credit. It is available only 26 weeks to
increase work-incentives of low-income families. In
terms of delivery system of the scheme, the Government
planned to pay credit through the wage packet. However
it has been criticised by the Social Security Advisory
Committee and by feminists as well, on account of the.
fear that the children might suffer when the wage earner
(who will usually be the father) would not pass the cash
on to the mother. 158
 Although wage-packet payment was
primarily proposed to increase the coordination between
the social security scheme and tax system, the Government
decided to withdraw the original plan. Whereas it is one
of the examples that original plans can be changed on ac-
count of public opinion. It would be very implicating to
the process of welfare policy making in developing coun-
tries.
157 DHSS, Cmnd. 9691 (White Paper), para. 3.65.
158 Ibid., para. 3.76.
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(iii) Housing Benefit
The reform of Housing Benefit is based on the independent
Review Team's recommendations that the rules for the new
income support scheme should be used to assess entitle-
ment to housing benefit, households on income support,
and all others on similar levels of income, should be
able to get the maximum level of assistance with their
eligible rent and rates and the local authorities should
continue to administer the scheme but more comprehensive
management control and information systems should be de-
veloped. 159 These recommendations are generally accepted
by the Government and supported by most commentators.
Amongst them, the most salient features of the reform
of Housing Benefit would be that assistance with rent and
rate would be integrated within a coherent system of in-7.
come-related benefits. m It was closely aligned to the
principle of effectiveness, and also was widely supported
by both recipients and staffs.
Meanwhile, in regard with practical assistance, it
provides 'the same level of help with rent and rates for
people at the same level of net income, regardless of
whether or not a person is on income support' ;161 For the
159 Besides, the committee recommended a contribution toward the cost of domestic rate,
simper formula to be reduced for households above income support levels, and more
comprehensive safeguards against excessive or unnecessary benefit expenditure. See
Ibid., para. 3.45.
160 Ibid., para. 3.47.
161 The Family Welfare Association (1990), op. cit., pp. 148-9.
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households whose income is above the certain level of
amounts, 'maximum housing benefit is reduced by a per-
centage (a taper) applied to the amount by which net in-
come exceeds the claimant's applicable amount' .162
(iv) Social Fund
The most fundamental change occasioned by the reform of
social security would be, of course, a great simplication
of administration. Undoubtedly this change would be more
advantageous if it were to direct limited resources to
those with greatest need, to increase effectiveness in
administration, and to align the social security scheme
with the technological advance of other sectors.
However there could be a group of people whose special
needs has not been fully met by the simpler social secu-
rity scheme. The more effective and simpler the social
security would be, the more carefully and deliberately
it prepare for all contingent cases. 163 In order to re-
spond the special needs more effectively, the Social Fund
is divided into two parts: the regulated payments which
are Maternity, Funeral and Cold Weather Payments, and the
discretionary payments, Community Care Grants for people
on Income Support, Budgeting Loans and Crises Loans.1"
162 Ibid., p. 149.
163 Green Paper argues that l it will be necessary to provide for the exceptional
circumstances and emergencies faced by a minority of claimants and to help those who
find difficulty in managing their resources and budgeting'. DHSS, Cmnd. 9517, para.
9.8.
164 For more details of the these benefits refer to The Family Welfare Association, op,
pp. 122-25.
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The Social Fund is administered locally by appointed
officers (social fund officer) who receive training in
the range of social security benefits, the functions and
powers of other agencies, advice on financial and budget-
ing problems, and interview techniques. 165 They would fo-
cus for liaison with social services and social work de-
partment, health authorities and voluntary agencies.
Concluding Remarks
It is fair to say that the Reform of Social Security is
aligned to the recent ideological change in many re-
spects. The commitments to 'self-reliance', Iwork-incen-
tives', and `effectiveness' are strongly reflected into
the changes of social security system. It is, of course,
occasioned by the changes of the surroundings: the
changes in politics.
In this regard, the recent changes of the British so-
cial security system exemplify how political ideas get
turned into welfare policies. Thus, we could assume that
the change of welfare policy is determined not only by
the needs assessment for administrators, recipients and
the public, but also by the ideological commitment of
politics.
165 DHSS, Cmnd. 9691 (White Paper), para. 4.42.
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2.2.2
	 Third World Welfare Systems
There have been numerous arguments and writings about the
backward economies since the ages of discovery of the New
Continent, although the term 'Third World' is of quite
recent origin.
One of the pioneering discourses about the basic sur-
roundings of these countries probably is the Hobson-Lenin
thesis. Although they accord central importance on the
idea that capital accumulation in the periphery was
brought about in an attempt to resolve the inevitable
failure of the capitalist system, there is sizable dif-
ference between the work of Lenin and that of Hobson.
Whilst Hobson sees the periphery as markets for the com-
modities of the metropolis, Lenin argues that coloniali-
sation should be seen as a profitable investment opportu-
nities to alleviate the declining rate of profit in the
metropolis.166
Irrespective of whether or not the thesis is sustain-
able in modern societies, it is fair to say that they
widened the views of capital relation to international
context. Moreover, no one would deny that the underlying
theme of the thesis that centre countries assume dominant
166 Lenin modified his previous view that there would be eventually an equalisation of
rates of profits between the metropolis and the periphery. In his later work he saw
the Imperialism as a particular stage of capitalist development, and thus it should be
seen as a combination of monopoly and colonialism. See, I. Roxborough, Theories of Un-
derdevelopment (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 55-7.
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control in shaping the course of periphery economies is
of key importance in any further attempt to analyse Third
World countries. In regard to this dependent situation,
Jones succinctly argues that:
At least we (Western people) have been free to
steer our own course, whether it is in the
direction of balanced and equitable development or
not. Many less developed countries are locked into
a form of reciprocity with us in which their
stagnation is a precondition for our progress.w
Although it still is a matter of debate whether their
stagnation is a precondition of development of the West-
ern economies or not, Jones' argument provides us with a
good starting point for further discussion of Third World
countries. Quite clearly, the point is that explanation
for underdevelopment of these countries lies in large
part with the historical fact that they could not shape
the course of their economies in their own favour.
Sharma and Rubin vividly describe this unequal relation-
ship between North and South as follows:
A persistent complaint of the Third World nations
has been that the current international economic
institutions are weighted in favour of the devel-
oped countries of the North and that decision-mak-
ing in these institutions has been controlled
primarily by a few rich nations.
167 H. Jones, ‘Some Factors in Third World Social Policy', Social Policy &
Administration, 17:2 (1983), p. 107.
168 S. Sharma and G. K. Rubin, 'New International Economic Order: Some Premises and Bases
of Social Welfare in the Third World Nations', Social Development Issues, 8 (1984), p.
127.
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Most colonies were l agriculturalised', rather than
'industrialised', under the full command of the interests
of metropolis countries. To name a few examples, the Ko-
rean economy during the colonial period was designed to
meet the demand of Japanese militarism; the agricultural
sector of the Southern region remained to supply military
rations. In India, existing textiles and ship-building
-
was dismantled in order to prevent competition with Lan-
cashire and the Clyde. Accordingly, the percent of the
population in the agricultural sector of India increased
from 61% in 1891 to 73% in 1921.169
Undoubtedly, colonialism was not specific to economic
exploitation. Rather, it is fairer to say that the un-
equal economic relationship between the metropolis and
the periphery was only one part of the colonial rule. It
began with the cultural or religious superiority which
led to the commitment that more civilised countries
should spread and diffuse their civilisation to the prim-
itive and barbarian countries. This commitment soon
transformed into Social Darwinism that persistently keeps
the faith in the doctrine of 'the survival of the
fittest'. Implication of this doctrine is the idea that
'human beings could acquire the prerequisites of social
development, not just via religious conversion, but
through learning European ways'.m
169 See, P. Worsley, The Third World: Culture and World Development (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1984), p. 16.
170	 Ibid., pp. 16-7.
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The post-war period widely witnessed the emergence of
the newly independent nations which now constitute the
Third World. Their political independence soon led to
the optimistic views that they would achieve economic de-
velopment in similar ways what European countries had
Rostow's work of The Stages of Economic
Growth, 172 with its sensational subtitle, Non-Communist
Manifesto, is a direct application of the Social
Darwinism into the 'development' of developing countries.
However, it is reasonable to say that the blueprint of
the 'development' has rarely been realised in the Third
World since then, and most importantly, their economic
situations, after over forty years time of their
independence, vary very widely.
In fact, the terminology of 'Third World' m inevitably
conveys an over-simplistic impression. Moreover, recent
changes in World politics such as the collapse of the
Second World and the rapid advance of Newly Industrialis-
ing Countries (NICs) make the terminology less meaning-
ful. Although the message of the North and South divi-
171	 Their optimism was reinforced by the fact that they now could control their natural
resources according to their own interests. It soon developed to the 'natural resource
nationalism' in Latin American countries.
172 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960). See also W. W. Rostow, The World Economy: History
and Prospect (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).
173	 In 1952, Alfred Sauvy named the term, the 'Third World', modelled on the Third
Estate of the French Revolution. However it was not until the mid-60s that the term
was generally used. Originally, it did not only refer to the newly independent
countries, nor only to the poor countries, but to political entity that did not belong
to either First World or Second World. See, N. Harris, The End of the Third World: 
Newly Industrialising Countries and the Decline of an Ideology (London: Penguin Books,
1987), P. 18.
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sion still endures today, we have to take into considera-
tion about the dangers of such dichotomy as well.
First of all, it is likely that such dichotomy usually
puts us in danger of, so we call, 'tyranny of the whole
over the part'. In the case of the North versus South
dichotomy, there is no ground to identify one individual
country with other developing countries since 'the na-
tions which may be loosely described as developing vary
enormously in their social and economic as well as their
cultural and political characteristics'.174
Secondly, such a dichotomy usually disregard or under-
estimate the social, economic and political attitudes of
the social forces of individual countries. Therefore, it
'fails to account for the fact that Third World elites,
pursuing class interests, often adopt First World per-
spectives, and that a great many scholars and practition-
ers of development from the First World choose to iden-
tify with the nonelites of the Third World'.175
Thirdly, since the genesis of this way of thinking can
be found in the ages of the crusades when the world was
divided into two part, Christian Territory and non-Chris-
tian territory, the moral superiority of First World to
its counterpart has been deeply rooted in North/South di-
vision. Thus, this static dichotomy view cannot explain
174 M. Hardiman and J. Midgley, The Social Dimensions of Development (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1982), p. 9.
175 J. K. Black, Development in Theory and Practice: Bridging the Gap (Oxford: West View,
1991), p. 23.
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the changes of individual countries such as the rapid
economic development of some Third World countries.
Quite simply, the broad similarities of Third World
countries should not blind us to grasp the particular as-
pects of individual ones. It means that the specific
historical background of the individual countries as well
as their similarities should be taken into consideration,
for any approach to Third World to be fruitful.
Meanwhile, it is widely accepted that one of imperative
research fields imposed on the academic domain of the
study of social policy is to probe deeply into the dis-
tinct features of welfare system in developing countries
in general.
Originally, this research problem was raised by Howard
Jones who argues that 'their (Western societies) general-
isability has never been tested to the South' .11% After
he raised the question, several attempts have been made
to explain the welfare system of developing countries on
the context of within which it has developed and has been
implemented. It is likely that they commonly call the
application of general interpretations of Western welfare
system to the welfare system in developing countries se-
riously into question.
To put it simply, their attempts have proved to present
serious caveats to the initial idea that general in-
terpretations can be applied to the welfare situation of
developing countries.	 Accordingly, the next research
176 H. Jones (1983), op. cit., p. 106.
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problem can be raised in relation with the question of
`what is the alternative approach to the study of welfare
system in developing countries ?' MacPherson claims that
`there is an urgent need for new approaches which break
with the inappropriate legacy of past'. "7 Moreover, tak-
ing more emphasis on Asian NICs amongst them, Midgley ar-
gues that `social policy in the Asian NICs is ... the
consequences of a variety of casual events which are not
accounted for by established theories' .178
It is in this regard that this section purports to
provide general backgrounds to seek for an alternative
approach to Third World welfare systems. For this
purpose, it will describe general features of developing
countries firstly, and duly discuss their `state' and
`welfare'.
2.2.2.1 General Features of the Third World Countries
A great number of scholars with different academic back-
grounds and ideological preferences have tried to explaia
the basic surroundings of developing countries, and to
provide the competent theoretical framework to generalise
about the common features of the developing countries.
They define the socio-economic political situations of
177 S. MacPherson, `Social Security in Developing Countries', Social Policy & Administra-
tion, 21:1 (1987), p. 3.
178 J. Midgley, `Industrialisation and Welfare: the Case of the Four Little Tigers', So-
cial Policy & Administration, 20:3 (Aut. 1986), p. 225. My emphasis.
99
the developing countries differently, not only because
they came from different academic traditions but also beL.
cause the developing countries vary in their char-
acteristics and these countries are in the process of dy-
namic social changing. However there should be some com-
mon natures of developing countries, distinct from the
advanced Western countries, and we will discuss them in
terms of legacy of colonialism, population, poverty, nat-
ural resources, military burden and international poli-
tics.
Legacy of Colonialism
It is commonly argued among the students of development
studies that not only during the colonial period but also
in the post-colonial period, the newly independent coun-
tries have come, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or
involuntarily, into politico-economic contact with the
colonial countries. In the post-independence phase, the
economic, political and administrative vacuums resulting
from the lack of capital, the backwardness of technology,
and the vacancy of the personnel including administra-
tors, educators and clergies, caused by the departure ot
colonial power, was tremendously detrimental to national
development. In regard to the economic situation during
the initial phase of independence, there has been no eco-
nomic class with initiative which could steer the na-
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tional economy toward development. Because the pre-capi-
talistic mode of production was prevalent during the
colonial period, the indigenous capitalists were immature'
and , consequently, the working class was also very
small. On the other hand, although a considerable number
of agricultural labours were left in the rural sector,
and the feudal class was able to exercise its political
power, agricultural landlords and labours were not polit-
ically organised and economically united. Here, we can
assume that the colonial forces were detrimental to na-
tional development even after the independence phase, not
only because they created the socio-economic political
vacuums but also because they destroyed the infrastruc-
ture of autonomous development during the colonial pe -
riod.
In this situation, the newly independent countries had
to establish economic relationship with the developed
countries to pursue their national development. This
economic relationship, unequal in most cases, was very
crucial for the formation of the characteristics of de-
veloping countries because invested foreign capital de-
manded favourable conditions for capital accumulation
from those countries. In addition, the penetration of•
foreign capital was generally accompanied by forms of
cultural colonialism in order to secure their domination,
to the developing countries constantly.
Not only in the economic sphere, the legacy of colo-
nialism has remained in the state and class structure of
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developing countries after their independence. About the
role of the state, Sobhan enucleates that 'in societies
where the colonial bourgeois has completely overshadowed
and even frustrated the growth of a national bourgeois,
its withdrawal leads to a dramatic escalation in the role
of the state sector'. 179	Accordingly, such writers as,
usiBerch Berberoglu, UM James Petrasi	 Hagen KocT	 Issa
Shiviji, 183 Guillermo O'Donnell ;84 Fred Bloc035 and Nora
Hamilton186 commonly emphasise the role of the state in
the process of development in the Third World countries.
In addition, Berch Berberoglu lays more attention to
the class structure of the Third World countries. He ar-
gues that 'the class structure of post/flea-colonial Third
World social formations have this in common the presence
of a small, weak and constantly threatened, national
bourgeois ... the working class is also small ... there
179 R. Sobhan, `The Nature of the State and its Implications for the Development of
Public Enterprises in Asia', Journal of Contemporary Asia, 9:4 (1979), 410-31.
180 B. Berberoglu, `Toward a Theory of State Capitalist Development in the Third World',
International Review of Modern Sociology, 9 (1979).
181 J. Petras, `State Capitalism and the Third World', Journal of Contemporary Asia, 6:4
(1976), 432-43.
182 H. Koo, World system, Class, and State in Third World Development: Towards an
Integrative Framework of Political Economy', Sociological Perspectives, 27:1 (Jan.
1984), 33-52.
183 I. G. Shivji, `The State in the Dominated Social Formation of Africa: Some
Theoretical Issues', International Social Science Journal, 32:4 (1980), 730-742.
184 G. O'Donnell, `Comparative Historical Formations of the State Apparatus and Socio-
Economic Change in the Third World', International Social Science Journal, 32:4 (1980),
717-729.
185 F. Block, `Marxist Theories of the State in World System Analysis', in Social Change
in the Capitalist World Economy, ed. by B. H. Kaplan (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,
1978).
186 N. Hamilton, `State Autonomy and Dependent Capitalism in Latin America', British 
Journal of Sociology, 32:3 (1981).
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exists a large agricultural sector/.187 Researches within
this line of thinking generally begin with the historical
analysis of the formations of the class structure during
the colonial period and in the initial phase of indepen-
dence, and extends to the sphere of the historical char-.
acteristics of the Third World countries.
Population
Throughout history, the anxiety that the population
growth might exceed the food supply has been deeply
rooted. In Western countries, however, both the increase
of food productivity by technical innovations of agricul-
tural sector and the decline of population growth rate
put an end to this anxiety. By contrast, most developing
countries with few exceptions have difficulty feeding
their population, mainly due to their high rate of popu-
lation growth and the low productivity of food industry.
As is shown in the following, the majority of people is
now living in the developing world and their portion of
world population is growing very rapidly. Thus it is
fair to say that their population problem is not specific
to themselves any more. Truly, it has become a world-
wide problem.
187 B. Berberogu (1979), op. cit. 
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<Table 2-3> Population and Average Annual Growth
Population • Average Annual growth
Country group (millions)	 (percent)




4,226 2.0 1.9 1.4
High-income
economies
821 0.6 0.5 0.2
World 1.7 1.6 1.2
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1992: 
Development and Environment  (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992), p. 196.
In addition to the ever-expanding population of devel-
oping countries, their rapid urbanisation causes critical
inner city problems such as housing, sanitation, pollu-
tion and so forth. In fact urbanisation was assumed as
the prerequisite of and the natural course of capitalist
development during the industrial revolution in Western
countries. The city provided more jobs, chances and
freedom for those who emancipated from the relation of
production in feudalism. However, the urbanisation of
developing countries is somewhat different because it is
'urbanisation without industrialisation Two main
components of the rapid urbanisation are the natural
urban population growth and the internal migration. m Of
the two, the latter merits a special attention, because
it reflects the uneven development between rural and
188 See, P. Worsley (1984), op. cit., Part III, 'The making of the working class'.
189 S. MacPherson, Social Policy in the Third World: The Social Dilemmas of Underdevelop-
ment (Brighton: Wheatsheat, 1982), pp. 119-23.
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urban area, which is very prevalent in developing world.
However, we can and must propose optimistic view of this
situation as well. A considerable number of people with
low labour cost in urban area can be turned into a strong
labour force, if jobs are allowed to them. It would in-
crease the competitiveness especially in the labour in-
tensive industries like textile, foot wear and so forth.
Poverty
Yet behind this facade of population problem, we must see
the poverty held central in any developing countries.
Since the Second World War, economic development has been
a paramount commitment to every Third World governments.
It was widely reckoned to be a firm buttress for reducing
poverty, political independence, and thus national pros-
perity. But the reality is that only a few nations has
manifested considerable economic development. Most of
them are still suffering from severe deprivation and, so.
we call, the vicious cycle of poverty. 190
 What is worse,
it seems highly questionable whether they would achieve
solid economic growth in the near future.
However, as is shown in the following table, they are
expected to have a better economic situation throughout
190 It was estimated that more than one billion people in developing world lived in abso-
lute poverty in 1985. The World Bank, World Development Report 1990: Poverty (Oxford:
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the nineties, although it would be different region to
region in developing world.
<Table 2-4> Annual Growth of GDP per Capita (percent)
Group	 1973-80	 1980-89	 1990s *
Industrial	 2.3	 2.3	 1.8-2.5
countries
Projections
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1991: 
The Challenge of Development (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991), p. 3.
As well, they show diverging performances of reducing
poverty region to region according to their economic de-
velopment. Whilst some rapidly developing region such as
•East Asia is estimated to achieve considerable reduction
in poverty until the end of this century, the poverty of
other region like Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Middle
East, North Africa, Latin America and Caribbean are pro-
jected to rise or to be still high, as is shown in the
following table.
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<Table 2-5> Poverty in 2000 by Region
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the share of the population below the poverty line,
which is set at $370 annual income.
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1990: 
Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 139.
Being faced with widespread poverty in developing
world, the World Bank report strongly recommends two in-
terrelated strategies for reducing poverty in this re-
gion:
The first element is to promote the productive use
of the poor's most abundant asset - labour. It
calls for policies that harness market incentives,
social and political institutions, infrastructure,
and technology to that end. The second is to pro-












health care, family planning, nutrition, and pri-
mary education are especially important.m
The report emphasises the interdependence of the two
strategies, and exemplifies two contrast cases; Brazil
and Parkistan, and Sri Lanka. In the former countries,
although economic growth has raised the income of the
poor, they cannot take full advantage of economic oppor-
tunities, because of its insufficient social services
such as health and education. By contrast, the latter
country, although it has a long tradition of social ser-
vices, the poor have lack of economic opportunity, mainly
due to the slow economic growth.192
There is no doubt that these two strategies are of key
importance in any attempt to economic development of de-
veloping countries. It should be denoted, however, that
the strategy does not by itself makes them prosperous.
These strategies should be transformed into a more sub-
stantial reality. Thus we have to explain how they
should be. turned into practical policy and what sort of
measures should be designed to implement that policy.
Natural Resources
In spite of successful industrialisation of a few Third
World countries, most of them still rest heavily on their
natural resources as a main source of income. 	 Truly,
191 Ibid., p. 3.
192 Ibid., p. 3.
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natural resources have been a prerequisite for the eco-
nomic prosperity of the industrial First World countries,
and thus they have kept a strong relationship with the
developing countries that have abundant natural resources
since the colonial ages.
Webster attempts to divide three groups of countries
according to the natural resources they produce. Latin
American countries with the temperate agricultural
economies fall to the first group. They were highly com-
mercialised by the European business since the last cen-
tury. Secondly, there are tropical economies which were
highly exploited by the Europeans to provide some tropi-
cal products like sugar, coffee and rubber. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, there are some economies whic4
merit a keen interest of the First World countries, be-
cause of their mineral resources which, vital to any in-
dustrial production.193
However, it is apparent that some countries with least
natural resources like East Asian countries have
manifested successful industrialisation, whereas other
economies with abundant natural resources have failed to
industrialise themselves. It gives us a clue about the
driving forces of economic development within a given
context.
193 See A. Webster, Introduction to the Sociology of Development, 2nd edn (London: Macmil-
lan, 1990), pp. 25-6.
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Military Burden
There is a group of writers who try to approach Third
World societies with respect to the military burden.
Among others, Peter Hess, 194
 Emile Benoit Basudeb
Biswas and Rati Ram, 196
 David Lim; 97
 and Peter Fred-
erikson and Robert Looney 198 commonly examine the
relationship between the socio-economic development and
the military burden of developing countries. Peter Hess
argue that 'real national income per capita in the
developing nations has roughly doubled over the past
-
quarter century, however real per capita military
expenditure has tripled'. w9 Although the military burden
of the individual country largely depends on the military
situation surrounding it, this general feature of the
military burden of the developing countries is much
suggestive of the economic relationship between the
developed countries and developing countries as well as
the military relationship between them.
194 P. Hess, `The Military Burden, Economic Growth, and the Human Suffering Index: Evi-
dence from the LDCs i , Cambridge Journal of Economics, 13 (1989), 497-515.
195 E. Benoit, 'Growth and Defense in Developing Countries', Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 26:2 (1978), 271-80.
196 B. Biswas and R. Ram, `Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in Less Developed
Countries: An Augmented Model and Further Evidence', Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 34:2 (1986), 361-72.
197 D. Lim, 'Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries', Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 31 (1983), 377-84.
198 P. C. Fredericken and R. E. Looney, 'Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in De-
veloping Countries: Some Further Empirical Evidence', Journal of Economic Development,
7 (1982), 113-26.
199 P. Hess (1989), op. cit., p. 497.
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The following table shows defense expenditure of de-
veloping countries in comparison with the two super power
bloc.
<Table 2-6>	 Defense Expenditure, 1987
Total defense Defense spending Defense spending
spending	 as share of	 as share of GNP
(billion,$)	 central govern-	 (%)
ment budget (%)
NATO	 446.6 15.6 4.9
Warsaw
Pact	 364.5 36.5 10.8
Developing
countries	 172.8 19.2 5.1
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1990: 
Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 17.
It seems clear that the greatest economic benefit of
the increasing military burden of the developing coun-
tries falls to the developed countries. It is widely ac-
cepted that where, in developing countries, other classes
or social organisations are relatively weak, military or-
ganisations enter the political stage with hierarchical
and well-organised forces. Hence the position of the
military forces in developing countries provides us with
a valuable way in which to understand the characteristics
of developing countries. This subject worths being exam-
ining in terms of the study of the social welfare system
since the military expenditure of the developing coun-
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tries is frequently in conflict with the welfare expendi,
ture of these countries.
International Politics
In contrast to the poor economic performance of devel-
oping world since the Second World War, it is noteworthy
that they have persistently increased their political
power in the international politics. Although not widely
recognised, it was the Afro-Asian grouping of the 1950s
that inspired Third World countries to seek for a third,
way, independence from either USA or USSR. Accordingly,
it proclaimed the anti-colonialism for their political
independence and the solidarity between the 'proletarian
nations' in opposition to the developed countries. 200
Under the present one nation-one vote system of United
Nations, their political power has enlarged and what is
more, it seems that it would be more and more important
in the world politics after the collapse of the Second
World. However it is also highly questionable whether
they would unite against developed countries because they
have different historical experiences, different level
and patterns of economies, different political ideology
and thus different interests.
200 For more details, refer to P. Worsley (1984), op. cit., pp. 306-22.
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2.2.2.2	 'State' and 'Welfare' in Third World Countries
It is widely accepted by students of development studies
that the main problem or dilemma in the process of indus-
trialisation of developing countries lies in the fact
that socio-economic conditions for industrialisation must
be created very rapidly by the intervention of the state
within a given context.
Industrialisation proper does not simply refer to
growth of the economic sector, nor is easily made by sim-
ple political intervention. Rather, it obviously re-
flects the long and winding road of technological devel-
opment which made the substitution of inanimate for ani-
mate source of power possible ,201
 political enlightenment,
bureaucratisation and overall rationalisation.
In Western societies, it has proceeded on the basis of
the ideology relevant for capital accumulation, the
fully-arranged infrastructure, the affluent supply of hu-
man and natural resources from both home and abroad, and
probably, most importantly, the piecemeal enlargement of
civil society. Of the ideological terms of those rapidly
industrialising era, the tenet that any political inter-
vention in economic sector would inevitably bring irra-
201 Here the technological development for the industrial revolution implies two interre-
lated terms; machine technology and social technology. For further debates, see R. A.
Peterson, The Industrial Order and Social Policy (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973),
Chapter II.
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tionality, ineffectiveness, and thus immorality has
firmly based throughout the process of industrialisation.
It surely can be named as the ages of 'laissez-faire'.
However, it should be pointed out that no theory or
ideological tenet can escape from the socio-political
context to which it belongs. Undoubtedly, the aforemen-
tioned tenet, which might provide the ideological ground
for industrialisation, has no longer been justified as a
solid ideology in the socio-economic situation of devel-
oping countries, both in theory and in practice.
Roles and tasks imposed on the Third World states, es-
pecially in the initial phase of industrialisation, are
very huge and wide-ranged, from the enlightening of pre-
modern attitudes and minds of people to the establishment
of the relevant industrial infrastructures such as trans-
portations, communications, harbours, and so forth. In
this regard, Tlemcani clearly defines the roles of the
states in the industrialisation of developing countries
as follows:
There is no sector of the reproduction of social
life (in the post-colonial society) where the
state does not intervene either directly or indi-
rectly. It acts as a lawmaker, investor, planner,
importer, exporter, manager, owner, judge and po-
lice officer. The state in post-colonial society
is everything .202
According to the above paragraph, we can presume that
the role of the state in the process of welfarisation of
202 R. Tlemcani, State and Revolution in Algeria (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 13.
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developing countries might be somewhat similar to that of
industrialisation of developing countries, because the
'state in post-colonial society is everything'.
However, no one would say definitely that the role of
the state in welfarisation could be identified with that
of industrialisation in those societies. Even when we
agree to the view that the role of the state is dominant
in every sector, and thus it has taken a supreme role in
welfarisation, we have to be more cautious about the dan-
ger of 'reductionism' which explains the genesis of all
social phenomena by reducing to the state activities. In
fact, we cannot grasp welfare state development of these
countries simply by accepting this view, without scruti-
nizing why, how and to what extent the state has played
in a given context.
The State in Developing Countries
According to the classical interpretations of Marx and
Engels, the state is defined as the 'instrument' of the
dominant class, main function of which is to stabilise
the class antagonism. However it is clear that this
classical notion of the state has a profound limitation
in explaining the various political activities, which may
be appeared to transcend the interest of dominant class,
of the modern state. Hence certain writers on the state
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generally tend to focus their academic quest on the au-
tonomy of the state which is well defined by Nora Hamil-
ton as `the freedom of the state from direct and indirect
control by dominant economic classes and ultimately from
structural constraints' •203
However their research into the autonomy of the state
is generally based on the basic formula of Marx and En-
gels. According to this formula, the state can be under-
stood as a political entity (a form of the superstruc-
ture), which is, or should be, duly corresponding to the
particular stage of the civil society (economic founda-
tion). Hence it is generally accepted by many writers
that the autonomy of the state can usually be derived
from the interrelationship (or dialectic synthesis) be-
tween the state and the civil society.
With respect to the historical background of the emer-
gence of the state, with a few exceptions, the dominant
economic class in the civil society took a decisive role
in the formation of the state apparatus. In this pro-
cess, we can assume that the politico-economic interest'
of dominant class naturally permeated the state appara-
tus. It is in this regard that the autonomy of the state
is described as the `relative'. So, briefly, even though
the state has an autonomy in the political sphere,
largely because its main role is to organise the politi-
cal unity of the segments of the ruling classes, and to
discourage the political organisation of the working
203 N. Hamilton (1981), op. cit., p. 305.
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class, `state managers may pursue their own interests
only to the extent that these do not conflict with those
of the dominant class or threaten the existing social
structure' 204
With respect to the political situation of developing
countries, the autonomy of the state can be explained in
a somewhat different way, both in the internal class
structures and the external (or international) politico-
economic environment. In terms of the internal class
structures the political situation of developing coun-
tries was generally characterised by the confused mixture
of a number of economically and politically immature
classes. In this situation, the state emerged as a form
of alliance of various economic classes. As Berch
Berberoglu argues `within the neo-colonial framework in
post-colonial states, the state is controlled by a coali-
tion of political parties (or a single party) that repre-
sent(s) the class interests of the comprador bourgeois,
the feudal landlord class, and the metropolitan imperial
bourgeois' 205
In this political context in which there is no dominant
class, we can find the possibility of the autonomy of the
state. As well, it is widely recognised that one of the
most favourable conditions can be found in the economic
situation in which a given economy contains more than one
mode of production, and, consequentially, in the politi-
204 Ibid., p. 308.
205 B. Berberroglu (1979), op. cit., p. 20.
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cal situation in which a number of classes are in con-
flict with one another. This notion is based on Marx's
analysis of Bonapartism, which provided a clue in the
study of the relative autonomy of the state.
On the other hand we can abstract the characteristics
of the developing countries from the modes of the in-
vested foreign capital and the implanted foreign culture.
It is clear that the external politico-economic environ-
ment surrounded with those countries has an crucial ef-
fect on the autonomy of the state. Here we can define
the autonomous function of the Third World state as the
state capacity to regulate the political intervention of
the domestic classes, and to independently negotiate the
conditions of the capital investment with the multina-
tional corporations.
A wealth of evidence suggests that one of the most
favourable conditions for the autonomy of the state
emerges `during periods of metropolitan global economic
crises (such as during severe depressions), world wars,
and international catastrophes, where metropolitan powers
become adversely affected , .m
 In relation to this
favourable situation for the state autonomy, Nora Hamil7.
ton argues that `it was during the populist period of the
1930s and 1940s that certain Latin American states proba-
bly came closest to structural autonomy in the sense of
freedom from external constraints and pressures by for-
206 Ibid., p. 21; A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
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eign capital and internal dominant classes1.207	 During*
this period, the nation state can independently establish
the development strategies suitable for its own histori-
cal background. In addition to both conditions
favourable for the autonomy of the state, 'there is a
historical condition that is related to a strong state
bureaucracy in those Third World countries that had colo-
nial experiences' .208
However we raise the question whether Third World coun-
tries, if necessary, can act not only against the do-
mestic classes but also against the foreign capital. A
great number of the writers commonly indicate the limita7.
tions of the autonomy of the state in the Third World
countries. Among them, Hagen Koo argues that 'if the pe-
ripheral state ignores this requirement to maintain a
certain level of business confidence or a favourable
business climate to attract continuous foreign invest-
ment], and act against the interest of international cap-
ital, then it is not just the centre capitalists but also
the centre state that will take certain measures to bring
this recalcitrant state back in line'. 209
 Thus we cannot
definitely assume that the Third World state is able to
enjoy full structural autonomy, because it was created in
the context of dependence on developed countries.
What is at issue on this debate of 'relative autonomy'
of the state in developing countries is whether the state
207 N. Hamilton (1981), op. cit., p. 315.
208 H. Koo (1984), op. cit., p. 43.
209  Ibid., p. 45
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could realise social reform measures including welfarisa-
tion, which seems to be in conflict with the interests of
either foreign capital or domestic capitalist. Further-
more, if so, there still remains a question of whether
the state is fully independent so as to decide the timing
of welfare adoption and the kind and level of welfare
benefit.210
With regard with this subject, Duvall and Freeman's
theme of 'entrepreneurial state' is of quite importance
because of its befitting implication on the newly indus-
trialising countries. They argue that the following are
the main features of the entrepreneurial state:
(1) state ownership of noninfrastructure
enterprises.
(2) the relative importance of capitalist
performance criteria.
(3)the extensive commitment to capitalism.m
The patterns of the capitalist development of South Ko-
rea, for example, are duly in accordance with the three
features of the entrepreneurial state; there have been
widespread state ownership of productive sector like'
steel industry, 212 a strong mission to achieve the eco-
nomic development plan, proposed by the government, and
comprehensive measures to strengthen the capitalist
value.
210 This issue is not necessarily specific to welfare system. It can be widely applied
to any social legislations, designed and implemented by the state.
211 R. D. Duvall and J. R. Freeman, 'The State and Dependent Capitalism', International 
Studies Quarterly, 25 (1981), P- 105-
212 POSCO, for example.
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The point however is whether 'the extensive commitment
to capitalism' is in conflict with the welfare state de-
velopment of some developing countries where political.
elites 'have consistently affirmed their faith in the
virtues of free enterprise, self-reliance and hard work
and frequently declared an aversion to welfarism'.213
In sum, for any research into the state policy of de-
pendent capitalism to be fruitful, it is necessary to
probe into 'the interaction of enduring structure of
(dependent) capitalism and the particular historical sit-
uation in shaping the nature and role of the (dependent)
state, its relative autonomy' .214
Advantages and Disadvantages of Third World Welfare
System
There have been both advantages and disadvantages for the
Third World countries to establish, manage, and sometimes
expand welfare system, compared with the developed coun-
tries. As far as the welfare situation of developing
countries are concerned, there are three prominent disad-
vantages for the making of the Welfare State.
Firstly, the negative aspects of the welfare state in-
cluding low work-incentives, low independence of recipi-
ents, economic recession have been excessively emphasized
213 J. Midgley (1986), op. cit., p. 243.
214 _R. D. Duvall and J. R. Freeman (1981), op. cit., p. 102.
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by the Government and ruling class who commonly disagree
to the overall welfarisation, in order to stir up the
public opinion that the welfarisation necessarily brings
economic drawbacks. True, those negative aspects of the
Western Societies are just the by-products of those soci-
eties in a particular historical context. Thus there is
no logical and empirical ground that those negative as-
pect would emerge in the Third World countries.
Secondly, people are apt to be in excessive anticipa-
tion of 'welfare' that the welfarisation would bring the
whole removal of the social problems. As noted previ-
ously, the welfare system is not designed to solve social
problems, but to soften or alleviate them within its fi-
nancial and political capacity to manage.
Thirdly and lastly, when the forms and techniques of
welfare system developed in the Western Countries are im-
ported in the Third World Countries without any deliber-
ate consideration about relevance, it would also bring
about the technological dependency. The welfare experts
and technocrats educated in the Western Countries, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, are likely to adopt the
Western-typed welfare system and techniques based on the
Western value system in the welfare field of the Third
World Countries. 215
 It evidently detrimental to the de-
velopment of indigenous welfare systems. 216
 As well, it
215 See, J. Midgley (1981), op. cit. 
216 For debates of l indigenisation' of Third World welfare systems, refer, for example,
to D. B. Lasan, "Indigenisation n with a Purpose', International Social Work, 18:1
(1975), 24-6; R. P. Resnick, , Conscientisation: An Indigenous Approach to International
Social Work', International Social Work, 19:1 (1976), 21-9; R. G. Walton and M. M. Abo
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would result in fiasco, when they adopt inappropriate
Western welfare policies, as is indicated by Midgley as
follows:
Even more dubious is the tendency to assume that
the social policies of the industrial societies
can be readily replicated. There are many exam-
ples of the disastrous consequences of adopting
inappropriate Western social welfare policies in
the Third World. Solutions that may be workable
in one society may not be effective in another
and, in any case, impede the discovery of authen-
tic, endogenous responses to social problems.217
It should be pointed out, however, that these adopted
Western system and techniques would contribute to the de-
velopment of welfare system, both in quality and quan-
tity, in the Third World Countries at least if they are
relevant to the historical context of individual coun-
tries. It is the reality that many welfare experts, edu-
cated mainly in United States, of developing countries*
are tending to take more emphasis on the intra-psychi-
atric social work, whilst most of people are suffering
from severe starvation. It surely would gloss over the
acute social problems of those countries.
Thus, when accepting the Western-typed welfare systems
and techniques, they should be modified in accordance
with the peculiar situations of individual developing
countries.
El Nasr, 'The Indigenisation and Authentisation of Social Work in Egypt', Community
Development Journal, 23:3 (1988), 148-55.
217 J. Midgley, 'Approaches to the Study of Third World Social Policy', Journal of Inter-
national and Comparative social Welfare, 1:2 (1985), p. 49.
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It is needless to say that there are plenty of advan-
tages for late-developing countries in the making of wel-
fare state. First of all, welfare experts or planner of
those countries can be more aware of the foreseeable so-
cial illness occasioned by industrialisation, and thus
they can be more deliberately ready for it. Lee argues
about this advantage in her research into the Japanese
Welfare system of the early twentieth century as follows:
For many enlightened bureaucrat-intellectuals who
were fully aware of the advantages of a late-de-
veloping country, the Western experience served as
a kind of early warning system alerting them to
oncoming dangers of social disruption.218
Thus we can assume that they could systematically prepare
for the foreseeable social problems such as crime,
unemployment, inequality and so forth.
Secondly and consequently, they can adopt the advanced
forms and technologies of the Western welfare system,
which considered to be relevant to the situation of de-
veloping countries. It surely provides them more oppor-
tunities to make use.
Thirdly, they also can prepare for the foreseeable neg-
ative aspects borne out by welfarisation. The Western
experience connotes that the overall welfarisation might
bring about the low work incentives, high dependency on
218 Hye Kyung Lee, 'The Japanese Welfare State in Transition', in Modern Welfare States: 
A Comparative View of Trends and Prospects, ed. by Robert R. Friedmann and others (New
York: New York Univ. Press, 1987), p. 246.
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the state, and high public expenditure on welfare sector,
which, at least partly, results in the economic recession
In conclusion, it can not be too careful in employing
the Western-typed welfare system particularly, and in re-
alizing the lessons from them generally. The Chilean
failure of economic development, directly carried out by
the 'Chicago Boys', composed of the faithful followers of
the Chicago School of Economics, clearly exemplifies the
importance of the independent development, and alerts
Third World countries to dangers of 'technical depen-
dency'. They are not the experiment centre for testify-
ing the advanced Western theories, nor are they the re-
cipients of favourable provisions from developed coun-
tries.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the Chilean
failure is not confined to the Latin American countries,
nor is limited solely to economic development. The
legacy of colonialism has been deeply rooted and widely
spread in all sectors of the post-colonial countries. In
fact, it is very hard to deny the influence of developed
countries over developing countries both in theory and in
practice. Thus the main point is 'how to deliberately
adopt the Western welfare system, and how to keep the
balance between the indigenous factor and the foreign
one, without impairing independence ?'
In accordance with this line of argument, the next sec-
tion deals with some Third World welfare strategies; Ba-
sic Needs Approach and the Welfarisation under new in-
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ternational economic order, in order to probe into the
possibilities of applying them into the Third World coun-
tries in general and the East Asian NICs in particular.
Third World welfare strategies
Examined previously, we need an alternative approach,
which would provide a more balanced views to the study of
welfare systems in developing countries, and which hope-
fully would widen the options of the Third World welfare
strategy as well as of the discipline. In this regard,
the following principles, proposed by Jones, would endow
a good guide-line for the Third World welfare systems.
1. Poverty is the central problem.
2. The various aspects of poverty interact.
3. The underdevelopment of Third World countries
is the main cause of poverty.
4. Social welfare provision can make its own
substantial contribution to economic growth.
5. The emphasis on growth must not be allowed to
obscure the importance for policy of non-
economic objectives.
6. Both economic and social welfare policy must
be appropriate to local economic circumstances,
but also to a country's cultural, geographical
and demographic circumstances.
7. The most valuable indigenous social welfare
resources available to the underdeveloped
country is the traditional system of mutual aid
based on the family. 219
219 H. Jones, Social Welfare in Third World Development (London: Macmillan Education,
1990), pp. 2-3.
126
Meanwhile, it is widely recognised that the main
dilemma with which Third World regimes face is placed on
the fact that they have to encourage economic develop-
ment, on the one hand, and have to introduce and expand
welfare system in order to soften the ever-lasting social
conflicts, on the other hand.
Although it still is a matter of debate whether wel-
farisation is in conflict with economic growth, many
Third World regimes usually give priority to making a big
pie rather than distributing it to the population. How-
ever there has been an argument for those interested in
Third World development that economic growth does not
have to be at the expense of the welfare of the people.
Now it becomes more evident that the alternative ap-
proach, developed in accordance with the above argument,
has to be devised as a main framework to the development
of Third World welfare system. Basic needs approach,
strongly recommended by international agencies such as
ILO and World Bank, can be understood as one of these al-
ternatives to solve the dilemma of developing countries
in regard to welfare and economic development.
It is widely accepted that the basic needs approach be-
gan with scepticism about the previous development
strategies of developing countries. Ricardo Lagos
clearly explains the background of the emergence of this
approach as follows; 'the wide recognition of the failure
of economic growth has led to new questions being asked
and to proposals for new strategies which would take
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other objectives as their central aim,.m In addition,
France Stewart argues, `the basic needs approach to de-
velopment is a response to the shortcomings of policies
concentrated on economic growth; it focuses directly on
improving the conditions of life of poor people - in par-
ticular on their need for essential goods and ser-
vices'. ZM
 Thus it can be largely estimated that it
`shifts from the goal of output maximisation to poverty
minimisation ' 222
Put simply, a basic needs approach raises the question
of the existing economic growth strategy which is largely
based on the misleading assumptions: firstly that
`economic growth would spread its benefits widely and
speedily', secondly, that `governments are democratic, or
at any rate are concerned with the fate of the poor', and
finally, that `the fate of the poor should not
cern in the early stages of development'.223
Now `what is basic needs approach?' and `how
effectively performed ?' To answer the first





edly, the basic aim of development is to improve the
level of living conditions of all members of a society:'
It is in this regard that it directly pays attention to
220 R. Lagos, `Introduction: the Satisfaction of Basic Needs as a Development Strategy'
in In Search of Equity: mimeo., p. 1.
221 F. Stewart, `Country Experience in Providing for Basic Needs', Finance & Development,
16:4 (Dec. 1979), p. 23.
222 N. L. Nicks, 'Growth vs Basic Needs: Is There a Trade-off ?', World Development, 7
(1979), p. 985.
223 P. Streeten, First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing
Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 9.
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-providing the basic needs such as 'education, basic
health, nutrition, water and sanitation, and shelter' ,224
with varying degrees from country to country, in order to
'increase and redistribute production so as to eradicate
deprivation that arises from lack of basic goods and ser-
vices'. 25
 As Paul Streeten argues, 'while there is vir-
tually universal agreement on the objective, there is
much disagreement on its precise interpretation and on
the most effective way of achieving it'.226
This debate is closely related to the second question,
'how can it be effectively performed ?' Actually, 'the
differentiating and difficult problems of the basic needs
approach are, probably, neither conceptual (how do we de-
fine and what are basic needs ?) nor narrowly economic,
financial and fiscal (what are the resources required to
meet them ?) but are those of access and deliver'. Zg
 It
is true, compared with the previous development strate-
gies such as 'economic growth strategy' and 'employment
and redistribution strategy', basic needs approach sug-
gests more concrete objectives, builds upon the experi-
ence gained in the past, and carries it a step further. MS
However, there have been several criticisms on basic
needs approach. According to Hicks, the criticisms on ba-p
224 S. J. Burki, `Social Priorities for Meeting Basic Needs', Finance & Development, 17:1
(March 1980), p. 18.
225 P. Streeten and S. J. Burki, `Basic Needs: Some Issues', World Development, 6:3
(1978), p. 413.
226 Paul Streeten (1981), op. cit., p. 8.
227 P. Streeten and S. J. Burki (1978), op. cit., p. 414.
228 See, Ibid., p. 412.
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sic needs approach which directly provides for basic
needs can be divided into two contentions as follows:
First, transfers of essential goods and services
result in increasing the consumption level of the
poor at the cost of eventually reducing the net
level of investment and saving in the economy and
therefore the welfare of everybody. Second, the
poor would be better provided for in the long run
through the higher incomes realized by greater
overall investment under a more conventional,
growth-oriented development strategy.m
Moreover, many local leaders of developing countries
tend to suspect that 'the stress on basic needs will be
used to deny assistance them for infrastructure, moderni-
sation, or industrialisation, ... , may be used by the'
developed countries to divert attention from the North-
South dialogue on the New International Economic Or-
der'T In addition, Hardiman and Midgley, in their
criticisms on unified approaches including basic needs
strategy, argue that 'they (unified approaches) gave lit-
tle practical guidance to planning organisations concern-
ing the implementation of this new approach ... , pro-
vides no guidance on the training requirements, deploy-
ment and professional responsibilities of planners con-
cerned with social welfare issues,
.22"
229 N. L. Hicks, 'Is There a Trade-off Between Growth and Basic Needs V, Finance & De-
velopment, 17:2 (June 1980), P. 18.
230 M. Hag, 'An International Perspective on Basic Needs', Finance & Development, 17:3
(Sep. 1980), P. 33.
231 M. Hardiman and J Midgley (1982), op. cit., p. 21.
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However, they also suggest the possibility of utilizing
the social welfare methodologies for meeting basic needs
as follows:
it is not difficult to reconcile these apparently
antagonistic approaches (social planning approach
including social policy and unified approach in-
cluding basic needs approach) by reaching the ob-
vious conclusion that they should be viewed as
complementary.m
As has been indicated previously, the tasks, with which
basic needs approach face, are the strategies of 'how to
access' and 'how to deliver'. Here we can find the ways
of applying social welfare methodologies for meeting ba-
sic needs, especially in the case of welfare system in
...
developing countries.
As was examined previously, basic needs approach can be
defined as a development strategy which is basically de-
signed for meeting basic needs, such as education, public
health, sanitation, water and shelter, through pubic ef-
forts. Therefore its main strategical aims are placed on
the increase of living conditions of the poor, which in
the long run contribute to the development of national
productivity.
In this sense, it is likely that the aforementioned
dilemma of social welfare with which Third World regimes
face, at least in appearance, would be lessened, when the
basic needs approach can be successfully incorporated
232  Ibid., pp. 21-2.
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with the social welfare methodologies. Proponents of ba-
sic needs approach commonly indicate that the practical
targets to meet basic needs have to be devised and imple-
mented on the basis of the specific national situations.
Like any other social programs, the success of basic
needs approach largely depends upon the questions of `how
skilfully can it be designed for meeting needs ?/, `how
deliberately can it be incorporated with other existing
social programs ?', and `how strategically can it be ori-
ented forward national development ?'
Whereas the basic needs approach proposes rather opti-
mistic views on the development of Third World nations
based on functionalism, the other approach strongly pre-
sents the view that promoting economic and social welfare
in these countries is impossible under the existing in -
ternational order.
The present international economic order is best de-
scribed as the `Bretton Woods System', of which main eco-
nomic institutions are the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (IBRD), and the General Agreement of Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) .m Accordingly the Third World coun-
233 The Bretton Woods system was formed in an attempt to promote the stability of
international economic order under the full commands of the Allied Nations in 1944.
The following are the main purposes of these three institutions:
(1) IMF - 'to stabilize the international monetary system through a system of fixed
exchange rate'.
(2) IBRD - I to promote free flow of capital, goods and services among the participants
of the conference'.
(3) GATT - 'to promote a supportive system of tariffs on goods and products flowing
among the Allied Powers'. See S. Sharma and G. Rubin (1984), op. cit., pp. 126-7.
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tries commonly launched ambitious economic development
plans in the hope that they could derive much benefit
from the post-war international trade order, and thus,
that they could exercise their economic and political in-
fluence to international organisations and developed
countries. As a natural course they have become heavily
more and more dependent on this Bretton Woods system
since it was created in 1944.
Yet there is a wealth of evidence to indicate that the
economic and social development gap between the North de-
veloped countries and the South developing ones remains
very large, and what is worse, it does not seem to be
narrowing in the foreseeable future. Moreover, they come
to recognise that the development aid and strategy deliv-
ered by the advanced countries were sporadic and short-
ranged. v'54 Their expectation to develop their nations in
combining the `welfare' and 'economic development' has
been very far from realisation.
Hence they commonly called the existing international
trade order seriously into question that it, implicitly
and explicitly, obliged them to conform to the interests
of few rich countries. It was widely recognised amongst
the Third World countries that these international eco-
nomic institutions 'encouraged and promoted further in-
ternational economic, technological, and political gaps,
234 S. Sharma and G. Rubin, 'International Economic Order, the WED Debate, and the Third
World Nations', Social Development Issues, 9:3 (Winter 1985), p. 19.
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and exacerbated the domestic and international problems
of Third World nationst.m
Seen in this light, it is not surprising that they
claimed the new international economic order, which is
succinctly described as follows:
The term in fact has three general connotations:
that there is something fundamentally wrong with
the existing system of international economic re-
lations, ... ; that something wrong can be blamed
on the past and present policies of the Western
advanced countries, ...; that the proposed change
in the international order requires a massive
shift of international political power from the
major countries to the voting Assembly of the
United nations.2256
In 1974, Third World nations obtained a United Nations
resolution to create a New International Economic Order
(NIE0) mainly led by OPEC countries, and the prospect of
their economic and social development seemed to loom.
However, the response of the counterpart of NIEO, ad-
vanced countries, was not much co-operative at all, blam-
ing the lag of Third World economies to their domestic
problems such as lack of infrastructure and of managing
resources.22
When faced with this unfavourable international eco-
nomic situations for economic and social welfare develop-
ment, proponents of NIE0 commonly accord central impor-
tance to the international welfare advocacy, which is in
235  Ibid., p. 19.
236 H. G. Johnson, 'The new International Economic Order/ in The First World & The Three
World: Essays on the New International Economic Order, ed. by K. Brunner (New York:
University of Rochester Policy Centre Publications, 1978), P. 81.
237 S. Sharma and G. Rubin (1985), op. cit., p. 20.
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favour of Third World nations. Since 1964, such interna-
tional agency as the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNICAD) and the United Nations General
Assembly have provided them with political platforms form
which to promote their own welfare. m
 Although it still
is dubious whether these agencies would change and reori-
ent the existing international economic order for their
favour, it is necessary to continue to use them.aN
Above all, it seems clear that the unity between the
developing countries is of particular importance, mainly
because it is the prerequisite of the effective exercise
of pressure to the developed countries. Thus the propo-
nents of NIE0 draw attention to several strategies such
as the 'Non-Aligned Movement'. NX
 As well, there raised
the necessity of using the non-governmental organisations
to address the developmental and social welfare needs of
Third World nations.241
In conclusion, this strategy may contribute to widening
our views on the welfare development of Third World na-
tions, and may indicate the practical importance of the
role of international organisations. However it needs
some more accurate explanations as to how this idea gets
238 Mainly led by OPEC, Third World nations could propose and approved the agenda which
asked for significant institutional restructuring of international economic institu-
tions of the Bretton Woods System, and for adjustment by the developed countries of
their economic and political policies to make reparation to developing countries for
past misuse and exploitation of their resources. See, Ibid., pp. 21-3; S. Sharma and
G. Rubin (1984), op. cit., p. 129.
239 S. Sharma and G. Rubin (1985), pp. cit., p. 22.
240 In tandem with this movement, they also claims to take advantage of the sympathetic
attitudes of some Western developed countries. See, Ibid., p. 22.
241  Ibid., p. 22-3.
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turned into policy, and what attempts should be made to
implement that policy.
136
Chapter Three: Historical Context of the Development of
Welfare in Korea and Taiwan
3.1 Some Explanations about the Industrialisation of
East Asian NICs
3.2 Economic Development and Societal Changes of Korea
and Taiwan
3.3 Political Development of Korea and Taiwan
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As noted previously, it is widely accepted that the wel-
fare systems of developing countries have been virtually
left out of analysis in the study of social policy. Its
academic attention has been predominantly devoted to the
Western welfare systems in general and the British one in
particular. Accordingly, the study of social policy as
an academic discipline has been criticised from the out-
set on account of its extreme lean on 'ethnocentrism', or
'parochialism'. Now it is urgently needed to widen the
scope of the discipline to the welfare systems of devel-
oping countries.
It is very noteworthy that, since the late seventies
there has been a growing interest in the welfare systems
of Third World countries. Some academics within the tra-
dition of British social administration have attempted to
account for the development of Third World welfare sys-
tems.	 It should be pointed out, however, their discus-
sions are not grounded in the down-to-earth researches
into the individual developing countries, though they
have paved the way toward opening the debates about the
Third World welfare system.
In all respects, the cases of Korea and Taiwan merit
the particular attention of those interested in the de-
velopment of welfare system in a dynamically industrial-
ising society. In order to get a sensible research re-
sult, it should be noted that their welfare systems
1 Refer to the voluminous working papers, articles and books of J. Midgley, H. Jones, M.
Hardiman, and S. McPherson. Actually it is true that, before they raised the research
questions about Third World welfare system, the working papers or research projects
conducted by the international organisations such as United Nations and World Bank can
be estimated as a simple fact-finding surveys.
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should be researched in a wider context within which they
have developed and been implemented.
For this purpose, this chapter, first of all, delves
into some theoretical explanations about the industriali-
sation processes of Korea and Taiwan. Secondly, it exam-
ines the economic development and accompanied societal
changes of the two countries during the last three or
four decades; how they transformed their societies from
impoverished agricultural ex-colonies to 'powerful and
important members of the community of industrial na-
tions'. 2 Thirdly and lastly, it examines the political
development of Korea and Taiwan which seems to have a de-
cisive role in the development of welfare systems of the
two countries.
2 J. Abegglen, Sea Change: Pacific Asia as the New World Industrial Centre (New York:
The Free Press, 1994). P- 109-
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3.1 Some Explanations about the Industrialisation
Processes of Korea and Taiwan
It is widely accepted that it was not until the 1950s
that 'development' of Third World was a case in point for
industrial Western world. True, the development was
brought in the central stage of Western social science on
occasion of the world-wide de-colonialisation after the
Second World War. To many Western countries, the histor-
ical fact that many former colonies became politically
independent inevitably amplified the fear that their cap-
ital, invested to their former colonies, might be so-
cialised or nationalised. 3 Thus they absolutely needed
to keep in corporation with the Third World countries,
and to oblige these countries to conform to their inter-
ests. In this regard the economic development was reck-
oned to be a firm defense of their interest from the
threat of either nationalist or revolutionary movement.
Amidst these de-colonialisation period of 1950s and
1960s, modernisation school had dominated the theory and
practice on the development of Third World. It was
widely accepted and actively practicised by those inter-
ested in the Third World development - the planners, gen-
eral administrators and politicians as well as academics.
Mainly due to the multifarious nature of the term,
'development', it was necessary for social scientists
with different academic backgrounds to corporate and ac-
3 Their fear was intensified by the Suez Crisis in Egypt (Nationalism) and the socialist
revolution in Cuba (Socialism).
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cordingly `the modernisation paradigm became the intel-
lectual property of all the social sciences'. 4
 Likewise,
the modernisation school comprises wide range of theoret-
ical spectrum such as sociological modernisation theory,
stage theory, socio-economic theory, political culture
theory, socio-political theory and the crisis mode1.5
The basic theme common to these theories is derived
from l evolutionalism' which has developed in natural sci-
ence. They, with varying degrees, widely share the view
that society is a adaptive system which is supposed to be
geared to reinforce its survival, and that the advanced
value system, technology, knowledge, institutions and ra-
tionality of 'modern' country can diffuse into
'traditional-oriented' countries. This sort of 'modern-
tradition' dichotomy has been at the heart of any mod-
ernisation persuasions. According to this line of think-
ing, economic development is viewed as a process of dis-
placement of the tradition value system with the modern
one, and thus 'lack of development is the fault of Third
World countries' socio-economic systems that create ob-
stacles to modernisation and encourage little ambition or
incentive among individuals, particularly in their
work'. 6
 Implicit in this argument, of course, is the
idea of l Eurocentric' that value system of the West is
much superior to that of Third World countries, and
4 D. Hulme and M. Turner, Sociology and Development: Theories, Policies and Practices
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 34.
5 Suk Joon Kim, The State, Public Policy & NIC Development (Seoul: Dae Young Moonwhasa,
1988), p. 12
6 A. Webster, Introduction to the Sociology of Development (London: Macmillan, 1990),
P. 54.
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henceforth 'Modernisation' is frequently identified with
1 Westernisation'. 7 True, one of the distinguished as-
pects of modernisation theorists and their forefather is
in the moral judgement of modernity which assumes the
Western modernity is advanced and desirable form of so-
cial, political and economic existence.8
We can propose the criticisms of modernisation theory
common to the literature of development studies as fol-
lows. First of all, its theoretical premises is basi-
cally ahistorical and ethnocentric, and thus inevitably
led to over-simplistic views on, such as, 'modernity' and
'tradition', which might includes huge variations. Sec-
ondly, its too much emphasis on the value system of eco-
nomic development led to subjective and normative ap-
proach. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it to-
tally disregards or neglects the international exchange
mechanism between the West and the developing world.
Quite simply, ample evidence of Third World development
suggests that the core belief of modernisation theory
that developing countries can and must copy the industri-
alisation processes of the West in order to achieve solid
economic development is no longer be sustained.
When faced with the both theoretical and practical
failure of modernisation paradigm, sociology of develop-
ment was in a crisis of explanations about what was going
on in developing world, and what should be done for their
economic development. Accordingly, there has emerged a
group of scholars who more or less lean on the Marxist
7 D. Hutme and M. Turner (1990), p p . cit., p. 35.
8 Ibid., p. 37.
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persuasion of development. 	 About this newly emerged
paradigm, Harrison argues:
Just as there is no single modernisation theory,
there is no one Marxist approach to development.
Instead, there is variety of approaches, originat-
ing in classical Marxism, whose collective work
has come to be known as dependency theory, world
systems theory and underdevelopment theory.9
They, with varying degrees, began to form with the
criticisms on the modernisation paradigm in the sixties,
and commonly define the relationship between the First
World (centre) and the Third World (periphery) as unequal
in the world context." They postulate their theoretical
frame just opposite to modernisation paradigm. They re-
placed the concept of 'development' and 'diffusion'
within the modernisation school with that of 'development
of underdevelopment' and 'dependency', respectively.
Thus the basic theme of the modernisation theory that
diffusion would bring development is replaced by depen-
dency theory that dependency would cause underdevelop-
ment.
Meanwhile, 'dependency' refers to a situation of being
influenced, controlled and supported by outside factor.
Now we turn it into unequal relation between the centre
and periphery:
the major decisions which affect socio-economic
progress within less developed ares are made by
9 D. Harrison, The Sociology of Modernisation and Development (London: Unwin Hyman,
1988), p. 62.
10 There are also many variations within this paradigm such as dependency theory, mode of
production, neo-populism, and world system. However, we may largely refer this tradi-
tion of thought as dependency theory.
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individuals and institutions outside those coun-
tries. ... `underdevelopment' refers to the pro-
cess whereby a country, ... , progressively be-
comes integrated as a dependency into the world
market. ... The production of that country thus
becomes geared primarily to the demands dictated
by the industrialised nations.11
Quite simply, the basic assumption of the dependency
theory is that the closer the economic relation between
centre and periphery is, the less development the latter
will be. However it is highly questionable whether they
can explain the economic development of some Third World
countries which are moving rapidly towards the status of
a developed country, and thus they seem to fail to over-
come the limitations of their premises that nationally-
oriented and formulated policy is desirable.12
Moreover, within the intellectual context of Marxism,
the fundamental economic unit which characterises a given
capitalist social formation should be analysed on the ba-
sis of `production' or `process of production', rather
than `exchange' or `distribution'. It is in this regard
that the writers within the dependency school usually un-
derestimate the domestic material forces of production,
and thus overlook the class formation of these societies.
As the dependency theory (Dependencia) emerged from the
crisis of mainstream Western development theory
(Developmentalism), another paradigm (Statism) has
emerged from the crisis of dependency theory as well.
11 P. J. Henriot, , Development Alternatives: Problems, Strategies, Values', in Political 
Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, ed. by C. K. Wilber, 2nd edn (New York:
Random House, 1979), p. 11.
12 M. Bienefeld, 'Dependency and the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs): Towards a
Reappraisal', in Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment, ed. by D. Seers '(London:
Frances Pinter, 1981), p. 79.
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Since the late seventies, 'anomalies' or deviant cases of
dependency theory have been frequently seen in developing
countries, and thus the legitimate problems and methods
of a research field within the tradition of Dependencia
has been seriously challenged. These deviant cases which
represent strong economic progression of some developing
countries within the dependency context, virtually
threaten the basic proposition of dependency theory; 'the
closer the economic relationship between centre and pe-
riphery is, the less the economic development of periph-
ery will be'. In other words, they represent a strong
challenge to the basic assumptions of dependency theory
that foreign economic penetration leads, firstly, to a
hindrance of the economic sector and, secondly, to a
. widening of economic inequality across the classes.
According to the OECD, these Newly Industrializing
Countries (NICs) are defined as fast growing of the level
and share of industrial employment, an enlargement of
export market shares in manufactures and a rapid relative•
reduction in the per capita income gap separating them
from the advanced industrial countries. 13 Their im-
portance lies in the fact that their emergence in world
markets since the seventies seriously called the tradi-
tional North/South division, which was associated with
the exchange of manufactured products for raw materials
and primary commodities, into question. 14 Meanwhile, it
13 See, OECD, The Impact of the NICs on Production and Trade in Manufactures (Paris:
OECD, 1979).
14 OECD, The Newly Industrialising Countries: Challenge and Opportunity for OECD Coun-
tries (Paris: OECD, 1988), p. 7.
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is very hard to make a definite list of NICs because dif-
ferent indicators may include different countries. Some
scholars15 denote solely economic factors to classify the
NICs, others16 include political factors. However, the
following countries are normally referred to as NICs:
Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Tai-
wan, and Spain. 17 In recent years, they are often clas-
sified as the first wave NICs, according to the rapid
economic development of a new wave of developing coun-
tries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and China.
Among those the first and second wave NICs, the East
Asian NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) com-
monly represent outstanding record in terms of economic
growth rate and income distribution. Accordingly, there
is a growing interest in the contrasting phenomena that
the East Asian NICs' economic performances brought the
paradigm change, from the Dependencia to the Statism,
whilst the remarkable economic development of Latin Amer-
ican NICs (Brazil and Mexico) in the mid-sixties deliv-
ered only the modification of the dependency theory such
15 Amongst those who take more emphasis on economic sector, they employ different indica-
tors; The per capita income and the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP (Bela Bal-
assa); The export growth rate (Stephen Krasner); The manufacturing and economic growth
(Brandt Report). For the general clarification of NICs, refer to the S. J. Kim (1988),
op. cit., pp. 5-9. See also B. Balassa, The Newly Industrialising Countries in the
World Economy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981); S. Krasner, 'Transforming International
Regimes', in World System Structure, ed. by L. Hot List and J. Rosenau (Beverly: Sage,
1981); The Independent Commission on International Development Issues (the Brandt Re-
port), North-South: A Programme for Survival (London: Pan Books, 1980).
16 Wallerstein, for instance, adds the state intervention. See I. Wallerstein, The Capi-
talist World: Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). See also S. J.
Kim (1988), op. cit. 
17 See, B. Crow and A. Thomas, Third World Atlas (Milton Keynes: Open Univ. Press, 1983),
pp. 48-9.
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as the `dependent development' of Peter Evans. m Why is
it then that the former brought paradigm change, whilst
the latter delivered simply the modification of the de-
pendency theory?
The fact that the paradigm is changed implies, at least
in development studies, that the gap between `what hap-
pens in the real world' and the `interpretations through
the old paradigm' (the dependency theory, in this case)
is so huge that the basic proposition and the legitimate
research problem and methods, defined within the old
paradigm, are no longer pertinent to the situation, and
henceforth they have come to be replaced, or at least,
changed. Seen in this light, the notion of `dependent
development' of Peter Evans might be appraised as the
paradigm change, not because it does not adhere to the
basic principle of the dependency theory, but because it
leaves ample room for developing countries to achieve
rapid economic growth. He explains the successful devel-
opment of the Brazilian economy in the sixties through
the frame of `triple alliance' of the state, local capi-
talists and multinationals, and argues that the role of
the state to promote economic growth is far greater than
those of the other two sectors. 19 Its importance lies in
the fact that `dependency' and `development' are not nec-
essarily contradictory terms.
However, two successive papers in the early eighties;*
one dealing with the Korean economy, and the other with
18 Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational. State, and Local 
Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978).
19 Ibid.
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the Taiwanese economy, suggest serious reservations re-
garding the attempt to apply the frame of triple alliance
to the East Asian NICs. 20 They commonly indicate that the
role of states in Korea and Taiwan has been far more in-
“
fluential than that of Latin American NICs. Moreover it
should be pointed out that his concept of `dependent de-
velopment' does not leap over the basic arguments of De-
pendencia, because it assumes that the `dependent devel-
opment' is, however successful it might be, basically
`dependent' from foreign capital, and thus the surplus
value of economic growth is constantly exploited by the
foreign capital through `multinationals'. It therefore
implies that economies of `dependent development' might
achieve substantial `growth' in volume, but they are
hardly able to realize solid `development'.
Here it seems worth distinguishing the concept of
`development' from that of `growth'. Actually it has
been popular to identify `economic growth' with `economic
development' in the development studies until very re-
cently. It is mainly due to the fact that economic
growth such as the increase of GNP can be measured in
quantity, whilst economic development is hard to be mea-
sured by universally accepted yardsticks. Moreover even
the definition of development varies widely according to
different ideological preferences and academic back-
ground, mainly because of its highly normative impli-
20 See, Hyun-Jin Lim, 'Dependent Development in the World System: The Case of South Ko-
rea, 1963-1979' (unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Harvard University, 1982); Thomas B. Gold,
'Dependent Development in Taiwan' (unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Harvard University, 1981).
See also S. J. Kim (1988), op. cit., pp. 12-19.
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cation. Marxists usually regard development as the soci-
etal processes towards building the community in which
people work according to their talent and ability, and
receive goods according to their necessity, whereas the
neoclassical liberals refer it to the processes towards
optimizing the freedom of individual choices in a given
context.
For any research in development studies to be fruitful,
however, it appears vital to distinguish solid de-
velopment from mere growth in volume. If it fails, the
economies of unfair privilege, characterised by extremely
concentrated wealth, persistent inequalities, and tremen-
dous imbalance across sectors would mistakenly be identi-
fied with solid economical development. Then, we can ap-
proach this problem by asking the question I to what ex-
tent, and under what condition, are they (development and
growth) different from each other?'
In regard to this subject, the United Nations report
clearly defines the development as `growth plus change1.21
Similarly the Brandt report presents the concept of de-
velopment as follows:
Certainly development must mean improvement in
living conditions, for which economic growth and
industrialisation are essential. But if there is
no attention to the quality of growth and to so-
cial change one cannot speak of development. It is
now widely recognised that development involves a
21 United Nations Development Decade: Proposals for Action, 1962. See also, C. Cockburn,
'The Role of Social Security in Development', International Social Security Review, No.
3/4 1980, 337-358.
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profound transformation of the entire economic and
social structure.22
As well, Lesson and Nixson express the similar viewpoint
on development in a more succinct form as follows:
Here are implied two distinct meanings of the term
'economic development': (i) development equals
growth plus structural change; (ii) development
equals growth plus income redistribution and/or
other measures to improve welfare.23
According to the above quotations, it can be further
assumed that development should bring improvement of the
'quality of life' to a considerable extent, whereas
growth simply refers to the increase of gross national
product, and therefore the economic growth without im-
proving general welfare or structural change does not
lead to the paradigm change, as have been exemplified by
the economic growth figures of Latin American NICs. How-
ever it would be too impetuous to assume that the East
Asian NICs made a structural transformation of their.
economies by improving general welfare of the society,
and thus conveyed a paradigm change in development stud-
ies, though they commonly manifest highest economic
growth rate in the world and move very quickly towards
the status of developed countries. It definitely needs
in-depth research into the distribution structure, polit-
ical system and the level of democratisation of the East
Asian NICs in order to reach the agreement that their
22 The Independent Commission on International Development Issues (the Brandt Report),
North-South: A Programme for Survival (London: Pan Books, 1980), P. 48.
23 P. F. Lesson and F. I. Nixson, `Development Economics and the State', in Perspectives
on Development: Cross-disciplinary Themes in Development, ed. by P. F. Lesson and M. M.
Minogue (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1988), p. 59.
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economic achievements can be appraised as solid develop-
ment.
From the poor tradition-oriented agricultural coun-
tries, they commonly manifested impressive economic
growth, by any standards, over the past three or four
decades. Accordingly, a number of substantial attempts
have been made to account for the reasons for and conse-
quences of the successful economic growth of the East
Asian NICs in comparison with those of frustrated or
still backward economies. They commonly draw attention
to the distinct characteristics of these societies such
as the Confucian tradition, experiences of Japanese colo-
nialism, relatively educated but low-waged labour , forces,
weak class struggles, strong and competent states, and so
forth. Amongst them, the role of the states, without
dispute, has been held central in accounting for the im-
pressive economic growth of these countries, and thus the
'state' was brought back into the central stage of social'
science in general, and development studies in particu-
lar.24
Now it seems quite clear that neither modernisation nor
dependency Schools could provide adequate conceptual
framework through which the economic development of East
Asian NICs can be analysed. Foster-Carter, in his recent
article about the Korean Economy, argues that 'South Ko-
rea's success is a profound theoretical embarrassment to
24 See Theda Skocpol and others (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1985).
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both neo-classical economists and dependency theorists' 25
Above all, the failure of dependency theory in accounting
for the unique industrialisation of the region has
largely increased the scepticism about the adequacy of
the theory of Third World development, and accordingly
has accelerated the need for a new paradigm which is able
to comprehend the Third World as a whole.
However there have been noteworthy attempts to escape
the theoretical impasse of the dependency theory in vari-
ous ways. Firstly, to actively embrace the academic
achievements which have emerged from other disciplines,
secondly, to abandon the theoretical and conceptual
'strait-jacket', and lastly, to become more practical.26
However, it can be said that their achievements could
find ways to escape the impasse, but failed to present
ways to move forward. In this regard, the debates on the
state would provide a good starting point for seeking a
new paradigm for development studies.
The role and function of the state in developing soci-
eties as defined in the early literature of Dependenciä.
was not viewed positively in relation to Third World de-
velopment. Rather, it was widely regarded as a mere bu-
reaucratic apparatus which was controlled and dominated
by the petty-bourgeois, so to speak, 'by a coalition of
25 A. Foster-Carter, 'The myth of South Korea', Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1989,
46-7.
26 D. Hulme and M. Turner (1990), op. cit. pp. 216-7. For more details; see, for exam-
ple, D. Booth, 'Marxism and Development Sociology: Interpretating the Impasse', World
Development, 13:7 (1985), 761-87; L. Sklair 'Transcending the Impasse: Metatheory, The-
ory, and Empirical Research in the Sociology of Development', World Development, 16:6
(1988), 697-709; P. Vandergeest and F. H. Buttel 'Marx, Weber, and Development Sociol-
ogy: Beyond the Impasse', World Development, 16:6 (1988), 683-95.
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political parties (or a single party) that represent(s)
the class interests of the comprador bourgeois, the feu-
dal landlord class, and the metropolitan imperial bour-
geois' .27
However, according to the radical changes of political
situation of the Third World countries, the concept of
state in dependency theory has been somewhat changed.
The concept of 'relative autonomy' has been actively ap-
plied in the development experiences of the individual
countries, and a number of structural conditions which'
contribute to the 'autonomy' of the state has been pre-
sented. m Now the state has been held central in the de-
bates on the third World development.
In regard with the third generation of development
studies (Statism), Kohli argues:
No coherent 'third' alternative to the moderniza-
tion and dependency approaches has emerged ...
Some analytical concerns have been voiced by
scholars who are troubled by the tendency in both
the modernization and the dependency approaches to
reduce politics to socio-economic variables. They
have, in various ways, attempted to restore the
significance of the autonomy of the political ...
They are attempting to highlight the significance
27 B. Berberroglu 'Toward a theory of state capitalist development in the Third World',
International Review of Modern Sociology, 9 (1979), p. 20. Wallerstein also argues
that `weak state' in the periphery and `strong state' in the core enables the latter to
enforce relations of unequal exchange over the former. See, I. Wallerstein, The Capi-
talist World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979).
28 According to Koo, the following three conditions of Third World countries contribute
to the autonomy of the state: firstly, `the peripheral economies typically contain more
than one mode of production', secondly, `there is a historical condition that is re-
lated to a strong bureaucracy in those Third World countries that had colonial experi-
ences', and finally, `a relatively new pattern of dependent development in the periph-
ery of the world capitalist economy has also strengthened the role of the states in pe-
ripheral (and semi-peripheral) nations'. See, H. Koo, `World System, Class, and State
in Third World Development: Toward an Integrative Framework of Political Economy', So-
ciological Perspective, 27 (1984), pp. 43-4.
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of political variables- state actions, relations
among the political elite, political traditions or
patterns of state organization- for patterns of
political-economic change in developing coun-
tries.29
In his study of the Asian countries, Pye argues, that
`the priority should be to find a theoretical lens that
will ensure both a vivid focus on the political domain
and a long historical perspective i . m
 However, it would
be too early to assume that the old paradigm
(Dependencia) will be replaced with the new one (Statism)
on occasion of the emergence of East Asian NICs in world
-
markets. Most of scholars of development studies argue
that the state-led development experiences of the East
Asian NICs are exceptional cases, m and l a proliferation
of state activity undertaken in the name of development
has not resulted in the anticipated improvements in so-
cio-economic welfare' 32 in most developing countries. In
that sense, Hulme and Turner are quite right to argue
that `the bureaucracies are often ill-equipped to perform
these tasks (developmental policy-making, planning, im-
plementation and evaluation) effectively and effi-
ciently'. 33
 Thus, 'if development is to succeed and the
state is to retain its principal role in it then the bu-
29 A. Kohli, The State and Development in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1986), p. 17.
30 L. W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), P. 18.
31 Cline argues, `it is seriously misleading to hold up the East Asian G-4 as a model for
development because that model almost certainly cannot be generalised without provoking
protectionist response ...' See, 14.. R. Cline, `Can the East Asian Model of Development
Be Generalized '2', World Development, 10:2 (1982), p. 89.
32 D. Hulme and M. Turner (1990), op. cit., p. 220.
33 Ibid., p. 220.
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reaucracy has to make dramatic improvements in managing
development' .34
It is widely accepted that the role of the state in the
industrialisation process of the East Asian NICs was re-
markable, and also quite different from that of other de-
veloping countries. However, it is still questionable
whether their experiences would ensure some general ap-
plicability with other developing countries, nor is the
replacement of paradigms from Dependencia to Statism.
Truly, what is urgently needed is to inquire into the
general paradigm or theoretical lens, being transformed
into a substantial reality, which comprehends the Third
World development as a whole, and furthermore directs the
right way of development. As was examined previously, it
seems quite clear that development does not have to be
confined to economic growth. Rather, it should be under-
stood as a progressive process of improvements and bet-
terments concerning human life in a given society. Now
we will look at the economic development and accompanied
societal changes in Korea and Taiwan in the next section.
34 Ibid., p. 220.
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3.2 Economic Development and Societal Changes of Korea
and Taiwan
It is widely accepted that the industrialisation pro-
cesses of both Korea and Taiwan are not only remarkable
but also very unique. From the least-developed agricul-
tural countries with unstable political situations, they
have manifested remarkable economic growth under the
strong control of the state, using an export oriented in-
dustrialisation strategy. Accordingly, their industrial-
isation process is now of great interest to those inter-
ested in the Third World development. Although it still
is a matter of debate whether their industrial strategies
can be transplanted in other developing countries, 35 it is
quite clear that they deliver the message of hope to de-
-
veloping countries for developing their economies within
the dependency context.
It probably cannot be too strongly emphasised the his-
torical fact that economic development has played a deci-
sive role in shaping the course of modernisation in any
given society. However, it should be pointed out that a
false picture would be given if economic performance
alone is used as the criteria for modernisation of the
society, in that modernisation is a very comprehensive
35	 For more details of this debate, refer, for example, to W. R. Cline (1982), op. cit.,
pp. 81-90. In it, the author presents the pessimistic views on the generalisability of
the East Asian model, and warns its possibility to provoke the protectionist responses
of developed countries. However, the rapid economic growth of the second-wave NICs
such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and China of the late 80s attests to high possi-
bility of transplanting this model to the other developing countries.
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social progress which comprises overall societal changes
including betterment of living conditions, demographic
changes, higher rate of urbanisation, changes of the fam-
ily structure, and so forth. Thus we can assume that ex-
ploring the reasons for and the consequences of economic
development is of particular importance in understanding
the modernisation processes of any given society. In do-
ing so, we can further the speculation about the links
between the overall societal changes and the development
of welfare system.
In this regard, this section, first of all, examines
the economic performance of Korea and Taiwan during the
last three or four decades. Secondly, it scrutinises the
reasons for their remarkable economic development in
terms of Confucianism, education, industrialisation
strategies and state autonomy respectively. Thirdly, it
examines the effects of economic development in terms of
demographic changes, family structure, employment pat-
terns and urbanisation and income distribution.
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3.2.1 Economic Performances of Korea and Taiwan
The sixties and seventies witnessed the emergence of the
East Asian NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore)
in the world economy. Since they launched their in-
dustrialisation in the early sixties, their share in the
world market economy has rapidly grown. m The total ex-
ports of these four East Asian NICs has been more than
double the total exports of all other developing coun-
tries since the mid-eighties, and their economic growth
rates are among the highest in the world. 37 However, the
most noticeable implication lies in the fact that they
break the traditional North/South division in the world
economy, where the North countries used to produce the
manufacturing goods while the South counterparts used to
provide the raw materials. Their economic success surely
represents a new international economic order in which
-
less developed countries can penetrate the world markets
with little more competitive advantage than low wages.38
Amongst the four East Asian NICs, Korea and Taiwan
merit particular attention in terms of the population,
historical conditions and the political situation.
36 Their share in world market economies increased from 0.6% in 1964 to 1.6% in 1983.
See, OECD, The Newly Industrialising Countries: Challenge and Opportunity for OECD In-
dustries (Paris: OECD, 1988), p. 9.
37 They manifested around 10% (1964-1973) and 8.7% (1973-1984), whilst all developed mar-
ket economies achieved 4.8% and 2.1% respectively. See, Ibid., p. 9. See also, Bruce
Cumings, 'The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Indus-
trial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences', International Organisation,
38:1 (Winter 1984), 1-40.
38 A. H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1989), la. 143.
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Politically, first of all, Hong Kong is a British colony
and will be duly transferred to China in 1997, and Singa-
pore is a former British colony as well. Whilst Korea
and Taiwan are divided countries which have developed
their economies under the heavy burden of military spend-
ing, Singapore and Hong Kong have had lesser burdens
throughout their development. 39 They have not experienced
the severe ideological conflict that Korea and Taiwan are
still undergoing. In terms of population, Singapore (2.5'
million, 1988) and Hong Kong (5.7 million, 1989) have too
small of populations to be compared with Korea (42 mil-
lion, 1990) and Taiwan (20 million, 1989). Thirdly, Sin-
gapore and Hong Kong have been developed by Britain as
main trade ports in Asia, and thus have not been an
agrarian society since the last century. They are basi-
cally city-states, which have never had a self-sufficient
economy. Thus it seems necessary to limit the scope of
the research to manageable proportions: Korea and Taiwan.
Of the poor tradition-oriented agricultural countries,
Korea and Taiwan commonly manifested impressive economid
growth. To illustrate, Taiwan achieved around a 9% aver-
age economic growth rate and Korea performed around 9.5%
during 1971-1990, far exceeding even the speed of devel-
opment in Japan and Germany in those nations' moves to
industrialisation. For these two decades the Korean and
Taiwanese economies have been growing at more than three
times the world growth rate., and output per capita has
39 However, Singapore has been , although to a lesser extent, impelled by a context of
military insecurity. N. Harris, The End of Third World: Newly Industrializing Coun-
tries and the Decline of an Ideology (London: Penguin, 1987), pp. 67-9.
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been increasing at more than four times the world rate.0
What is more, their economic development has been more
and more highly regarded, compared with the frustrated
economic situations of other developing countries where
the 'promise of developmentalism f has never been re-
alised. 0 Quite simply, they have maintained high growth
rates, high investment rates and the high dependency on
the World market. The following table shows the rapid
growth of the manufacturing sectors of Korea and Taiwan.
<Table 3-1> Growth Rate of Manufacturing Sector
1964-73 1973-83
Korea 21.0 11.7 (0.8)*
Taiwan 18.2 8.3 (0.7)*
Developed
Market Economies 5.5 1.6 (73.6)*
Developing
Market Economies 7.9 4.6 (15.1)*
the percentage of the share in the world market in
1983.
Source: Office for Development Research and Policy Analy-
sis, U.N., N.Y., 1986. Quoted from OECD, The Newly In-
dustrialising Countries: Challenge and Opportunity,
Paris, 1988, Table 1.2.
Now it can be said that their economies are moving very
rapidly towards the status of developed economies. It
means that their economies have reached a stage where
they are sufficiently resilient to withstand potentially
disruptive domestic and foreign forces without suffering
long term damage to their economic structure. Unlike the
40 J. C. Abegglen (1994), op. cit., p. 109.
41 See C. Clark, Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy
Paradigms (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 18.
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second-wave NICs, their economies are diversified and
strong enough not to be devastated by a single factor
such as the sudden fall of commodities or the unexpected
rise of raw materials in the international market.42
It should be emphasised, however, that their economies
have benefited from the international economic situation
throughout the sixties and seventies. The early post-war
period widely witnessed a boom in the Western economies
in general, and it is fair to say that their prosperity
had continued until the first oil crisis in 1973. During
these economic boom periods, the Western economies
largely manifested steadfast economic growth, full em-
ployment and, most importantly, the expansion of interna-
tional trade. 0 Their ever-growing productivity in their
industries accordingly has enabled their industries to
move toward higher value-added products. On the corol-
lary, the traditional labour-intensive industries like
textiles, clothing and footwear have withered away in
these countries. It is commonly recognised that the East
Asian NICs have, fully taken advantage of the industrial
adjustment of the Western countries. Thus the economic
development of Korea and Taiwan, in this understanding,.
is a true outcome of the new international division of
labour.
42 See J. Clark, 'Prospects and Market Conditions in the Newly Industrialised Countries',
in The Newly Industrialised Countries: Key Prospects and Market Conditions in Taiwan
R.O.C., ed. by R. Baker (Taipei: CSP Economic Publications Ltd., 1988).
43 The GATT, designed to take down the tariff, which used to be forty percent before the
war, in the Bretton Woods conference, have played an enormous role to increase the
world trade.
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Accordingly, it can be said that they accepted the
port oriented industrialisation as a main industrial
strategy, which inevitably resulted in a high foreign de-
pendency ratio. The following table shows high depen-
dency on overseas markets.
<Table 3-2> Rate of Export and Import to GNP*
Korea Taiwan
1970 * 38.1 44.9
1975 * 62.6 75.3
1980 * 69.8 90.5
1985 * 76.0 88.0
average rate of past five years
Source: KIET, Industrial Structure and Economic
Achievements of Korea and Taiwan, 1989 (in Korean).
In a similar vein, a wealth of evidence suggests that
the successful economic development of the East Asian
NICs has been geared by the process of 'learning', rather
than 'invention' or 'innovation'. While the first indus-
trial revolution was carried out by Britain on the basis
of invention not only of machineries but also of rela-
tions of production, and the late industrialising coun-
tries like Germany and USA manifested strong economic
growth by innovation, the industrialisation of the East
Asian countries is a true example of a learning process.44
In sum, the remarkable economic development of four
East Asian NICs during the past three decades rested
heavily on the work of 'learning' from the
industrialisation experiences of developed countries,
44 See A. H. Amsden (1989), op. cit., pp. 3-5.
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and, most importantly, have skilfully taken advantage the
favourable conditions of the world economies under the
full command of the state.
Figure 3-1 shows the changes in four main economic
indicators of Korea since the sixties. It merits
particular attention that the Taiwanese economy shows'
some similarities with the Korean economy in terms of
growth rate, unemployment rate and tax burden rate.
Since Taiwan had launched industrial planning earlier
than Korea, the GNP per capita of Taiwan is considerably
higher than that of Korea: $7512 and $4968 respectively
in 1989. Figure 3-2 represents the development of the
Taiwanese economy since the sixties.
<Figure 3,-1>
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Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1990, CEPD
Taiwan Eoonomio Statisitos, 1990, CE PD,
Taiwan.
It should be noted, however, that their broad similar-
ities should not blind us to the differences. They are
different in economic structure, economic planning and
economic achievements. What follows is the comparison
between the Korean and Taiwanese economies.
As is clearly shown in the following table, the most
significant difference between the two economies is found
in the distribution of wealth (Gini's Coefficient). Com-
pared with the distribution of wealth in Korea that has
not been improved or rather worsened, that of Taiwan has
been kept very low, by any international standard,
throughout the industrialisation process.
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<Table 3-3>










Rate 10.4 9.8 8.7 8.9 7.5 10.6 7.5	 6.5
Gini Co-
efficient
0.33 0.29 0.38 0.28 0.39 0.28 0.36	 0.29
Manufacture




38.1 44.9 62.6 75.3 69.8 90.5 76.0	 88.0
Average of the past five years
** data of 1983	
-
Source: modified data from KIET, Industrial Structure and
Economic Performance of Korea and Taiwan, 2nd ed. 1989,
(in Korean).
Thus the Taiwanese industrialisation process can be
properly appraised as solid development in that the con-
cept of solid economic development comprises both
`growth' and `improving general welfare'. Moreover,
while the Korean economy has suffered an ever-increasing
trade deficit, the Taiwanese economy had the highest
level of foreign reserves (excluding gold) in 1992, which
has been built from enormous and continuing trade and
current surpluses.45
The genesis of the differences between two economies
can be found in the early stages of their industrialisa-
tion. In fact, the Korean government has planned the in-
dustrial development on the basis of a number of conglom-
erates (Chaebol) to realise the scale effect. The Korean
government has implemented several measures to concen-
45 J. C. Abeggen (1994), op. cit., p. 116.
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trate scarce domestic resources to the conglomerates:
Consequently, this industrial strategy brought about rel-
ative economic inequalities which still endure in the
nineties.
By contrast, the Taiwanese government has implemented a
policy of restricting economic inequalities from the out-
set of industrialisation. Instead of large conglomerates
as is the case of Korea, the Taiwanese economy is firmly
based on medium sized companies which are very flexible
to the changes of world markets as well as favourable to
economic equality. It should be pointed out, however,
these small units of production were encouraged by the
government. Since only three million mainlanders govern
the rest of the population politically, it might be nec-
essary for the government to diffuse the units of produc-
tion, for the fear that alternative power centre like
chaebol in Korea would challenge the ruling mainlanders.46
In sum, several reasons can be presented to account for
the differences of the two economies. First of all, the
Taiwanese government, retreating from the Communist vic-
tory over mainland China, has always kept in mind the
historical lesson that economic equality is the strongest
weapon against Communism. Secondly, although Taiwan had
several battles with Communist China in the fifties, it
has not undergone a total war such as the Korean war
(1950-1953), which thoroughly destroyed Korea's economic
infrastructure. Thirdly, it has benefited from the eco-
nomic links with overseas Chinese merchants widely spread
46 M. Shibusawa and others, Pacific Asia in the 1990s (London: Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 1992), P. 9; J. C. Abegglen (1994), op. cit., p. 115.
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out through the South East Asian countries. Thus they
could launch industrialisation without a heavy burden of
foreign borrowing.
In spite of these differences in details of economic
situations between two countries, it is fair to say that
similar aspects pf their industrial development merit
more attention, especially when compared to other devel-
oping countries as well as to Western advanced economies.
Now we turn our attention to the reasons for their eco-
nomic development.
3.2.2 Reasons for Economic Development
The issue now under discussion is related to the question
of 'what have made them differ from other developing
countries?' A Considerable number of books, articles and
working papers have been published to account for the
reasons for the successful economic growth of the East
Asian NICs in comparison with those of frustrated or
still backward economies. They commonly draw attention
to the distinct characteristics of these societies such
as the Confucian tradition, experiences of Japanese colo-
nialism, the land reform shortly after their indepen-
dence, the foreign aid mainly from U.S.A., relatively ed-
ucated but low-waged labour forces, weak class struggles,
strong and competent states, and so forth. It should be
noted, however, that these are the differences of Korea
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and Taiwan from other countries in general. In fact, to
enumerate the differences may be useless unless major ef-
forts are oriented to identify the specific factors which
have driven these economies into the successful industri-
alisation. Now we duly draw our attention to Confucian-
ism, education, industrialisation strategy, and state au-
tonomy respectively.
3.2.2.1 Confucianism
Some scholars claim that the explanation of their suc-
cessful economic development lies in large part with Con-
fucianism, which has been exclusively shared by these
countries for a long time. The East Asian NICs and Japan
have been, to varying degrees, strongly influenced by the
Chinese culture since ancient times. In fact, Singapore,
Hong Kong and Taiwan were peripheral regions of China un-
til they were occupied by the colonial forces, and Korea
and Japan had tried to assimilate the advanced Chinese
culture, though they retained an independent national
identity. Meanwhile, up until the medieval ages, China
was one of the most civilized and prosperous nations in
the world. 47 Of particular importance is that the unified
47 For instance, the northern area of China in the 11th century produced 125,000 tons of
iron per annum, which were far more than the iron output of Britain in the 18th century
when it began to industrialise. Along with the most powerful iron-making capacities,
the Mying dynasty had the strongest warfare armies. Moreover, the paper money was
widely circulated in markets, and foreign trade was actively carried out with the
neighbouring countries such as Korea, Japan, South Asia and East Africa. For more de-
tails, see P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Mili-
tary Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Unwin & (lyman, 1988), pp. 4-9.
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hierarchic administration was run by a well-educated Con-
fucian bureaucracy. 48
Thus it is mainly due to historical circumstances that
the states of these societies are sufficiently autonomous
from both domestic classes and foreign capital to formu-
late development policies independently. In regard to
this extraordinary characteristic in these states, Cal.
Clark argues:
All the successful East Asian countries (Japan,
the four little dragons, and the P.R.C.) were
marked by strong states committed to developmen-
talist policies, and all shared a Confucian cul-
ture that, among other things, included respect
and veneration for political authorities.49
Interestingly enough, Confucianism was severely blamed
for the economic backwardness of Asian countries by such
a Western scholar as Max Weber 50 , who might have thought
that the Protestant ethic was much superior to the Confu-
cian ethic, as far as industrialisation is concerned. At
least thirty years ago when the economic development of
Latin American countries rivalled many Western countries,
the conventional wisdom said that the cultural differ-
ence, Confucianism in other words, would hinder the eco-
nomic development of countries like Korea and Taiwan.51
But this argument turned out to be wrong in a short time.
The evidence of the remarkable economic development of
48 Ibid., pp. 4-9.
49 C. Clark (1989), op. cit., p. 35.
50 See, for example, Max Weber, The Religion of China (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1951). Special attention should be paid to Chapter VI, 'The Confucian Life Orienta-
tion'
51 J. D. Macomber, 'East Asia's Lesson for Latin American Resurgence', The World Economy,
10:4 (1987), p. 469.
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the East Asian countries during the last three decades
strongly suggests that certain characteristics of
Confucianism must have contributed to their economic
success. Confucianism traditionally put a great emphasis
on education, and thus scholars were highly respected.
Moreover, political authorities were very active in
recruiting these scholars in order to put Confucian
teachings into practice. It is in this regard that these
Confucian countries traditionally have strong state
autonomy. We will discuss these characteristics of
Confucianism ('education' and 'state autonomy') in the
following sections in detail.
3.2.2.2 Education
Capitalism, however defined, is basically a commodity
producing economic system, and a commodity is produced by
human resources acting on natural resources. It implies
that human resources are more important than natural re-
sources in producing a commodity, since natural resources
cannot be exploited without human resources. The remark-
able economic development of Korea and Taiwan from the
early sixties attests to this view because they developed
a strong competitiveness in the world market despite
their deficient natural resources.52
It is thus widely accepted that the high level of ed-
ucation of Korea and Taiwan has been a firm buttress for
their successful economic development. It is true that
education has been a highly respected value for these
52 H. T. Oshima, Strategic Processes in Monsoon Asia's Economic Development (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 177.
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countries, consistent with Confucian teachings. They
commonly manifest high school enrollment and high aca-
demic achievement which have provided a sufficient number
of well-educated manual workers during their industrial
development. However, it was not until independence
(1945) that the average educational level of the popula-
tion dramatically increased. The following table shows a
time series comparison (1950 and 1980) of the average
number of years of the formal education among major coun-
tries in both the developed and the developing world. In
1950, the years of formal education of both Korea and
Taiwan were no more than the developing countries, but in
1980 they have increased comparable to those of developed
countries.
<Table 3-4>
Average Number of Years of Formal Education (Aged 15-64)
1950 1980
Total A* B* *C Total A* B* *C
China 2.13 1.98 0.14 0.01 4.50 3.40 1.07 0.03
India 1.30 1.19 0.10 0.01 2.94 2.03 0.85 0.06
Korea 3.13 2.62 0.46 0.05 7.38 4.35 2.48 0.55
Taiwan 3.40 2.90 0.46 0.04 8.07 4.32 3.43 0.32
Brazil 1.83 1.36 0.42 0.03 7.22 5.00 1.74 0.47
Mexico 2.30 1.61 0.65 0.04 4.94 2.87 1.95 0.12
France 8.18 4.96 3.04 0.18 10.30 5.00 4.59 0.71
Germany 8.51 4.00 4.37 0.14 9.41 4.00 5.15 0.26
Japan 8.12 5.88 2.08 0.16 10.77 6.00 4.26 0.51
UK 9.40 6.00 3.27 0.13 10.66 6.00 4.31 0.35
USA 9.46 5.61 3.40 0.45 12.02 5.80 4.92 1.30
A: Primary, B: Secondary, C: Higher.
Source: OECD, The World Economy in the 20th Century,
Paris, 1989, Appendix C.
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Furthermore, Korea manifested the highest level of
mathematics proficiency, which is vital to decide the












Source: Financial Times, 4 May 1990.
<Table 3-6> Ratio of Tertiary Education











University and College level.
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1989. Selected
Countries.
53 Scores were are measured on the following principles:
Level 300 = Simple addition & subtraction
Level 400 = Basic operation to solve simple problems
Level 500 = Intermediate level skills to solve two-step problems
Level 600 = Measurement & geometry solving complex problems
Level 700 = More advanced mathematical concepts
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The existence of professional managers and highly
qualified engineers as well as a well-educated cheap
labour force is vital for economic development. The ter-
tiary level school enrollment ratio of Korea is much
higher than most developing countries and rivalled devel-
oped countries, as is shown in the above table (Table 3-
6).
As well, they have more readily accepted the advanced
knowledge and technology from developed countries such as
the U.S.A. It is fair to say that many public adminis-
ters, engineers, scientists, education experts who stud-
ied in the U.S.A. have played a pivotal role in mod-
ernising their societies. Although some critics argue
that they transplanted American values and thus deepened
dependency, 54 it might be inevitable in the process of in-
dustrialisation which needs vast numbers of experts.
It should be emphasised, however, that socio-cultural
elements as such do not of themselves bring successful
economic development. They could merely endow the
contextual evidence for deepening and developing our
understanding about the East Asian NICs industrialisa-
tion. What matters most is to scrutinise the roles and
functions of the institutions which have driven nations
to industrialise by way of particular policies.
54 See, J. Midgley, Professional Imperialism: Social Work in the Third World (London:
Heinemann, 1981). In it, the author argues that the value system of imperial nations
is duly transplanted into developing countries through the professionals who have been
educated in those developed countries.
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3.2.2.3 State Autonomy
One of the main myths amongst the students of development
studies is that the industrialisation of East Asian NICs.
is the result of a free market system. According to the
neo-liberal viewpoint, the role of the state should be
limited to public goods such as law enforcement, physical
infrastructure, macroeconomic stability and education
which are difficult for private sector to meet. 55 Thus
any kind of state intervention beyond the boundary of
public goods as listed above inevitably brings ineffi-
ciency, unproductivity, and thus market failure at last.
Although the governments of East Asian NICs have in-
tervened very deeply in their industrial development, ac-
cording to this line of interpretation, their role is.
limited to providing the environments for growth.% It
means that they have pursued the 'right price' policy in
the markets throughout the industrial development pen-
ods. 57 Not the governments, but the enterprises run by
the private market principles led their economies
successfully, and in turn, turned out to be the most ef-
fective agent for industrialisation. Thus it is reason-
55 R. Wade, 'East Asia's Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights,
Shaky Evidence', World Politics, 44 (January 1992), pp. 271-3.
56 For the neo-liberal interpretations of economic development, see, B. Balassa, The
Newly Industrializing Countries in the World Economy (N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1981); 'The
Lessons of East Asian Development: An Overview', Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 36 (April 1988); H. Hughes (ed.), Achieving Industrialisation in East Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); I. Little, Economic Development: Theory, 
Policy and International Relations (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1982). Here, neo-liberal is a
subset of neoclassical economics.
57 It can be further argued that the intervention of the state is understood to make
things 'right'.
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able to assume that successful economic development of
the region is the triumph of neoclassical economics.
However there have been scholars who call this orthodox
paradigm seriously into question. They commonly argue
that the sustaining economic growth of the region was.
brought about not by an 'invisible hand' but by a
'visible intervention' of government. According to them,
the role of the government in industrialisation processes
of the East Asian NICs was not only remarkable but very
decisive, and also quite different from that of other de-
veloping countries, whether it be 'state capitalism',58
'entrepreneurial state', 59
 'bureaucratic state capital-
ism," or 'bureaucratic-authoritarian industrialising
regimes'. 61
They commonly begin with the notion of the autonomy of
the state from private sectors. Due at least partly to
the Confucianism, the public authorities of the region
have been traditionally respected, and thus have enjoyed
full autonomy from civil society. In the political de-
velopment of the post independence era, the autonomy of
the state has been further strengthened. In Taiwan, for
example, the nationalists retreated from mainland China
could establish an authoritarian government free from the
interests of the local landlords. It is in this regard
that they could successfully enforce land reform across
58 James F. Petras, `State Capitalism and the Third World', Journal of Contemporary Asia,
6:4 (1976), 432-43; Berch Berberoglm, `Toward a Theory of State Capitalist Development
in the Third World', International Review of Modern Sociology, 9 (1979). 	 .••
59 Raymond D. Duvall and John R. Freeman, `The State and Dependent Capitalism', Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, 25:1 (March 1981), 99-118.
60 Rachid Tlemcani, State and Revolution in Algeria (London: Zed Books, 1986).
61 Bruce Cumings (1984), op. cit. 
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the island. It was a turning point for the state of Tai-
wan to be strong and independent enough to command and
guide the economy throughout the industrial development
period.
In a similar vein, the American military regime in Ko-
rea after the independence has paid more attention to the
land reform and education than economic development.
They reckoned land reform, which was intended to reduce
the power of the landed bourgeois, to be a firm defense
against the political agitation from North Korea in which
land reform was enforced in a more revolutionary way
shortly after the independence. 62 At last, the Land Re-
form Act was passed in the Korean National Assembly in
1949 just before the Korean War. Although it was far
from the wishes of the majority of tenant farmers, it
served to reduce the economic and political power of the
landed bourgeois, and thus the state of Korea could at-
tain a considerable degree of political autonomy since
then. Moreover, as the cold war has dominated the polit-
ical situations of Korea and Taiwan more deeply since the
middle of the fifties, the far right anti-Communist gov-
ernments of the two countries have reinforced their au-
tonomy from civil society.
It is now clear that the states of Korea and Taiwan
have exercised almost full control over private firms,
and this control is accordingly regarded as the main rea-
son for their economic success, as is argued by Onis:
62 Consistent with the Communist teachings, they carried out land reform by the principle
of 'free confiscation, free distribution' in the March of 1946.
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the phenomenon of "late development" should be un-
derstood as a process in which states have played
a strategic role in taming domestic and interna-
tional market forces and harnessing them to na-
tional ends.
Key to rapid industrialisation is a strong and au-
tonomous state, providing directional thrust to
the operation of the market mechanism. The market
is guided by a conception of long-term national
rationality of investment formulated by government
officials 63
Quite simply, it is fair to say that the economic de-
velopment of Korea and Taiwan has been brought about by
the guidance and command of the state with an unusual de-
gree of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private coop-
eration.
3.2.2.4	 Industrialisation Strategies
It is quite clear that proper industrial strategy is of
great importance in propelling economic development. In
this regard, Korea and Taiwan have fittingly selected ex-
port oriented industrialisation as the main strategy in
industrialising their economies.
In this regard, there are two critical choices of Third
World economic development strategy. First of all, Third
World nations must decide their industrial structure in
economic development: primary industry focused develop-
ment or manufacturing focused development. However, the
former option could not has been accepted in the region
because both Korea and Taiwan commonly lack sufficient
natural resources. Secondly, they also face the dilemma
63 Z. Onis, 'The Logic of the Developmental State', Comparative Politics, 24:1 (Oct.
1991), p. 110.
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of the `import substitution industrialisation (ISI)' or
the `export oriented industrialisation (EOW. Korea and
Taiwan are widely recognised as the successful cases of
the EOI development. 64 Then, what made them determine the
right policy at the outset of their industrialisation?
This issue is held central to any attempt to analyse
Third World development. In fact, the ISI strategy was
widely recommended by many advisers for developing coun-
tries in the post-war period. The basic idea of the ISI
strategy originated from the historical experience of
Latin American countries which had had EOI strategy until
1929. The economic depression of the early 1930s dramat-
ically decreased the Western demands for Latin American
products and accordingly revealed their economies'
vulnerabilities to fluctuating external markets. 65 It
served as an impetus to change their economies from out-
ward export oriented to inward economic development in
the post-war period. According to the recommendations of
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA), the larger Latin American economies accepted ISI
strategy, designed to substitute the imports with domes-
tic production, in the hope that it would realise the na-
tional desire to reduce dependency and to create
employment."
64 It should be emphasised, however, these two strategies are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Looking back to the history of industrialisation of these two countries, it
is fair to say that they have never abandoned the ISI strategy throughout the post-war
period, although the priority was given to E01 strategy.
65 D. Hulme and M. M. Turner (1990), op. cit., pp. 46-7.
66 Interestingly enough, the Latin American countries, which launched the ISS strategy,
are more dependent on developed countries than the East Asian countries. See, J. D.
Macomber (1987), op. cit., p. 472-8.
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Thus it would be fair to say that the ISI, rather than
EOI, was the dominant industrialisation strategy widely
held, both theoretically and practically, across the
Third World countries throughout the fifties and
sixties. 67 However, the seventies and eighties witnessed
the rapid growth of economic prosperity of East Asian
countries including Japan, and accordingly EOI strategy
turned out to be the right policy of Third World
development. The imperative question now is; what made
East Asian countries choose EOI strategy under a goal-
oriented planning? 68 In regard to this issue, Amsden
attempts to explain it as follows:
Just as a strong state in Korea was the outcome
not of policy choice but of a long process of so-
cial change, so too were the particular policies
that the military regime pasted together in the
early 1960s to form a model of accumulation that
was rooted in the past.69
According to this line of thinking, the explanation of
selecting a particular policy lies in large part with the
historical past. One plausible explanation on this issue
is that both countries have been greatly influenced by
Japan since their independence. Those who formed politi-
67 It is very noteworthy that the ISI strategy was accepted mainly by the larger
economies such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (Latin America) and Pakistan (Asia) and
Philippines (South Asia). In accordance with assignment of the ISI strategy, they
maintained high tariffs and over-valued currency. For more details of ISI strategy,
refer for example to Ibid.,P  472-4; D. Hulme and M. M. Turner (1990), op. cit., p.
101-11; D. Harrison, The Sociology of Modernization and Development (London: Unwin Hy-
man, 1988), pp. 75-8.
68 At the outset of industrialisation planning in the early sixties, the patronage insti-
tutions for the Third World development expressed their fear that the economic plan-
ning, rather than free market system, of developing countries would turn their
economies to the Soviet model.
69 A. H. Amsden (1989), op. cit., p. 63.
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cal elites of the early sixties were educated during the
Japanese colonial periods, and thus were more accustomed
to the Japanese model, which drove her economy to export-
oriented development since the fifties under the command
of the government.70
It should be noted, however, that the right decision
does not itself bring one country prosperity. It should
be accompanied with the state capacity to pursue its
goals persistently. In regard to this issue, Macomber
argues:
If a country is going to be interventionist, then
it needs to be able to manage the implementation
of the policy, as well as take the initial deci-
sion to intervene.n
Quite clearly, the issue at stake is not whether the
state decides this or that policy, but how the government
policies are directed and implemented. When the state
capacity is defined as the ability to plan, formulate and
implement its own goals72 , it is fair to say that the
states of the two countries have been autonomous and com-
petent enough to guide and command their economies to-
wards national interests. m In regard to Korea, Amsden
argues:
70 J. K. Kwon, Woloan Choson (Monthly Choson), Sep. 1992 (in Korean).
71 J. D. Macomber (1987), op. cit., p. 478.
72 See S. J. Kim, The State, Public Policy and NIC Development (Seoul: Dae Young Moon-
whasa), pp. 34-7. Meanwhile it is widely accepted that EOI strategy usually needs more
state capacity than ISI strategy does, because the state should be competent enough to
negotiate with foreign capitals and local bourgeois under the E01 strategy.
73 Central to the successful intervention of the states in the region is the single-
minded commitment of the state elites to growth, productivity, and international com-
petitiveness. Onis tries to explain the conception of this commitment by historical
circumstances; 'security threat' and 'redistribution of income and wealth from the out-
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Where Korea differs from most other late
industrializing countries is in the discipline its
state exercise over private firms.74
In regard to the Taiwanese economy, Tsai expresses a
similar view:
the state in Taiwan, under the capable leadership
of the Nationalist government, functions as an
initiator in drawing plans for socioeconomic
developments, while the private sector voluntarily
and effectively seeks ways to implement these
plans.75
3.2.3 Consequences of Economic Development
It is needless to say that the paramount goal of economic
development is to improve the living conditions of the
whole population. As noted previously, Korea and Taiwan
represented impressive economic growth during the last
three or four decades. We can now draw our attention to
the consequences of their economic development.
The rapid economic development during the last three or
four decades has brought immense societal changes in Ko-
rea and Taiwan. Their agriculture sector has dwindled as
quickly as their modern industrial sector has grown.:
This transformation from an agriculture-based society to
a modern industrial one has had a great effect on the de-
set'. See, Z. Onis, `The Logic of the Developmental State', Comparative Politics, 24:1
(Oct. 1991), pp. 116-7.
74 A. H. Amsden (1989), op. cit., p. 14.
75 W. Tsai, `Social Changes under the Impacts of Economic Transformation in Taiwan: Form
Industrialisation to Modernisation during the Post-World War II Era', Studies in Com-
parative International Development, 24:2 (Summer 1989), p. 37.
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mographics, urbanisation and employment patterns, family
structure and income distribution. We will discuss these
changes in this section respectively.
3.2.3.1 Demographic Changes
Taiwan and Korea are the world's second and third most
densely populated countries after Bangladesh, though
their population growth has steadily declined since the
early sixties. What is worse, they both have limited
natural resources and poor soil, of which only a quarter
is arable in Taiwan and slightly less (22 percent) in Ko-
rea. m Thus it is not surprising that they were among the
poorest countries during and just after the colonial pe-
riod.
It is quite evident that the overall economic achieve-
ment of both Korea and Taiwan is reflected in the high
growth rate of GNP and GNP per capita. It should be em-
phasised that the decline of population growth rate of
Korea and Taiwan helped increase their respective GNP per
capita considerably. Thus it is fair to say that
demographic changes may be a cause, as well as a result,
of economic growth.
It is generally accepted that one of the disadvantages
of high population growth is the smaller percentage of
76 T. Scitovsky, 'Economic Development in Taiwan and South Korea, 1965-81/ in Models of 
Development: A Comparative Study of Economic Growth in South Korea and Taiwan, ed. by
L. Lau (San Francisco: ICS, 1986), p. 155
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the population of working age, which means a larger share
of dependent population.77
In Taiwan, for example, the average growth rate of GNP
during 1953 to 1962 was 7.5 percent. However, mainly due
to the relatively high population growth rate of 3.5 per-
cent, GNP per capita increased only 4.0 percent annually
for these years. However, the steady decline in popula-
tion growth afterwards and the high growth rate in GNP
helped increase .the income of Taiwan's population, as is
shown in the following table.78
<Table 3-7> Average Growth Rates of GNP, Population, and
GNP per Capita in Taiwan, 1953-1987.
GNP	 GNP per capita 	 Population
1953-1962 7.5 4.0 3.5
1963-1972 10.8 8.1 2.9
1973-1987 8.4 6.5 1.7
Source: Executive Yuan, ROC, Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book, Various years, Quoted from H. Tien, The Great Tran-
sition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of
China (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), p. 27.
In a similar vein, Korea showed very high rate of
population growth in the fifties. But since the early
sixties when the first 5-year economic development plan
was launched, the rate has begun to decline steadily.
Since the early seventies, the rate has declined
considerably, and it definitely helped increase GDP per
capita in Korea since then, as is shown in the following
table.
77 H. Oshima (1993), op. cit., p. 178.
78 H. Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), pp. 26-7.
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<Table 3-8> Average Growth Rate of GDP, Population, GDP
per Capita in Korea, 1971-1990.
GDP	 GDP per capita	 Population
	
1971-1980	 9.0	 10.3	 1.64
	
1981-1990	 9.9	 11.0	 1.10
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning
Board, ROK, Social Indicators in Korea, 1990; The World -
Bank, World Development Report (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1992); Asian Development Bank, Asian Develop-
ment Outlook (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Meanwhile, mainly due to improved medical services,
good nutrition and an overall increase in living stan-
dards accompanied by industrialisation, life expectancy
in Korea and Taiwan has risen. It accordingly con-
tributed to the increase of the population over sixty
five years of age and the growth of the age dependency
ratio of Korea and Taiwan, as is shown in the following
tables.
<Table 3-9> Demographic Changes of Taiwan
Year	 Population	 Percentage of Age Dependency





































= (Pop. 65 years or over /
Source: Council for Economic
ROC, Taiwan Statistical Data




<Table 3-10> Demographic Changes of Korea
Year
	 Population Percentage of 	 Age Dependency
growth rate Aged (over 65)	 Ratio
1960	 n.a	 n.a	 5.3
*2.341965	 n.a	 5.8
1970	 1.97	 3.4	 5.7
1975	 1.61	 3.5	 6.0
1980	 1.57	 3.9	 6.1
1985	 0.93	 4.3	 6.5
1990	 0.97	 n.a	 6.8
data of 1966
** (Pop. 65 years old or over/ Pop. 15-65) * 100
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning
Board, ROK, Social Indicators in Korea, 1990; Ma'or
Statistics of Korean Economy, 1990.
As a result of the increase of the dependency ratio,
aging of the labour force in Korea and Taiwan will also
become a critical concern, with their median ages pro-
jected to increase dramatically over the next two
decades.79
<Table 3-11>





Source: J. Bauer, 'Industrial Restructuring in the NIES:
Prospects and Challenges', Asian Survey, 32:11 (Nov.
1992), Table 2.
These demographic changes definitely increased the in-
tensity of aging as a social problem in both Korea and
Taiwan. In economic terms, aging affects productivity,
79 J. Bauer, 'Industrial Restructuring in the NIES: Prospects and Challenges', Asian Sur-
, 32:11 (Nov. 1992), p. 1020.
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mobility and labour costs. 80 However, the greater signif-
icance of the demographic changes lies in social aspects:
Although family still plays an important role in meeting
the needs of the aged in these societies, it is also true
that the needs for social services for the aged have con-
siderably increased as the traditional lineage system is
steadily breaking down.
3.2.3.2	 Family Structure
According to the teachings of Confucianism, the obedience
of the son to the father is the most notable virtue, and
normally the eldest son is obligated to live with and re-
sponsible for the care of his elderly parents. However,
the rapid industrialisation of Korea and Taiwan during
the last three or four decades seriously increases the
strain of their traditional family system. Mainly due to
the weakening of their traditional lineage system, fewer
people live together in extended family networks, and
, thus their average household size for a family has
steadily decreased.
80 Ibid., p. 1020.
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1990 3.7 4.2 *
1987
Source: Ministry of Interior, ROC, Elderly Welfare in the
Republic of China, 1989; National Bureau of Statistics,
Economic Planning Board, ROK, Social Indicators in Korea,
1992.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the percent of ex-
tended families (three generations or over) has declined
as well. In Korea, the number of these extended families
has declined from 23.2 percent in 1970 to 12.5 percent in
1990.81 In Taiwan, the percent of the aged living with
children has declined: 75.67 percent in 1979, 70.24 per-
cent in 1986, and 65.65 percent in 1989.82
Accordingly, these changes in the family structure of
Korea and Taiwan have caused serious housing problems es-
pecially in metropolitan areas, and have significantly
increased social needs such as the social protection for
the aged living alone.
3.2.3.3 Employment Patterns and Urbanisation
In general, economic growth is accompanied by a transfer
of human and non-human resources from agriculture to in-
81 National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board, ROK, Social Indicators in Ko-
rea, 1992, p. 262.
82 Executive Yuan, ROC, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, 1989.
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dustrial sector, and the cases of Korea and Taiwan are
not exceptions. In Taiwan, more than 90 percent of ex-
ports around 1950 were agricultural products. By the
late eighties, agriculture accounted for only 6 percent.
of GDP, while manufacturers produced nearly one-half of
GDP. Moreover, during the last three decades of the
rapid industrialisation of Korea, agriculture dropped
form 40 percent of GDP to less than 10 percent, while in-
dustry grew from one-quarter to one-half of the economy
over the same period. 83
 Stated briefly, Korea and Taiwan
have become industrialised societies from agriculture
ones during the last three or four decades.
Accordingly, the employment structure of Taiwan has
transformed into the Western type. Employment in the
secondary industry sector (manufacturing, construction
and utilities) and the tertiary one (communications,
transportations and services) has increased, while the
primary production sector has steadily withered away.
The following table shows the trends in the composition
of the labour force by industry.
<Table 3-13> Employment by Industries (Taiwan)
Primary Secondary Tertiary
1965 46.5 22.3 31.2
1970 36.7 28.0 35.3
1975 30.4 34.9 34.7
1980 19.5 42.4 38.1
1985 17.5 41.4 41.1
1989 12.9 42.2 44.9
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development,
ROC, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1990.
83 J. C. Abegglen (1994), op. cit., p. 111.
188







1965 58.5 10.4 31.2
1970 50.4 14.3 35.3
1975 45.7 19.1 35.2
1980 34.0 22.5 43.5
1985 24.9 24.4 50.6
1989 19.5 28.2 52.3
* Social Overhead Capital which includes construction.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning
Board, ROK, Major Statistics of Korean Mconomv, 1990;
Economic Active Population Survey, various issues.
It is interesting to note that the employment patterns
of Korea have changed in a similar way, as is shown in
the above table.
These changes in employment patterns duly spur the high
rate of urbanisation both in Korea and Taiwan. In 1950,
only 24 towns and cities in Taiwan had populations over
5000. By the early eighties, such places numbered nearly
70. 84 Accordingly, the percent of the population in
cities over 100,000 has rapidly increased from 20.7 per-
cent in 1950 to 50.2 percent in 1985. 85 The main cause of
this rapid urbanisation is migration from rural areas,
rather than the natural increase of urban residents. In
Korea, the number of such cities (population of 50,000 or
more) and the share of urban population also increased
from 27 to 62 and 28.0 percent to 69.0 percent, respec-
84 H. Tien (1989), op. cit., p. 30.
85 A. Speare, Jr., P. Liu and C. Tsay, Urbanisation and Development: The Rural-Urban
Transition in Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 18.
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tively, between 1960 and 1987. 86 Like Taiwan, a large
part of urban population growth is accounted for by net
migration. However, it should be pointed out that the
rapid urbanisation of Korea took place mainly in the
largest cities. In 1960, Seoul, the largest city in Ko-
rea accommodated 9.8 percent of the nation's total popu-
lation. By 1987, its share rose to 23.6 percent. 87 But
Taiwan's urbanisation pattern differs from that of Korea.
Taiwan is a geographically compact island and, more im-
portantly, many industries are located in smaller cities
and towns. Thus Taiwan does not have a lop-sided concen-
tration of population in a few metropolitan centres.88
Above all, one of the salient features in the urbanisa-
tion processes of Korea and Taiwan during the last three
or four decades is that rapid urbanisation has taken
place without a high level of urban unemployment, unlike
many developing countries. The urban industries of Korea
and Taiwan were active enough to absorb the job-seekers
from rural areas, and thus they have kept very low rates
of unemployment in urban areas throughout their industri-
alisation processes.
3.2.3.4 Income Distribution
86 K. Kim and E. Mills, 'Urbanisation and Regional Development in Korea , in Korean Eco-
nomic Development, ed. by J. Kwon (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 411-2.
87 Ibid., pp. 412-3.
88 H. Tien (1989), op. cit., p. 30.
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The post-war world widely witnessed increased inequality
of income distribution both between and within countries.
While rich countries were getting richer and richer,
backward economies grew very slowly, falling further and
further behind. What is worse, the domestic income dis-
tribution of these least developed countries has gener-
ally widened the gap between the rich and the poor.
Amongst those least developed countries just after the
second world war, Korea and Taiwan are considered as a
number of exceptional cases of successful economic devel-
opment, which have achieved both growth and equity. They
developed their economies very rapidly without experienc-
ing the customary great and increasing inequalities and
the emergence of mass unemployment. 89 It should be noted,
however, that the economies of Taiwan and Korea also re-
veal some significant differences in income distribution,
as was examined previously. Whereas, in Korea, income
has become quite concentrated at the upper end, the in-
-
come distribution of Taiwan has become more equal, though
both countries show far more equitable development than
most developing countries. Atul Kohli and others, for
instance, found a sharp contrast between Korea and Tai-
wan, at least in the initial phase of industrialisation.
In contrast to Korea which was classified among the
'Countries Showing Significant Rise in Inequality' in
1960-1970, Taiwan was grouped into the 'Countries Showing
Significant Drop in Inequality' in the same period.98
89 T. Scitovsky (1986), op. cit., p. 136.
90 Atul Kohli and others `Inequality in the Third World: An Assessment of Competing Ex-
planations , . Comparative Political Studies, 17:3 (Oct. 1984), Table 2, P. 289. As far
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Moreover, the income gap between the highest and lowest
20 percent in Taiwan is smaller than that in such ad-
vanced countries as United States, Japan, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and West Germany.91
The explanation of this striking difference in income
distribution between Korea and Taiwan lies in large part
with their different degrees of industrial concentration.
Compared to the Korean economy dominated by a number of
large conglomerates, Taiwan has hundreds of thousands of
small and medium sized enterprises. Although it is a
matter of debate whether a high degree of industrial con-
centration is advantageous for economic growth, it is
quite obvious that industrial concentration must have
contributed to the greater income inequality in Korea.92
3.2.3.5 Concluding Remarks
In general, to be a modernised society means that the
society possesses a high degree of self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth, a high level of social mobility, a diffu-
sion of secular-rational norms in the culture, and
as the distribution structure of Korea is concerned, the 1 Kuznet's hypothesis,' which
shows how inequality deepens in the initial phase of industrialisation, and beyond a
certain level of industrialisation improves, could be applied. For the details of the
income distributions of both Korea and Taiwan, refer to National Bureau of Statistics,
Economic Planning Bureau, R.O.K, Social Indicators in Korea, 1990; Korea Institute for
Economic & Technology (KIET), Industrial Structure and Economic Achievement of Korea 
and Taiwan (in Korean), 2nd ed. (Seoul: KIET, 1989); Overall Planning Department, CEPD,
Executive Yuan, R.O.C, Taiwan Economic Statistics, Dec. 1990; Dept. of Statistics, Min-
istry of Interior, R.O.C, Statistical Abstract of Interior of the Republic of China,
1990.
91 H. Tien, op. cit., pp. 26-7.
92 L. Lau, 'Introduction' in Lau (1986), op. cit., p. 9.
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participation in the polity. 93 In other words, industri-
alisation usually brings increases in GNP and reductions
in the unemployment rate by developing economic produc-
tion systems and technology, and more importantly, duly
conveying changes in non-economic spheres: social, cul-
tural and political modernisation. Moreover, modernisa-
tion will not be completed without sustainable growth to
pave the way for other extensive changes in the noneco-
nomic sectors of the society. % Thus development, in this
understanding, must be seen as a social rather than a'
purely economic process.95
We have discussed societal changes in Korea and Taiwan
brought about by their rapid industrialisation in terms
of population, family structure, employment patterns and
urbanisation, and income distribution. We may now draw
our attention to how these societal changes impact the
course of shaping the structure of welfare systems in Ko-
rea and Taiwan.
Industrial development is a critical factor in the gen-
esis of modern welfare institutions and a key correlate
of welfare effort, as a wealth of evidence suggests.96-
93 D. Lerner, 'Modernisation' in International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, Vol.
X., ed. by D. Shills (new York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 386; W. Tsai (1989), op. cit., p.
25.,
94 W. Tsai (1989), op. cit., p. 25.
95 H. Jones, 'Some Factors in Third World Social Policy', Social Policy and Administra-
tion, 17:2 (Summer 1983), p. 107.
96 See, for example, C. Kerr and others, Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems 
of Labour and Management in Economic Growth (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964); H.
Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public
Expenditure (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); P. Cutright, 'Political
Structure, Economic Development, and National Social Security Programs', American Jour-
nal of Sociology 70 (1965), 537-50; P. Flora and A. Heidenheimer (eds.),_The Develop-
ment of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books,
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Thus it seems quite clear that the socio-economic changes.
and associated social problems that emerged during the
industrial transformation of Korea and Taiwan have had a
great effect on the development of their welfare systems.
These socio-economic explanations would provide general
contexts within which the welfare system has developed
and been implemented in such dynamically industrialising
countries as Korea and Taiwan.
In terms of their demographic changes, two prominent
phenomena can be found: the lower rate of population
growth and the increase of dependency ratio, which possi-
bly have far-reaching effect upon the aging problems. In
general, the welfare system directly responsible for the
welfare for the aged is a retirement pension programme.
It is said that Taiwan has a relatively generous state
pension programm497. and its coverage has been steadily ex-
tended. However, it should be noted that many workers do
not build up the necessary service years, because labour
turnover rates are high and many firms in Taiwan are
small and •do not remain in existence for fifteen years.98
Moreover, it is fair to say that therefis no comprehen-
sive pension scheme for the aged in Korea at the moment
since it was not until 1988 that a pension programme was
introduced in Korea. 99 However, it is possible to assert
that a national pension programme of Korea was introduced
1981); J. Midgley, `Industrialisation and Welfare: The Case of the Four Little Tigers',
Social Policy and Administration, 20:3 (Autumn 1986), p. 226;
97 Normally, fifteen years of requirement and up to a maximum of 45 months of wages.
98 W. Galenson, Labour and Economic Growth in Five Asian Countries: South Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 102.
99 Actually, the National Welfare Pension Act was passed in 1973 but has not been en-
forced for fifteen years.
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in 1988 in order to absorb the baby boom generation, usu-r.
ally born in the early sixties, because this generation
entered labour force in the middle of the eighties. It
provides a good example as to how demographic changes
translate into the making of a welfare system.
It is not clear, however, how the changes in family
structure of Korea and Taiwan have affected their welfare
systems. Mainly due to unique family support system,
widely seen in the Confucian countries, it is hard to
find the modification of their welfare systems according
to the changes of family structure. In spite of the de-
cline of the number of family members which causes a.
great demand for housing, there is no comprehensive hous-
ing benefits, and, what is worse, no family allowance
scheme sponsored by the government.
It is quite obvious that changes of employment patterns
in Korea and Taiwan have helped extend the coverage of
such main welfare systems as the National Labour Insur-
ance of Taiwan and the Medical Insurance of Korea. To
say that employment patterns have shifted from the pri-
mary sector to the manufacture sector is to say that peo-
ple in rural areas have flowed into urban areas to pursue
job opportunities. Meanwhile, many of these immigrants
with few skills and little capital were likely to be
placed in small factories in which workers usually were
not covered by the main social insurance schemes. Thus
the existence of these immigrants intensified the neces-
sity of extending the coverage of the welfare systems of
both Korea and Taiwan.
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In the early fifties when the Labour Insurance Act was
first introduced in Taiwan, a person who is employed at
an industrial establishment with ten workers or more was
covered compulsorily. According to industrial develop-
ment in general and the changing employment patterns in
particular, the coverage of the Labour Insurance scheme
was extended to those at an industrial establishment with
five workers or more in 1979. 100
 In Korea as well, when
Medical Insurance, the main social insurance scheme, was
enacted in 1977, only those employed at an industrial es-
tablishment with five hundred workers or more was covered
compulsorily. Since then, there have been successive
amendments to extend the coverage; the coverage of Medi-
cal Insurance was extended to those at an industrial es-
tablishment with three hundred workers or more in 1979,
with hundred workers or more in 1981, and with sixteen
workers or more in 1982, respectively. 1M
However, there is no welfare scheme for unemployed im-
migrants from rural areas in Korea and Taiwan. On the
contrary, the Korean government limits the eligibility
criteria cf Livelihood Protection (Social Assistance) to
those who have lived continuously at least five years in
Seoul and at least two years in other major cities in or-
der to hinder rapid urbanisation.
It is quite clear and widely pointed out that there
has been a huge difference in income distribution between
Korea and Taiwan. While Taiwan has shown a relatively
100 S. Chiang, IA Comparative Study of the Social Insurance System in Korea and Taiwan,
(Unpublished M.A. Dissertation in Seoul National University, 1986).
101 In 1989, a person who is self-employed in urban area came to be covered.
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egalitarian income distribution structure, Korea lags
well behind. However, it is encouraging, as the World
Bank notes, that the Korean government will be focusing
increasingly on social development according to overall
democratisation in Korea. The Sixth Five Year Plan
clearly showed an emphasis on social expenditure in-
creases to improve the standard of living of low-income
households.102
It is quite clear, from the evidence of Korea and Tai-
wan, that industrial development and the accompanied so-
cietal changes do not automatically bring in greater wel-
fare systems. They instead provide a general socio-eco-
nomic context within which their welfare systems have
developed. Moreover when we probe into such academic
themes as the timing of welfare adoption and the level of
welfare expansion more closely, some other variables
should be added. Now we turn our attention to the polit-
ical development of both Korea and Taiwan, which is gen-
erally supposed to have a more direct effect upon the de-
velopment of a welfare system.
102 The World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies (Washington, 1990), p. 300. See also
W. Galenson (1992), op. cit., p. 103.
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3.3	 Political Development of Korea and Taiwan
We have previously reviewed the economic development and
accompanied societal changes in Korea and Taiwan during
their rapid industrialising decades. We now consider the
question of whether their remarkable industrial develop-
ment, which brought affluence and duly contributed to
structural change in their social systems, has facili-
tated their political development.
3.3.1 Relationship between Industrial Development and
Democracy
During the fifties and early sixties, students of devel-
opment studies more or less were optimistic that de-
colonialisation and industrial development would bring
the multiplication of democratic regimes in the Third
World. In .fact, it is quite fair to say that a newly
emerged large middle class, which has a strong demands
for political participation and institutional reforms,
would give a boost to full democracy. It is in line with
the 'no bourgeois, no democracy' thesis, which has been
developed in the history of democratic traditions of the.
Western world.
However, this causal relationship between industrial
development and political reform is not fully relevant to
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most developing countries. O'Donnel, in his research in
South American politics, contends that socioeconomic de-
velopment would instead enhance the authoritarian
regime's oppressive capabilities or set the stage for
praetorian politics. 103
 It, of course, is not exclusively
confined to South American countries. Quite probably, it
is applicable to the political situations of Asian coun-
tries in general. Diamond argues that there is no sig-
nificant correlation between per capita GNP and Gastil's
summary measure of civil and political liberties in his
research of ten Asian countries. 104
 Thus it is quite rea-
sonable when Huntington argues that almost all newly in-
dependent countries became less democratic (Korea, for
example) or remained undemocratic (Taiwan, for exam-
ple)1 25 If so, why is it that the remarkable industrial
development of such developing countries as Korea and
Taiwan has not brought some equally novel political re-
forms ? One possible explanation can be found in their
historical past.
According to Diamond, the supremacy of the state over
civil society has been a major source of difficvlty for
democracy in many Asian countries. 106 He argues:
103 G. O'Donnel, Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South Ameri-
can Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, Univ. of California, 1973).
See also H. Tien, 'Transformation of an Authoritarian Party System: Taiwan's Develop-
ment Experience' in Political Change in Taiwan, ed. by T. Cheng and S. Haggard
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), pp. 37-9.
104 L. Diamond, Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (London: Adamantine Press, 1989),
Vol 3, Table 1.
105 S. Huntington, 'Will More Countries Become Democratic?', Political Science Quarterly,
99:2 (Summer 1984), PP- 193-7-
106 L. Diamond, Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (London: Adamantine Press, 1989),
Vol 3, p. 22.
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If the state is too strong, centralised, and domi-
neering, there will be little to prevent its in-
cumbents from exercising power in an authoritarian
and abusive fashion. ,..., On the other hand, if
the state is too weak, it may be unable to deliver
the social and economic goods that groups are ex-
pecting and demanding, and to maintain order in
the face of conflict group demands.107
Whereas the civil society of the Western societies has
developed since the age of industrialisation, that of de-
veloping countries has been, in general, immature and
weakened, at least partly, by the colonial forces Ob-
viously the civil society, in which strong and autonomous
interest groups and political parties can develop, has
played a great role in establishing the rational-legal
institutions through which various, sometimes factional
interests can be mediated and modified in history.
However, traditionally, the supremacy of the state
(administrative apparatus of the dynasties in Asia) over
the civil society (subjects) has been deeply rooted, in
most of Asian countries, since the medieval ages because
these countries, in large part, have been under the in-
fluence of Chinese culture in which the government offi-
cials were greatly respected and the civilians were
forced to respect them. Although the notion of democ-
racy, modern government administration and rational so-
cial institutions were imported through contact with the
Western societies, this tradition of authoritarianism has
remained very firm in many Asian countries.
It is a very important point in explaining the
establishment of the authoritarian regimes of such Asian
107 Ibid., p. 22.
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countries as Korea and Taiwan, and, what is more, this
tradition is deepened and propelled by the militarisation.
of them. Undoubtedly, it does not imply that those au-
thoritarian military regimes have enjoyed a high level of
political stability. When military regimes retain a re-
actionary attitude toward civil society, their political
instability would be exaggerated. Some would argue, on
the other hand, that there would be no serious political
crisis, if these regimes employed more reform-minded
policies. It should be noted, however, they need great
political endurance and financial support to fulfil the
preconditions for reformative and progressive policies.
Thus they are easily lured to use the coercive and re-
pressive means of control, rather than seeking for con-
sensus and adopting reformative policies in the face of
political crises. What is more, it is widely accepted by
highly ranked civil servants that the authoritarian poli-
cies are a more effective means than democratic one to
pursue national goals such as economic development.
In fact, there are many examples in history of authori-
tarian political regimes, coercively but successfully,
propelling economic development at the sacrifice of po-
litical liberties. Advocates of authoritarian regimes
usually maintain the view that priority should be given
to economic development because democracy, justice, order
and other political propositions are possible only when
people are free from physical needs including food, shel-
ter, disease and so forth. Economic performance is pre-
requisite to, and precondition for the development of
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democracy. Hence the following hypothesis can be pro-
posed; 'If a political regime steadily and deliberately
carries out various economic projects to propel economic
development, the regime's legitimacy will be increased,
and thus no serious political instability or crisis will
be emerged'. However this hypothesis is not grounded in
evidence because political problems of economically suc-
cessful developing countries such as Korea and Taiwan
suggest some important reservat4ons. Diamond describes
the dilemma as follows:
If they (military regimes of rapid developing
economies) do not perform, they lose legitimacy,
since performance is their only justification for
holding power. ,..., If they do perform socio-
economically, they tend to re-focus popular aspi-
rations around political goals for voice and par-
ticipation that they cannot satisfy without termi-
nating their existence.108
Thus:
no matter whether they perform well or badly,
they, in time, face demands for change.109
Sundhaussen calls it as the 'inevitable legitimacy cri-
sis for military regimes'. It surely is mainly due to
the historical characteristics of economic development
itself. Economic development does not occur in a vacuum.
Capital, technology, and labour are very essential ele-
ments for economy. Meanwhile, because most developing
countries lack capital and technology, they commonly have
108 Ibid., p. 33.
109 Sundhausse (1989), 'Indonesia'. Quoted from Ibid., p. 39.
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to foster the labour-intensive industries in the hope
that those industries will play the role of locomotive
for rapid economic development, and, in time, that the
productivity of other industrial sectors will increase.
It is the basic and main economic process of the stage
theory in the tradition of the Modernization schoo1.110
In the cases of Korea and Taiwan, labour intensity has
been strengthened to improve the national competition, as
these economies have been deeply engaged in the world
trade market. As a corollary, the labour forces of these
countries have suffered from low wages, long working
hours, and, in most cases, coarse and even dangerous
working conditions. It is very noteworthy that the po-
litical regimes of the two countries usually enforce very
repressive measures against their citizens for fear of an
uprising. According mainly to the demands of the world
trade market, and partly to the interests of the domestic
ruling group, labour-intensive industries have developed
with the help of their Government's financial and politi-
cal support at the expense of human rights, democracy and
so forth.
More recently, however, both Korea and Taiwan have be-
gun to transform their economic structures from labour-
intensive industries to high value-added ones since the
middle of the eighties, as was examined previously. A
freer movement of technology and information is needed,
which would contribute to a political change toward a.
110 See W. W. Rostow, The Stage of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960); The World Economy: History and Prospect (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1978).
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democracy. Meanwhile, L. Ya-li argues that the estab-
lishment of a viable democratic system in a developing
country consists of two phases: 'the transition from an
authoritarian system into one with some democratic and
liberal features, though not yet a full democracy' and
'the consolidation of the new system and its evolution
into a full democracy' .111 In this regard, both Korea and
Taiwan, which are 'partially democratic and partially au-
thoritarian' U2, can be said to be in the transition phase
from an authoritarian rule to full democracy. During
this phase, the dynamic process of democratisation itself
may be set off by a 'prolonged and inconclusive opponents
political struggle :113
 between advocates and entrenched
opponents of democracy. 114
 However, as economic develop-
ment improves socioeconomic conditions and duly brings
more freedom of civil society, political leaders are
likely to accept democratic values and accordingly take.
some political reform measures toward a full democracy. U5
Now we turn our attention to the political development of
Korea and Taiwan respectively.
111 L. Ya-Li, `Political Developments in the Republic of China , in Democracy and Develop-
ment in East Asia: Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines, ed. by T. Robinson
(Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1990), p. 46.
112 L. Pye, 'The New Asian Capitalism: A Political Portrait', in In Search of an East
Asian Development Model, ed. by P. Berger and H. Hsiao (New Brunswick: Transaction
Books, 1988), p. 81.
113 D. Rustow, `Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', Comparative Politics, 1
(April: 1970), p. 352.
114 H. Tien (1992), op. cit., p. 38.
115 Ibid., p. 38-9.
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3.3.2 Taiwan Politics
When the Kuomintang government retreated from mainland
China and settled down in Taiwan at the end of the for-
ties, it suffered severely from both the domestic and the
external environment; military threat from the Communist
regime in mainland China was intensified coupled with the
Korean war, its economy was very poor and agriculturally-
oriented, and most importantly, the government went deep
into defeatism- 116
 In this situation, the government
seriously and painfully reviewed their defeat in the Chi-
nese continent, and ambitiously undertook land reform,117
which destroyed the agricultural village community, and
accordingly transformed the agricultural labourers into
industrial labourers. 118
 Cal Clark argues about reasons
for the changes of Kuomintang as follows:
First, the KMT concluded that development and
reform were necessary to expand its popular
appeal, ... , Second, _there was considerable
American pressure for liberalisation and for
following the example of the U.S. occupation in
Japan. , ..., Third, industrialisation was viewed
necessary for building a deferse industry.
116 See Cal Clark (1989), op. cit., p. 122
117 In an interview with a Western correspondent in China, Mao resolutely insisted that
explanation for the Communist victory laid in large part with the 'land reform'. With
deep factionalism and corruption, the Kuomintang government was not able to realise its
basic principles, San Min Chu I (nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood), dur-
ing the civil war. It is very noteworthy that the Kuomintang government launched the
nationwide `land reform' in Taiwan soon after its retreat from mainland China. Ac-
cording to one line of argument, the underlying aim of the 'land reform' was to weaken
the economic power of landed aristocracies in Taiwan.
118 Cal Clark argues that 'The subsequent urbanisation and industrialisation of Taiwan
meant that breakdown of village life was associated with growing prosperity, not
poverty', See, Cal Clark (1989), op. cit., p. 125
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Finally, the San Min Chu I certainly called for
economic growth and liberalisation.119
Firmly based on the ideology of San Min Chu I (Three
Principles of nationalism, democracy, and people's
livelihood), and with the relatively well-educated laboui
forces, Taiwan actively participated in the world trade
market and manifested the most successful economic devel-
opment amongst Third World countries. Here it should be
pointed out that, like the Korean economy, the Taiwanese
economy has been basically the `planned economy' in which
the state actively participate and lead the economy sec-
tor. State technocrats and administrators, many of whom
graduated from excellent American universities, were
deeply involved into the industrialisation strategy. It
can be assumed that their skilful and deliberate strategy
for industrialisation coupled with the relatively
educated abundant labour forces brought Taiwan remarkable
prosperity.
Compared with the impressive industrialisation of Tai-
wanuo during the past three or four decades, it is widely
acknowledged that Taiwanhas not duly developed equally
novel political system since 1949 when the R.O.C. govern-
ment retreated from mainland China. Accordingly, little
documentation has been made, at least until the middle of
eighties, to explain the political situation of Taiwan,
and what is worse, it has been imprudently argued by many
119 Ibid., p. 126.
120 Taiwan, with other three East Asian NICs, has been one of few countries which mani-
fested impressive economic growth during the past three decades. Its average annual
growth rate of last four decades is over 9%, saving rate is highest in the whole
world, and most importantly, inequality rate has considerably fallen, and thus has be-
come similar to the levels of the developed countries
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scholars that the government's authoritarian policies
which have sustained relatively stable polity, have
greatly contributed to the rapid economic development in
whole process of Taiwanese industrialisation. However,
when examined closely, it is self-evidently clear that
'economic growth under an authoritarian regime' has a
clear limitation for further development. Undoubtedly,
economic development in capitalist societies should be
accompanied by free communications of informations, free
trade, and ultimately, freedom of civil society. 121
Hence such 'militarised society ,
 in as Taiwan and Ko-
rea, though they might manifested impressive economic
growth in the initial phase of industrialisation, would
reach an impasse in moving towards the status of a devel-
oped country. Furthermore, the annual report of the
World Bank, clearly provides solid ground for the strong
correlation between democracy and economic development.
that most of countries in the category of the 'industrial
market economies' which show highest per capita income
are sorted out as 'democracy', whilst almost all Third
World countries, with few exceptions such as India, are
generally categorised as undemocratic countries.123
121 Economic recoveries of the newly democratising Latin American countries such as Ar-
gentina and Mexico in the beginning of nineties illustrate how important the democratic
value which provides political legitimacy to the regimes is to the production sector.
122 Halliday argues that Korea and Taiwan are not merely societies where military regimes
assume the reins of government, but `militarised society'. See Jon Halliday,
`Capitalism and socialism in East Asia', New Left Review, 124 (1980). In addition, the
martial law had been effective across the island until 1987 when it was brought to an
end.
123 See The World Bank, World Development Report, each year; Samuel P. Huntington, `Will
More Countries Become Democratic?', Political Science Quarterly, 99:2 (Summer 1984),
193-218. In it, the author further argues that `the failure of democracy to develop in
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In all respects, the Taiwanese polity can be well-
equipped to the 'authoritarianism' in the Western per-
spectives. 124
 However it should be pointed out that au-
thoritarian regimes vary country to country and period to
period as well. Thus the R.O.C. government in Taiwan
must be distinguished from the Bismarkian regime in the
end of 19th century, from the 'Bureaucratic-Authoritari-
anism' in Latin American countries, and also from the
fascist regimes. It truly is the Chinese expression of
the modern historical context within which her government
has developed. To have a good grip on the nature of the
R.O.C. government, one should pay anattention to what
the Confucianism is and how much it has had an affect on
Chinese politics.
Confucianism, or the Confucianists in general, has al-
ways placed great emphasis on the 'cause' rather than on
the legally based rational processes. Once they assume
their own 'cause', the rational process, if it is not in
accord with the cause, would be readily withdrawn or even
neglected. Provided that R.O.C. regime, as the de jure
government of China, proclaims the restoration of main-
land China125
 (Cause), and thus tries to maintain the na-
tional unity, they are not hesitant to be at the expense
of other values such as democratisation, free speech, and
Third World countries despite their economic growth can, perhaps, be related to the
nature of that growth'. p. 204.
124 Winckler argues that Taiwan is best understood as a gerontocratic-authoritarian
regime. See Edwin A. Winckler, `Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism', The China
Quarterly, no. 99 (Sep. 1984) p. 482
125 In fact, the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was not much interested in the industrial-
isation of Taiwan. His efforts were mainly devoted to the restorations of mainland
China.
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multiparty parliament, which might, at least for its
part, be regarded as the obstacle for national unity. It
is in this regard that the R.O.C. government has main-
tained the inflexible foreign policies towards Communist
regimes such as three 'No's: 'No Negotiations', 'No Com-
promise', and 'No Contacts'.
In sum, major defects, derived mainly from the strident
policies of the government, of the Taiwanese polity can'
be described as follows:
First, the system created the possibility of a
strong president who could dominate the system
even within the constitutional framework;,...,
Second, the extraconstitutional fact that the
R.O.C. has essentially been a one-party state
meant that many of the democratic elements
envisioned by the constitution were drastically
curtailed. Third, the Constitution contained an
'emergence' clause that constitutional provisions
could be restricted by law. ,..., Finally, the
conditions of open civil war that existed when the
Constitution was adopted created less than optimum
conditions for the exercise of democratic
rights. 126
In addition, it is very interesting to see that TW
(Tang Wai: outside the party, literally, which represents
the political opposition against the ruling party, Kuom-
intang) maintains to stick to the 'cause' as well. When
they gathered together and tried to establish the DDP
(Democratic Progressive Party), the government were
likely to arrest the participants of the meeting. In
this situation, whilst the leaders of the DDP attempted
to compromise with the governmental authorities through
private channels, 'they were unwilling to take such a
126 Cal Clark (1989), op. cit., p. 116.
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conciliatory stance publicly1.127	 The uncompromising
stance of both sides characterises, so we call, the tran-
sition periods from authoritarianism to democracy.
Numerous accounts have been made to explain the `cause
and effect' of democratisation, and further to manifest
the laws or regularities of democratising processes in a
world-wide context. True, as far as the political devel-
opment of the past two centuries after the French Revolu-
tion is concerned, it is best understood as the `ups and
downs' of democracy. Shifting from the democratic regime
to autocratic one had been frequently found in many Euro-
pean countries such as Germany, Italy and Spain in the
first half of the twentieth century. Therefore, when we
think about the historical context within which the demo-
cratic system is developed and implemented, it seems ex-
tremely hard to manifest to what extent and under what
condition can democratic regime emerge.
However eighties of the twentieth century can be named
as the overwhelming democratisation, or the breakdown of
dictatorship in other word, of the Third World countries.
which were traditionally characterised as nondemocratic
systems. 128 The beginning of eighties widely witnessed
the retreat of military regimes of Latin American coun-
tries, 129 and the `Yellow Revolution' in Philippines has
had a great impact on the neighbouring Asian countries.
127 See, Yangsun Chou and Andrew J. Nathan, 'Democratizing Transition in Taiwan', Asian
Survey, 27:3 (March 1987), P- 288
128 Huntington decisively argues that 'With a few notable exceptions, almost all colonies
that achieved independence after World War II shifted from democratic to nondemocratic
systems'. See, Samuel P. Huntington (1984), op. cit., p. 197
129 By 1983, Argentina had a democratically elected government and Brazil also manifested
impressive progress towards democracy. Ibid., p. 197
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In 1987 the Korean government was forced by the citizen
movement to reluctantly accept the direct presidential
election which, at least partly, guarantees the demo-
cratic political system. More recently, the sweeping
democratisation of the Eastern European countries illus-
trate that democracy has been the Zeit Geist throughout
the eighties.130
In this regard, the sequent reforms of Taiwanese Polity
(12th (1986) and 13th (1988) Party Congress of the ruling
Kuomintang] are in line with the democratising trends of
the Third World countries throughout the eighties. Three
most prominent political reforms were carried out during
1986-1988:
1. the formation and institutionalisation of an
opposition party in 1986.
2. the abolition of martial law and absorption of
open dissent and public demonstrations in 1987
and 1988.
3. leadership change and liberalisation after the
death of President Chiang Ching-kou in 1988.131
The aforementioned political reforms are largely based
on the six-point programme of the proposal of the special
Task Force in June of 1986:'
1. To conduct a large-scale supplementary election
to the central representative organs.
2. To put local self-government on a legal basis.
3. To simplify the national security laws.
4. To provide a legal basis for formation of new
civic associations.
5. To strengthen public order.
130 What the most distinguished nature of the democratisation movement of these former
authoritarian regimes is that it is brought out by the ordinary citizen, neither by po-
litical elites, nor by the deliberate institutionalisation of political conflicts.
131 Cal Clark (1989), op. cit., p. 136.
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6. To strengthen party work.132
Based on the above programmes, the Kuomintang has grad-
ually transformed itself from the power concentration
typed Lennist party to more democratic one in ways to re-
lease the martial law on the one hand, and to compromise
with the political opposition groups on the other hand.
Thus the government has come to permit the formation of
political party on conditions that 'party members must
uphold the 1947 constitution of the ROC, be anti-commu-
nist, and oppose any move to establish an independent'
Taiwan. 1133
The present political problems with which the Taiwanese
polity faces are largely twofold: the weakening of the
international status 134
 which definitely causes legitimacy
crisis of the Kuomintang government and the demand of
political participation of islanders m who proclaims the
independence of Taiwan. These two political problems
will persistently force the government to accept the
flexible and pragmatic policies.
132 Yangsun Chou and Andrew J. Nathan (1987), op. cit. ,, p. 286 The formation of the po-
litical party is legally grounded by this programme. However it is noteworthy that the
government did not directly clarify the legal permission of formation of political
party. In fact, the Kuomintang Secretary and Legislative Assemblyman Mah Soo-lay, in
an interview with the Central Daily News on Nov. 12th of 1986, argues that "the key to
party politics is not whether different parties can take turns to rule, but whether the
ruling party is sincere and honest in implementing democracy". It means that the basic
concept of parliament democracy in the Western societies is not accord with the Tai-
wanese polity. See, Chung-yang jih-pao, November 12, 1986, p. 2, quoted from Ramon H.
Myers, 'Political Theory and Recent Political Developments in the Republic of China',
Asian Survey, 27:9, (Sep. 1987), pp. 1007-1008.
133 See, Chung-yang jih-pao, Oct. 9, 1986, pp. 1-4.
134 It will be discussed in details in chapter four.
135 The difference between mainlanders and islanders are rather clear. Chinese who came
from mainland China with the Koumintang government in the end of forties and their de-
scendants are generally called as 'mainlanders'.
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However, it can be argued, compared to the neighbouring
countries, that the present Kuomintang regime has rela-
tively high political legitimacy from the people because
the Kuomintang has maintained around seventy per cent of
support in the recent successive elections. Therefore,
as was noted by Chou and Nathan, the future evolution of
Taiwan's political system depends more on the flexible
adaptation of the KMT (Kuomintang) towards the both do-
mestic and international changes than on the democratic
movement of opposition group. U6
In all respects, the democratic processes of Taiwan in
the end of eighties are different from those of the.
aforementioned Second and Third World countries, because
it has progressed through the institutionalisation by the
power elites of the ruling party, rather than through vi-
olent movements. The future Taiwanese politics will rep-
resent both the limitations and possibilities of democ-
racy in the Third World countries.
3.3.3 Korean Politics
Political cataclysm and coups have been widely witnessed
in the post-war Third World countries in general. Mainly
due to the legacy of colonialism, the newly independent
countries neither experienced nor developed their own p0-
136 Yangsun Chou and Andrew J. Nathan (1987), op. cit., p. 296
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litical system relevant to their situations, but just
tried to transplant the democratic political institutiona
developed in the Western society. In fact, the concept
of democracy itself does not fit to colonial situations
at all. They haven't experienced democracy, nor been
disciplined as a democratic citizen, irrespective of
whether they recognised what the democracy meant or not.
Although every independent regimes proclaimed democracy
but the gap between rhetoric and reality remained huge.
Moreover, the lack of competent politicians and adminis-
trators, coupled with the evacuation of the colonial ad-
ministrators, to run these institutions worsened the po-
litical situations. Under such circumstances, it would
not be surprising to see that most of newly independent
countries have suffered from the unstable political situ-
ations since their independence.
Looking back to the history of Korean politics since
her independence, we can find the typical form of politi-
cal orbit largely shared with other newly independent
countries: corrupted authoritarian rules, coups, civil
resistance and coups again. Thus it would be a natural
course that each newly emerged regimes has suffered from
the lack of legitimacy in its power transition period.
This legitimacy crisis and its response of the regime are
our main concern of this section.
As was examined earlier the response of regimes facing
a legitimacy crisis depends on the source of crisis it-
self. Unlike the legitimacy crisis of Taiwan being com-
pared, it was exclusively a domestic matter. More pre-
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cisely, it came from the political struggle of power
elites.
Facing the legitimacy crisis, two options can be con-,
sidered in general; strengthening the repressive appara-
tus, first of all, and the application of appeasement ap-
paratus (social integration) secondly. This traditional
policy of 'stick and carrot' has dominated the political
situation of Korea since the former president Park seized
power by the coup in May, 1961. It can be estimated that
his regime skilfully utilised these two social appara-
tuses and kept a balance between the two throughout his
terms, until 1979.
On the one hand, the response patterns of his regime
represented repressive nature, especially when in crisis
caused from the civil resistance: martial laws have been
frequently proclaimed, the right of speech and publica-
tion have been yielded under censorship, and opposition
leaders have been deterred from political activities, and
sometimes, jailed. These repressive policies were justi-
fied by the military and ideological conflicts with the
North Korea. He also utilised the division situations
into his domestic rule.
On the other hand, he wisely recognised that the suc-
cessful economic development was the best way to achieve
the legitimacy of his regime. Accordingly, he launched
ambitious economic development plannings, and it turned
out to be the prominently successful so as to be an envy
of all developing countries. He timingly accepted the
export-oriented industrialisation strategy and pursued
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rapid growth policy throughout his reign. In fact, the
economic prosperity of eighties can be appraised as the
outcome of his initial design.
Seen in this light, it is fair to say that the members,
of ruling democratic party and the government of 1960-
1961, which was regarded as the only legitimated regime
until the early of nineties, were not competent enough to
accomplish the successful industrialisation, though they
had faith in democracy. They did not present determined
will to industrialise the country, nor did they effec-
tively control the erupted needs from all sectors of so-
ciety. Their incompetence probably was due to the pro-
cess of seizing the power itself, since they assumed the
rein of government on occasion of the mass demonstration
of April in 1960, which made the first president Lee re-..
tire from politics. It is fairer to say that they did
not actively get the power but received from the people.
Their ineptitude towards confusion period resulted in the
coup of 1961.
Although it is the majority view that the coup was
brought about by the political struggle between military
elites, we have to recognise the political context within
which the coup was possible. Looking back to the socio-
political situations of Korea in the fifties and early
sixties, we can easily find that most modernised and
probably most resourceful social group was military
elites, who usually were educated in U.S.A. Whilst most
of the high ranked civil servants were trained by the
Japanese colonial administration and kept their adminis-
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tration skill even after the independence, the military
organisation, rapidly developed on occasion of the Korean
war, actively accepted the modern administration skills.
Seen in this light, the political participation the mili-
tary elites might be inevitable, whether it be a coup or.
other way.
However, the political misfortune of the former presi-
dent Park lay in the fact that his regime had suffered
from the lack of legitimacy throughout his eighteen years
rule, in spite of his successful achievements in economic
development. He could not overcome the political burden,
that he overthrew the de jure government, until his
death. Undergoing three subsequent direct presidential
elections, 137
 he designed more effective and power-concen-
trated political system, and carried out his second coup
(Siwol Yushin) in October 1972.138
After the coup, his regime, which established the cen-
tralised power system, could concentrate defence and eco-
nomic development without the burden of politics, and
successful overcame the first oil shock. It should be
emphasised, however, that 'authoritarianism without le-
gitimate authority' inevitably brings corruption, abuse
of power and, most importantly, cannot effectively and
137 He won narrowly at his last direct presidential election in 1971 with the opposition
candidate Mr. Kim Dae-jung. In this election he garnered 6,342,828 votes, whilst Mr.
Kim won 5,395,900 votes. See, The Political Chronology of the Republic of Korea: 1945-
i2, National Assembly Library, 1984 (in Korean). Reference Material for Enactment
No. 235. In his election campaign, the opposition candidate Mr. Kim criticised and
warned that then incumbent president Park was planning the generalissimo system which
guaranteed his lifelong presidency. His predict turned out to be true by Siwol Yushin.
138 For more details about the Siwol Yushin, refer for example to Byungsun Kahng, 'The
Yushin Constitution and the Establishment of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in the Re-
public of Korea', Korea Observer: A Quarterly Journal, 23:2 (Summer 1992), 177-95.
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resourcefully cope with the various demands duly devel-
oped and spurted from the socio-economic development.
These needs from time to time turned to the political
participation demands, but the existing authoritarian po-
litical system was not able to control, nor channel these
demands skilfully. Their solution, unfortunately, was
enforcing more repressive measures in response with ever
strengthening political demands.
The end of the seventies witnessed the very consider-
able side effects of the rapid industrialisation; eco-
nomic inequality, labour unrest and widespread demands
for democratisation. Faced with this political crisis,
the conflicts amongst power elites revealed in dealing
with the Pusan and Masan incident, ultimately resulted in
the assassination of the former president Park in 1979.
The vacancy of absolute power absolutely brings polit-
ical confusion. Amidst-this situation, the newly emerged
military elites skilfully utilised this confusion and fi-
nally succeeded in seizing power by the coup in May 1980.
This new military group created the new security-oriented
regime under the control of general Chun.
Like his predecessor, the former president Park, the
newly elected 139
 president Chun has suffered from the le-
gitimacy crisis throughout his reign. What is worse, the
legitimacy crisis was intensified by his military sup-
pression against the democratic movement in Kwangju dur-
ing the coup in 1980. During his seven year rule, he ex-
ercised almost absolute power to all sectors of society
139 He was not elected as a president by direct presidential election but by the voting
college, which did not represent the political preference of the population.
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and drove the country into the militarised society in or-
der to keep his power.
Although the Korean economy developed remarkably and
power was peacefully transferred to the successor during
his rule, 140 he could not overcome the legitimacy crisis
of his regime, mainly caused from his coup and cruel sup-
pression of the Kwangju democratic movement. Along with
the national prosperity and the increase of civil soci-
ety, political discontent was more and more deepened and
spread amongst people, which resulted in the success of
June Resistance in 1987. Facing with this mass demon-
stration, the presidential candidate of then ruling
party, Mr. Noh reluctantly proclaimed the programmes for
democracy including the acceptance of the direct presi-
dential election and the political pardon of the opposi-
tion leader Mr. Kim Dae-jung.
It is widely accepted that the period of authoritarian
rule has passed by since the directly elected former
president Noh assumed the rein of the government in 1988:
Thus we may assume that the serious legitimacy crisis
that the former president Park and Chun used to suffer
has not occurred in the Korean political situation since
1987. It should be emphasised, however, that every
regime in every epoch in history has faced political cri-
sis. Moreover, it would not be absurd to say that some-
times political crises may be utilised to make the regime
more susceptible and resourceful to the political demands
of people. Thus we can argue that the political success
140 It was the first time in the Korean history since independence that the power of
regime has transferred peacefully to the next regime.
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of the regime depends on the response to the imminent
• crisis of the time.
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Chapter Four: Welfare in Taiwan
4.1 Overview of the Taiwanese Welfare System
4.2 Major Factors Affecting the Adoption and
Expansion of the Taiwanese Welfare System
4.3 Concluding Remarks
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4.1	 Overview of the Taiwanese Welfare System
It would be too ambitious to attempt to summarise or out-
line the whole welfare system in such a limited space:
This section thus does not embrace a comprehensive fea-
ture of the Taiwanese welfare system nor does analyse
deeply enough to produce, justify or criticise some opin-
ions. It simply is designed to offer some background
study for the further argument of this research. How-
ever, it is also true that sometimes a, synopsis will more
effectively increase the understanding to the basic na-
ture of the welfare system, when accounted for by those
who fully comprehend the cultural context within which it
has developed and been implemented, rather than scruti-
nizing every details of social provisions.
The Republic of China, 1 the longest independent state
of the world, 2 has maintained its own traditional way of
life and thinking on the basis of `harmony with external
world'. Looking back to the history of China, there have
been many invasions of the neighbouring countries, and
some of them succeeded to destroyed the existing dynasty
and occupied the centre of the China. 3 It is worthy of
notice, however, that once the external culture came into
1	 The Republic of China (ROC) is an official name, which covers all over the mainland
China. Taiwan is one of the thirty five provinces in China and is the main territory
presently under the control of the ROC. In this thesis, the Taiwan is mainly used un-
less otherwise noticed.
2 The first dynasty appeared in Chinese history was the Hsia dynasty dates back 2205,
B.C.
3 The most recent example is the Ching dynasty (1644 - 1911).
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China, it turned into the Chinese culture very quickly.
It is undoubtedly due to the basic characteristic of the
Chinese, so we call, 'harmony with the nature'. Thus it
is not surprising to see that the concept of the Western
welfare state has been melted into the traditional Chi-
nese system.
It is widely accepted that the modern welfare system is
based on the 'Three Principles of the People' (San-min-
chu-i) 4 delivered by Dr. Sun Yat-sen? in 1923 in Canton,
which have served as a guiding principle to the Chinese
government and people. These ideals are clearly spelled
out in the preface to the Constitution as 'in accordance
with the teachings bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, • •
safeguard the rights of the people, ensure social tran-
quillity, and promote the welfare of the people'. Ac-
cording to these ideals in the preface, the Constitution
clarifies the responsibility of the State to improve the
social security as follows:
1. To provide suitable opportunity for work to
people
2. To improve the livelihood of labourers and
farmers
4 These three tenets, now the backbone of the ROC constitution, are the Principle of Na-
tionalism, the Principle of Democracy and the Principle of Social Well-being. The KMT,
the ruling Kuomintang later adopted these ideals as its basic approach to government
and nation. See Republic of China Yearbook 1991-92 (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Com-
pany, 1991), p. 12. It should be pointed out, however, it was not delivered from the
logical or rational theoretical basis. Rather, it is best understood as a political
appeal to the Chinese people who suffered from the poverty, desperation and division.
It was later succeeded by the `New Life Movement' of Taiwan commanded by the Generalis-
simo Chang Kai-shek.
5 It is very interesting that he is admired by both ROC and PROC as a great patriot and
a founding father of modern China, though he denied the inevitability of Communism in
China.
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3. Capital and labour in harmony and cooperation
4. To establish a social insurance system in order
to promote social welfare
5. To promote the welfare of women and children in
order to consolidate the foundation of national
existence and development
6. To establish extensive services for sanitation
and health protection in order to improve
national health (Articles 152 to 157)
It can be argued that these destinations of the Con-
stitution are the modern expression of the Chinese cul-
ture in accordance with the rapid industrialisation dur-
ing the last three or four decades. It should be empha-
sised, however, that they have developed the welfare sys-
tem on the basis of their own tradition, different from
the Western welfare states.
Compared to the Western culture or value system based
on individuality, the Confucian countries in Asia as well
as the traditional Chinese culture have bestowed their
supreme value to family. It is very interesting to note
that this family-oriented nature of the Chinese culture
is clearly exemplified in the Taiwanese welfare system.
In Taiwan, the welfare services for the less-privileged
people like the aged, disabled and children traditionally
belongs to the responsibility of the family. Moreover, it
is a reality that nearly all welfare benefits are given
to the family, not to individuals.6
Now we turn our attention to the government adminis-
tration of the welfare system in Taiwan, and see whether
6 Ministry of Interior (MOI), Social Welfare of the Republic of China: Thought, System, 
and Implementation  (Taipei: Government Information Office, ROC, 1989, updated source),
pp. 2-3. Pages of this document may be varied from the original version because I
don't keep a original book but a document file in a computer diskette.
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or, if any, how different culture bears to the different
administration.
4.1.1	 Administration of the Welfare System
4.1.1.1 Administration of ROC government in general
According to the ROC Constitution, the ROC government is
divided into three main levels; central, provincial and
county/city, each of which has well-defined powers.7
The ROC Constitution, which was adopted, promulgated
and began to be effective before the Kuomintang govern-
ment retreated from the mainland China, bestows the high-
est representative of the nation to the president. He
shall be the head of the state and shall have supreme
command of the land, sea and air force of the whole coun-
try. 8 Under his presidency, there are five branches of
the central government; the Executive Yuan, the Legisla-
tive Yuan; the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and
7 For the power of each level of governments, see The Republic of China Yearbook, 1991-
2, pp. 86-123.
8 Adopted by the National Assembty on December 25, 1946, promulgated by the National
Government on January 1, 1947, and effective from December 25, 1947. Since the Consti-
tution defines the ROC government in Taiwan as the only legitimate (de jure) government
in China, the president represents whole Chinese population and the central government
under his presidency duly covers whole China. They still see the Communist regime in
mainland China as the `Communist Rebellion'. Although the President Lee signed the
document authorizing the termination of the `Period of National Mobilisation for Sup-
pression of Communist Rebellion' in May 1, 1991, it does not necessarily mean that the
ROC government approve the Communist government in China. Refer to Presidential Press
Conference by Lee, Teng-Hui, on April 30, 1991.
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the Control Yuan. 9 They are the highest national govern-
ment organs. According to the Constitution, the Execu-
tive Yuan is the highest administrative organw and has
eight ministries, one of which is the Ministry of Inte-
rior which is directly responsible for social security.
The Taiwan Provincial Government was established in May
1947 as the highest administrative organ of the province.
Its principal functions are to handle the general admin-
istrative affairs of the province, to supervise the local
governments, and to promulgate and issue laws and regula-
tions only to the extent that these do not conflict with
the central government. In both 1967 and 1979, two main
cites, Taipei and Kaohsiung changed their administrative
status to the special municipalities under the direct ju-
risdiction of the Executive Yuan."
Under the jurisdiction of the province are counties and
cities, each of counties has a county government and
council and each of cites has a city government and coun-
cil. By law, the organisations of the county and munici-
pality governments are similar to that of provincial gov-
ernment./2
9 For the functions and powers of each branches, see The Republic of China Yearbook,
1991-92, pp. 91-104.
10 Article 53, Constitution of the Republic of China.
11 About the ROC local governments, refer to The Republic of China Yearbook, 1991-2, pp.
110-123.
12 Ibid., p. 116.
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4.1.1.2 Administration of Welfare Services
Social Welfare agencies exist at all three different ad-
ministrative levels of ROC government; central, provin-
cial and county/city.13
The Social Affairs Department in the Ministry of the
Interior and the Council of Labour affairs of the Execu-
tive Yuan are jointly and directly responsible for the
planning and development of social welfare programmes.14
While the department of social affairs of the centrai.
government is responsible to planning, legislation and
supervision of services, the counterparts of the provin-
cial government and municipal government are in charge of
implementation of such services. 15 The Taiwan Provincial
government and two municipal city government have the De-
partment of Social Affairs and the Department of Labour
Affairs, directly responsible for implementing welfare
services for each jurisdiction. In county and cities un-
der provincial jurisdiction, the Social Affairs Bureau or
Section is responsible for welfare services.
Meanwhile, the existence of good qualified social work-.
ers is most essential for both planning and implementing
of welfare services. According to the Social Welfare
Act, each government units responsible for welfare ser-
13 Ibid., p. 245.
14 The Council of Labour Affairs, established in 1987, provides employment guidance and
Labour welfare services in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior. For more details
about the ministries, commissions and councils under the Executive Yuan, refer to
Ibid., pp. 92-5.
15 Gordon Hou-Sheng Chan, 'Taiwan/ in Social Welfare in Asia, ed. by J. Dixon and H. S.
Kim (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 332.
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vices recruits qualified professional social workers.
The professional quality of them has greatly improved and
there are 2991 social workers are working for the Govern-
ment in 1991.16
4.1.2 Welfare Enactment and Welfare Expenditure since
1960s
This section is designed to provide basic sources for an
analysis of the determinants of welfare development in
the next section. It presents two specific welfare ef-
forts: welfare enactment and welfare expenditure. The
following table (Table 4-1) and figure (Figure 4-1) show
major welfare enactments and trends of welfare ex-
penditures of Taiwan since the early sixties.
16 There are two different ways to train social workers: school education and on-the-job
training. For more details about the professional social workers working for the gov-
ernment, refer to Ministry of Interior (1989), op. cit., pp. 11-2. Pages may vary.
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<Table 4-1> Welfare Enactments of Taiwan
Year No. of Enactment	 Contents
1968	 1	 Labour Insurance Law Revised
1973	 2 •	 Children's Welfare Law
Labour Insurance Law Revised




	 1	 Labour Insurance Law Revised
1980
	 4	 Welfare Law for the Aged





1983	 1	 Vocational Training Law
1984
	 1	 Labour Standards Law
1988
	 2	 Labour Insurance Act
The Settlement of Labour
Disputes Law
1989	 1	 Juvenile Welfare Law
1990	 1	 Welfare Law for the Disabled
and Handicapped Revised.
Source: Government Information Office, ROC, Social Wel-
fare of the Republic of China: Thought, System, and Im-
plementation, 1989 (updated source).
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% of Whole Government Expenditure 	 % of GN
80 85 87 89
<Figure 4-1>
Welfare Expenditure of Taiwan
% of Government Expenditure & GNP
% of Gov't Expenthe --1— % of GNP
68 60
	 65	 70	 76
Year
Taiwan Statistical Data Book, CEPD, ROC,
1990, Yearbook of Financial Statiatios,
MOF, ROC, 1988
Meanwhile it should be pointed out that the welfare ex-
penditure being used in this section comprises wide range
of public services including community development and
environment protection. 17 The following table shows the
structure of the welfare expenditure.
17 If the social welfare expenditure (social insurance, social assistance and welfare
services) alone is taken into consideration, it would be more vividly reflect the po-
litical intention of the government. In fact, the term of social security in Chinese
character literally comprises wide range of public policies, and thus it was not easy
for me to get the data that the social welfare expenditure alone was recorded during my
data collection trip in Taiwan. However, it can be said that the social security
expenditure which includes public services such as community development and




Structure of Social Security Expenditure of 1992, All
Level Governments	 Unit: %
Central Taipei Kaohsuing	 Taiwan	 Total
A 60.14 21.34 17.62 36.94 47.89
B 2.82 0.11 0.14 19.05 6.20
C 22.18 18.13 21.44 6.33 19.19
D 1.38 1.22 1.20 1.19 1.17
E 2.92 9.73 6.69 3.21 3.67
F 5.52 22.99 15.63 17.35 9.33
G 5.03 26.48 37.28 15.94 12.55
Total 100 100 100 100 100
A: Social Insurance
B: Social Assistance
C: Social Welfare Services
D: National Job-placement
E: Housing and Community Development
F: Public Health
G: Environment Protection
Source: Ministry of Interior (MOI), ROC, Report of Budget
and Execution of All Levels of Government, 1993 (in Chi-
nese).
4.1.3	 Implementation of Welfare Programmes
In this section, the practical provision of three main
welfare schemes; social insurance, social assistance and
welfare services, will be sketched very briefly.
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4.1.3.1 Social Insurance
Social insurance, first statutory welfare scheme insti-
tuted by the government, has been put into operation
since 1950. Like other welfare system of developing
countries, the social insurance scheme in Taiwan has been
strongly influenced by the welfare state development in
the post-war Europe, especially in Britain and West
Germany. M
Now it comprises various social insurance programmes:
labour insurance, government employee insurance, military
servicemen's life insurance, insurance for the teaching
and administrative staffs of private schools, and compre-
hensive accident insurance for students. In addition,
the insurance scheme for coal minersw and farmers were
introduced in 1986 and 1988 respectively. 20 Amongst them,
undoubtedly the labour insurance has been held central
not only in social insurance schemes but in overall wel-
fare system.21
Labour insurance has been revised several times since
its set up in 1940, each of which has expanded the cover-
age and increased the benefits. In 1950 when a new
labour insurance scheme was created by the provincial
government, only those employees who worked for companies
with 20 employees or over were eligible to be insured.
18 Gordon Hou-Sheng Chan (1985), op. cit., p. 326.
19 Full name is the Coal Miners , Group Safety Insurance.
20 The Republic of China Yearbook, 1991-92. p. 249.
21 It is in this regard that the other insurance schemes, which aim to cover for special
occupations, are excluded in this discussion.
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One year later, its coverage has extended to the workers
in the work places with 10 employees or over. It further
expanded in 1979 to all workers in private firms with
more than five employees. 22 The present Labour Insurance
Act specifies that all workers in Taiwan between the ages
of 15 to 60 are covered in the insurance scheme.23
The aim of the labour insurance is not single but man-
ifold, though the prime object is to safeguard the in-
sured in case of accident. It has been expected to re-
distribute the nation's wealth, to accumulate the capi-
tal, accrued from contributions, during the economic de-
velopment, to reduce the government's financial burden,
and to stabilise the supply of labour force. 24 It pro-
vides wide range of protection in case of maternity, in-
jury, medical care, disability, old age, and death,
still are not insured. 25 The ratethough the unemployed
of premium for normal accident insurance has
the Labour Insurance Act at 7 percent of




pay 20 percent of the premium, whilst the employers pay
remaining 80 percent.26
22 Gordon Hou-Sheng Chan (1985), op. cit., pp. 326-7.
23 Ministry of Interior (1989), op. cit.,, p. 13. Page may vary.
24 Ibid., p. 13. Page may vary.
25 Ibid., p. 13-4. Pages may vary.
26 For the self-employed insurers, 40 percent of premium shall be subsidized by the




Social assistance scheme of Taiwan, like the counterparts
of other countries, has been set up on the principle of
'safety net', and thus is in nature ancillary to social
insurance scheme. It provides living subsidy, assistance
for medical care, emergency relief, and relief for disas-
ter for those who are not eligible to be insured in the
present social insurance scheme.
As the social insurance was created under the influence'
of the post-war European welfare state, the social assis-
tance was greatly influenced by the 'War on Poverty' wel-
fare programmes in the 60s of USA. Two prominent social
assistance programmes, Shao-kang (little well-off, liter-
ally) and An-kang (healthy and wealthy, literally) were
launched to tackle the poverty by providing vocational
training, short-term loans for the self-employed and res-
idential care for unattended chronically ill and disabled
people.27
4.1.3.3	 Welfare Services
Some less-privileged people among child, juveniles, the
aged, disabled and handicapped are entitled to receive
special welfare services, according to their needs.
27 It is fair to say that these two welfare programmes are mixture of social assistance
and welfare services. See Gordon Hou-Sheng Chan (1985), op. cit., pp. 327-8.
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Compared to the Western societies, East Asian countries
in general are `young' societies, in which the ratio of
children population is relatively high. In Taiwan, more
than 4.2 million people are under the age of 12, which
represents over one fifth of whole population. Among
those children, orphans, mentally retarded and disabled
and children from low-income families are now receiving
special benefits from the government.m
The Chinese society traditionally has emphasised the
respect for the aged, consistent with the Confucian
teachings. While most elderly people thus are now under
the care of their offsprings, some of them without family
needs special institutional care from the government.
There are two different residential homes for the needy
elderly; the `Homes for Aged People' and the `Homes of
the Retired Servicemen' .29
In 1990, it was estimated that there were 154,162 hand-
icapped and disabled people in the Taiwan province, each
of whom has a `Disabled and Handicapped Handbook'. The
purpose of the welfare programmes for the disabled is to
help them receive adequate education, training and as-
sistance. The government is now providing special care'
and education according to their special needs.3°
28 The Children's Welfare Law enacted in 1973 subsidises needy families and funds day-
care centres and juvenile homes. See The Republic of China Yearbook, 1991-92. p. 245.
29 The ratio of people over 65 has increased very steadily since 1950s. In 1992, they
represent 6 percent of whole population. See, Ibid. p. 246. See also, Ministry of In-
terior (1989), op. cit., pp. 18-9. Pages may vary.
30 For more details about the government's service for the disabled, refer to Ministry of
Interior (1989), op. cit., p. 19 . The Republic of China Yearbook, 1991-92. p. 247-8.
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4.2 Major Factors Affecting the Adoption and Expansion
of Taiwanese Welfare System
In this section, the factors affecting welfare enactments
and expenditure will be classified. However, since we
recognise that the variables examined in previous chapter
are not entirely satisfactory to be virtually and univer-
sally applicable to any country, they will be modified in
accordance with the particular situations of each indi-
vidual country. In selecting the variables being exam-,
ined in this chapter, the following considerations have
been taken into account:
1. Factors which are duly accorded with the
particular historical context within which
Taiwan has developed since 1949.
2. Factors which reflect both domestic and
international situations.
3. Factors which have continuously and seriously
affected the socio-politico-economic
situations of Taiwan.31
According to newly classified variables, modified for
the social, economic and political situations of Taiwan
since the sixties, the most significant factor(s) in wel7.
fare state development of Taiwan will duly be identified.
This will contribute to sharpening and deepening the un-
31 It is in this regard that such factors as the ideology, riots, age of programme, age
of population, and diffusion theses examined in the chapter two are duly disregarded.
According to the particular situations of Taiwan, the battles with P.R.C. and the sev-
ered diplomatic relations instead are selected.
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• indirect Tax Rate
• Battles with P.R.O.C.
	
• Wefare Enactment






As is shown in the conceptual research framework, in-
dependent variables which seem to have decisive effects
on the welfare enactment and welfare expenditure are duly
classified into three groups: political-institutional
context, socio-economic context and international context
in accordance with the researches in chapter two. The
first group is further divided into three dominant fac-
tors; elections, indirect tax rate, and battles with
P.R.C. (Mainland China). The second group contains the
age of its population, economic variables like employment
by industries, GNP per capita, growth rate of GNP, tax
burden rate and unemployment rate, respectively.	 The
237
last group is about international politics: openness and
severed diplomatic relations with world's most powerful
countries like G7 and the influential international in-
stitutions like United Nations.
4.2.1	 Political-institutional Context
4.2.1.1 Elections
The elections in this section include those for National
Assembly, Executive Yuan, Control Yuan (supplementary
elections), and Taiwan Provincial Parliaments. In fact,
members of National Assembly, Executive Yuan and Control
Yuan were elected by the nationwide election in 1947 and
1948 for three-year terms. However, due to the Communist
victory over mainland China, the succeeding nationwide
elections have not been held since then, whilst the elec-
tion for provincial parliament (Taiwan) has been held
eleven times since 1951. It is in this regard that only
supplementary members were elected for the aforementioned
three nationwide elections. 32 The following is the number
of the newly elected members of supplementary elections
for the National Assembly, Executive Yuan and Control
Yuan respectively.
32 For further informations, see Cal Clark, Taiwan's Development: Implications for Con-
tending Political Economy Paradigm (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).
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1980 76 97 32
1983 98
1985 1
1986 84 100 32
1989 130
Incumbent 773 250 52
Number
The number of elected member may be different from that
of other sources.
Source: MOI, ROC, Abstract of the Internal Affairs, 1990.
In addition, the political support to the ruling Kuom-
intang was still firm, even in the middle of transition
period of 1986. The following table illustrates the rul-
ing Kuomintang maintained around 70% of political support
from its constituents.
<Table 4-4> Political Support of KMT









Source: Lien-ho-pao, Dec. 8, 1986, p. 2. Quoted from R.
H. Myers Ramon H. Myers, `Political Theory and Recent Po-
litical Developments in the Republic of China', Asian










Now the issue of the election thesis is whether the
election has affected welfare enactments and expenditure.
<Figure 4-3'.
Elections in Taiwan
National Assembly and Province MPs
Number of Eleotlona
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Abatraot of Internal Affairs, MOI, ROC,
1990.
The above figure shows the number of elections held in
Taiwan since the early sixties.
Meanwhile, when we attempt to compare the elections
with the welfare enactment, we can get the plausible ac-
count that the correlation between the election and wel-
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Elections & Welfare Enactment in Taiwan
National and Provincial Elections
<Figure 4-5>
Election & Welfare Expenditure in Taiwan
% of Government Expenditure & GNP
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ltbarbook of Financial StatiSitos, MOF,88
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However, there is no strong correlation between the elec-
tion and welfare expenditure in Taiwan, as is shown in
the above figure.
4.2.1.2 Indirect Tax Rate
Implicit in the indirect thesis is the idea that con-
stituencies are likely to expect more benefits but less
taxes for their services. In election, the candidates
usually tend to promise 'more services, but less taxes'
to garner the tax-payers' votes. However, it clearly is
a contradiction. One of the ways to resolve this dilemma
is to increase indirect taxes. In regard to this tax
concealment thesis, DeViney argues that 'the greater the
state reliance on indirect taxes, the greater the expan-
sion of public expenditure for social programs1.33
• However, as the following figure shows, the correlation
between indirect tax and welfare expenditure in Taiwan
turns out to be the reverse relationship. Thus it is
hard to prove that DeViney's thesis is applicable to Tai-
wan, though it still is a matter of debate whether the
indirect tax rate is the sole factor affecting the expan-
sion of public expenditure.
33 S. DeViney, 'Characteristics of the State and the Expansion of Public Social Expendi-
ture', Comparative Social Research, 6 (1983), p. 155.
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<Figure 4-6>
Welfare Expenditure & Indirect Tax, ROC
% of Govern't Expenditure & Indirect Tax
% of Gov't Expend're	 % of Indirect Tax
% of Whole Government Expenditure	 % of Indireot Tax






Taiwan Statiatioal Data Book, CEPD, ROC,
1990. Yearbook of Finanoial Statiatioa,
MOF, ROC, 1988.
4.2.1.3 Battles with mainland China
Battles against the Communist regime in mainland China,
though it has not been extended seriously, have greatly
influenced the shaping of the domestic polity by way of
strengthening the anti-Communism sentiment of its people
on the one hand, and of appealing the restorations of
mainland to them on the other hand. At the peak of nine
battles of 1958, however, the number of them had de-
creased, and moreover, battles have not broken out since
the end of the sixties. This is partly due to the strong'












with the international trends of Detente in the early
seventies.
Ironically, military conflicts with mainland China,
though it brought overwhelming fear about national secu-
rity, has greatly contributed to stabilisation of domes-
tic politics in Taiwan. The following figure presents
the number of battles with mainland China.
<Figure 4-7>
Battles with Mainland China
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 57 68 69 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Year
MI No_ of Battles
China Yearbook, 1991-2
However, we cannot find any significant correlation be-
tween military conflicts with mainland China (number of
battles) and welfare enactment since the battles have
never been brought out since the late sixties. As well,
in terms of welfare expenditure, there is no reason to
believe that battles with mainland China have had an af-
fect on the changes of expenditure.
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It thus can be assumed that military conflict does by
itself lead neither to the enactment of welfare pro-
grammes nor the increase of welfare expenditure directly.
It should be emphasised, however, that the military and
ideological tension has obliged the domestic institu-
tions, including the welfare system, to conform the logic,
of the cold war.
4.2.2	 Socio-economic Context
4.2.2.1 Age of Population
Due to the development of medical services, good nutri-
tion, overall increase of living standards, life ex-
pectancy of Taiwan has greatly increase from 58.6 in 1952
to 73.5 in 1989, 34 although the population growth rate has
fallen. 35 Accordingly, both the portion of the aged (over
65) among the whole population and the age dependency
ratio has risen dramatically since the early sixties.
The following table summarises some important indices for
population change.
34 Council for Economic Planning & Development, Taiwan, Republic of China, Economic De-
velopment, 1990, p. 40.
35 The population growth rate has fallen from 3.8% in 1953 to 1.0% in 1989. See, Council




Life Expectancy and Age Dependency Ratio of Taiwan
Year Life	 Percentage of	 Age Dependency
Expectancy	 Aged (<65)	 Ratio*
1960 66.40	 2.5% 4.8%
1965 69.71	 2.6% 5.1%
1970 71.56	 3.0% 5.1%
1975 73.42	 3.5% 5.7%
1980 74.54
	 4.3% 6.7%
1985 75.81	 5.1% 7.7%
1989 76.21** 6.0% 8.9%
= (Pop. 65 years & over / Pop. 15-60) * 100.
** 1988
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development,
ROC, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1990; Department of
Statistics, Ministry of Interior, Statistical Abstract of
Interior of ROC, 1990.
The basic idea of the age of population thesis is that
a country with more aged people is likely to spend more
social security expenditures than the one with less aged
people. Compared with the Western developed countries,
the East Asian countries generally have a less aged popu-
lation and thus a lower rate of age dependency. It can
be roughly assumed, according to this line of explana-
tion, that the countries with less aged population like
East Asian countries have fallen well behind in welfare
state development. However it is clear that the plausi-
bility of this thesis depends not on the existence of the
aged group, but on the political power of the aged. It
really is a precondition for any attempt to analyse the
welfare state development on the basis of this thesis.
It seems that there is some correlation between the age
indices (the proportion of aged and the age dependency
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rate) and the trend of welfare expenditure, as is shown.
in the following figure.
<Figure 4-8>











% of Gov't Expend're	 % of GNP
% of the Aped
	
—°— Dependency Ratio
Taiwan Statistical Data Book, CEPD, ROC,
1990. Yearbook of Financial Statistics,
MOF, ROC, 1988.
It should be emphasised, however, that it still is du-
bious whether the age population thesis is applicable to
the East Asian context. One of the most essential
virtues of Confucianism is the filial duty, and thus aged
people are generally respected by their juniors in these
countries, consistent with Confucian teachings. It is a
praiseworthy virtue that should be spread abroad. Inter-
estingly enough, however, it more often than not in these'
countries hinders the natural development of the welfare
state because the aged are generally expected to be sup-
ported, both financially and emotionally, by their sons
and daughters.
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Hence it is too naive to assume that the rise of aged
population has had an effects on the increase of welfare.
expenditure, even though the two factors show some corre-
lation in Taiwan.
4.2.2.2 Economic Development
Economic development of Taiwan during the last three
decades has been unquestionably remarkable. Whereas
plenty of material has been written to account for the
economic success of Taiwan, too little attention has been
paid to her welfare system. It really is of analytical'
value to examine the development of welfare system under
a rapidly growing economy which has maintained the dy-
namism for over three decades.
It is widely accepted that the welfare expenditure of
East Asian countries has shown incremental trend, and the
Taiwan expenditure is not an exception. The portion of
welfare expenditure of whole government expenditure has
increased according to the growing economy, as is shown
in the following figure.
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. <Figure 4-9>
Welfare Expenditure & GNP per Capita
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Though it is hard to ascertain that the economic
development of Taiwan has directly influenced the in-
crease of welfare expenditure in Taiwan, it does not to-
tally neglect nor reverse the `logic of industrialism'
thesis. In fact, we cannot emphasise the importance of
industrial development too strongly in the welfare state
development. Welfare system may be the superstructural
expression of industrial development. It provides the
basic resources which make the ideas or commitment to get
turned into the actual programme.
But the point here is that industrial development has
not by itself made welfare enactment nor increase of wel-
fare expenditure directly. We have to probe more direct
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and plausible accounts on welfare system in Taiwan. Now
we turn our attention to the international context.
4.2.3	 International Context
4.2.3.1 Openness
Implicit in the 'openness' thesis is the idea that coun-
tries with a highly dependent economy towards world mar-
kets are likely to have more advanced social policies.
Since these economies have a number Of huge conglomerates
to survive in the severe international competition, they
have a traditionally strong labour organisation, and thus
a strong progressive party or government in favour of
universal welfare system.
This thesis has developed from the evidence of the
Scandinavian countries. This section aims to examine
whether it is solely specific to the highly corporatist
countries or it can be extended to other highly dependent
economies like Taiwan.
Taiwanese economy has launched the 'export-oriented in-
dustrialisation' since the early sixties, and accord:
ingly, has rested heavily on international trade. The
foreign dependency ratio has risen dramatically since the
seventies and is now among the highest in the world.
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<Table 4-6> Foreign Dependency of Taiwanese Economy
Export % GDP* Import % GDP
1962 11.4 (50.5) 15.9
1965 16.1 (46.0) 19.9
1970 26.3 (78.6) 27.1
1975 34.7 (83.6) 39.0
1980 48.5 (90.8) 48.5
1985 51.0 (93.8) 33.4
1986 54.9 (93.5) 33.4
* () indicates the percent of industrial products to
whole export.
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development,
ROC, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1987
It should be pointed out, however, the industrial con-
centration rate of Taiwan has not been so high than is
often thought. Compared to the Scandinavian economies
and its East Asian competitors as well, the Taiwanese
economy has developed on the basis of the medium-small
sized companies, rather than huge conglomerates. For ex-
ample, the property, value-added products and employment
of upper 200 biggest companies are 42.6%, 41.5% and 21.3%
respectively in 1976, compared to those of the upper 30
biggest companies in Korea are 37.2%, 33.2% and 18.6% re-
spectively in 1982.36
As well, there has never been a strong tradition of
labour movement in Taiwan since independence. In fact,.
the radical labour movement was strictly banned by the
martial law which was brought to an end in 1986. Accord-
36 See, Korea Institute for Economics & Technology (KIET), Industrial Structure and Eco-
nomic Achievement of Korea and Taiwan (in Korean) (Seoul: KIET, 1989), pp. 62-72.
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ingly, up to 1990, only 44 percent of the 6.2 million
paid employees were members of at least one union.37
When we think about the context within which this the-
sis has developed in Scandinavian countries, there is no
reason to believe that this thesis is applicable to the
welfare state development of Taiwan, although both the
welfare expenditure to GNP and the percent of export to
GDP has steadily risen, as is shown in the following fig-
ure.
<Figure 4-10>
Welfare Expenditure and Expt % GDP
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4.2.3.2	 severed Diplomatic Relations.
In the historical situation of Taiwan, diplomatic rela-
tionship with the world's leading countries like members
of G7 or with the influential international organisations
like the United Nations, has been held central in Tai-
wanese polity either domestically or externally, because
the Kuomintang (National Party) regime has persistently
endeavoured to maintain the political legitimacy over the
mainland China. However the international status of
R.O.C. government has dwindled, according to the prag-
matic foreign policies of world's leading countries. The
following table shows the comparison between P.R.C. and
R.O.0 in international diplomatic status.
<Table 4-7>






1973 39 ' 85
1977 23 111
China (Cambridge, Mass.:
153-54; quoted from Cal
lications or Contendin
York: Greenwood Press,
Source: Ralph N. Clough, Island
Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), pp.
Clark, Taiwan's Develo ment: Im
Political Economy Paradigm (New
1989), p. 97.
38 With few exceptions such as Saudi Arabia, the R.O.C. government now maintains the
diplomatic relationship with relatively small countries. Due to the pressure of
P.R.O.0 government, Korean government, which has been a long-time patronage of the Tai-
wanese government in international politics, decided to sever the diplomatic relation-
ship with R.O.C. in 1992.
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It is widely acknowledged that the most serious crises
of Taiwanese politics since 1949 came from severed diplo-
matic relationship, not from the domestic problems. In
1971, the Republic of China, one of the founder of the
United Nations, was withdrawn from the UN. Since 1971,
the number of countries recognizing P.R.C. has exceeded
that of countries recognizing R.O.C. Furthermore, the
United States of America, once the strongest supporter of
the R.O.C. government, decided to severe the diplomatic
relationship with R.O.C. in 1979, and officially recog-
nised P.R.C. as de jure government in China. It deepened
the political isolation of Taiwan, and brought about se-
rious subsequent domestic crises in Taiwan. It is very
noteworthy that welfare enactments were actively made
around two serious crises. It demonstrates the strong
correlation between the political crisis and welfare
actment (See Figure 4-11). Moreover, the trend
welfare expenditure shows momentary increase around
two crises as well (see Figure 4-12). The percent of
welfare expenditure to whole government expenditure and
GNP in 1972 were 12.7% and 2.81% respectively and those
of 1982 were 14.5% and 3.95%. When we think about the
general trend that the increase of welfare expenditure
would be made one or two years after the enactment, it is
a natural course that the welfare expenditure has steeply
risen since 1982.39
39 Whilst the percent of welfare expenditure to whole government expenditure before 1982
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Throughout the fifties, sixties and early seventies, the
logic of industrialism has been prevalent in explaining
the emergence and development of welfare state. Inherent
in this thesis is the idea that the modern welfare system
can be understood as a product of the changing needs cre-
ated by the development of industrial societies. It means
that such social factors as the breakup of the extended
family, the ageing population, and the rapid urbanisation
and so forth impact the course of shaping the structure
of welfare systems.° Thus it is fair to say that 'Only
the form and extent of the welfare state, rather than its
very existence, is a political issue in market-dependent
societies' 41
However, since the seventies, the second camp has ap-
peared, stressing the importance of working class in the
emergence and development of the Western welfare state.
They ushered in to criticise the then orthodox interpre-
tation, the logic of industrialism, that it tended to
make the working class the passive object of social and
economic transformation. 42 They duly gave more weight on
the organised expression of trade unions, left parties
40 For details of the societal changes of Taiwan, please refer to chapter three.
41 C. Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State?: The New Political Economy of Welfare
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 19.
42 See F. G. Castles, The Working Class and Welfare: Reflections on the Political Devel-
opment of the Welfare State in Australia and New Zealand, 1890-1980 (Wellington, New
Zealand: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 1-9. In it, the author indicates that the passive
role of the working class was also a theme that characterised the interpretation of the
welfare state development in the tradition of Marxism.
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and left or coalition government in the development of
welfare state.
Research into the Taiwanese welfare system in the pre-
vious section, however, manifests the view that neither
camp has stood up well to the Taiwan case. Yet there is
a wealth of evidence to indicate that the explanation for
the determinants of welfare efforts in Taiwan lies in
large part with the legitimacy crisis, mostly from the
severed diplomatic relationships, of the regime. Seen in
the previous figures (4-11, 4-12), it is self-evidently
clear that the political crises have been a major
determinant factor both in welfare enactment and ex-
penditure in Taiwan. It also clearly implies that the
state, however defined, definitely decides the timing of
enactment of welfare programmes in an attempt to
tranquillise political crises. Now we can have a clue as
to how, why, and in what respects the welfare system of
Taiwan is different from those of advanced countries. It
can be further assumed that the welfare systems of Taiwan
are basically designed to cope with the political crises,
and thus can achieve and maintain their political.
legitimacy.
The importance of the case of Taiwanese welfare system
lies in the fact that it has developed under the authori-
tarian regime on the one hand, and with the rapid eco-
nomic development on the other hand. According to the
main findings of this chapter, we can propose the theme
that the welfare system was brought about by the serious
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political crises, in order to restore the legitimacy of
the regime. It further assumes that authoritarian
government has influenced the timing of welfare enactment
and the level of welfare expenditure in favour of its
political interests.
However, it should be manifested that there is a
limitation of this argumpnt. Since this chapter did not
discuss the history of welfare legislations of Taiwan,
and, moreover, the social factors have not been
adequately taken into account, this argument can be
maintained only to the extent that what sort of political
interpretation can be proposed when relating the timing
of welfare enactments and the level of welfare
expenditures to the political crises in Taiwan.
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Chapter Five: Welfare in Korea
5.1 Overview of the Korean Welfare System
5.2 Major Factors Affecting the Adoption and
Expansion of the Korean Welfare System
5.3 Concluding Remarks
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The case of the Taiwanese welfare system, as was examined
in the last chapter, evidently illustrates that the po-
litical crisis amongst other factors have had the most
significant effects on the welfare enactment and welfare
expenditure. It can thus be further assumed that welfare
system of Taiwan has been basically designed to cope with
the political crises, and to achieve or restore the po-
litical legitimacy of the regime in the long run. How-
ever, it still is a matter of further inquiry whether
this political crisis thesis is solely specific to Tai-
wan, or it can be extended to different cultural context.
Now we turn our attention to the case of the Korean wel-
fare system.
For this research purpose, this chapter first of all
describes, albeit briefly, the overview of the Korean
welfare system with a view to provide a background re-
search tor the main argument of this chapter. The next
section deals with the welfare efforts (welfare enactment
and welfare expenditure) in relation with the independent
factors, and probes which factor is the most significant
factor in the development of the Korean welfare system.
Identifying the most significant factor, we can get
more reasonable and deeper understandings of the nature
of the welfare system in Korea. This chapter concludes
that political crisis amongst other factors decides the
timing of welfare enactment and the trends of welfare
expenditure, as is in the case of the Taiwanese welfare
system.
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5.1	 Overview of the Korean Welfare System
The task of scientific inquiry is to present an empiri-
cally based interpretation of the welfare system of the
individual countries within a given historical context.
To attempt a close examinations of the Korean welfare
system, along with the Taiwanese welfare system, would be
of enormous interest to those interested in the welfare
system of the region. It would further contribute to the
enrichment of the literatures of the social policy in
ways to present some possibilities to overcome the
parochial nature of the discipline.
It is widely recognised that both Korea and Taiwan are
situated in a very particular position in the interna-
tional context. They are different from the advanced
countries with respects to their colonialised experience
and relatively backward economies, different from the
former socialist countries with respect to their rigidly
pursuing capitalist development, different from the less-
developed countries with respect to their relatively
flourishing economies, and also different from other NICs
(Latin American NICs, East European NICs and South Euro-
pean NICs) with respects to their preserving the Confu-
cian tradition, and manifesting consistent and solid eco-
nomic growth even in the hardest times of the world mar-
ket. In many respects, Korea and Taiwan seem to have
much in common, though they have some difference in de-
tails.
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In regard to the similarities of Korea and Taiwan, Euh
and Baker succinctly describes as follows:
When examined closely, Korea and Taiwan show some
striking similarities in their political and eco-
nomic system. Both countries are small geographi-
cally and are densely populated with very homoge-
neous populations. Both countries have export-
driven economies. Both have been dominated in the
past by Japanese military forces. Both have en-
countered political conflict since the Second
World War - Korea with the political tensions from
North Korea and Taiwan as a result of the politi-
cal split with Mainland China, the People's Repub-
lic of China. Both nations have been administered
by dictatorial or military governments with vary-
ing degrees of political domination from the cen-
tral government.1
Now the issue at stake is whether the political crisis
thesis, endeavoured by the evidence of the Taiwanese wel-
fare system, can be applied to the case of the Korean
welfare system.
According to this research purpose, this section first
of all describes the administration of the Korean welfare
system. Secondly, it provides the basic source of the
analysis of the Korean welfare system: the welfare enact:
ment and the welfare expenditure since the early sixties.
Thirdly, it explains how the welfare programmes are oper-
ating in practice.
1 Yoon-Dae Euh and J. C. Baker, The Korean Banking System and Foreign Influence (London:
Routledge, 1990), pp. 78-9.
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5.1.1
	 Administration of the Welfare System
5.1.1.1 Administration of the Korean government
in general
Since the research deals with the statutory welfare sys-
tem operating on the basis of governmental networks, it
would be worth describing overall governmental adminis-
trations beforehand, and accounting for how welfare sys-
tem is administered.
The Republic of Korea has maintained the presidential
system as a governmental form since the early sixties.2
The Government thus shall be, at least in principle,
checked by, and balanced with the national assembly and
the judicature. The president is in the highest level of
the government, and also is the chairman of the cabinet
which consists of the prime minister, the deputy prime
ministers, the head of the government ministries and min-
isters of state.
Administratively, the local governments are divided
into one special city (Seoul), five direct jurisdiction'
cities (Pusan, Taegu, Kwangju, Inchon and Daejon 3 ), which
enjoy provincial status, and nine provinces. A province
2 In fact, the Korean government had maintained the presidential system since 1948 when
the Republic of Korea established the first government. The Second Republic, borne out
by the mass demonstration of the April, 1960, however, abandoned the presidential sys-
tem and instead adopted the parliamentary system, for fear that the strong presidential
system would lead to dictatorship. This government was collapsed by the coup in May
1961 and thereafter the presidential system has been sustained until now.
3 Daejon has been a direct jurisdiction city since 1989.
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is subdivided into county (Kun, 137), city (Shi, 67),
town (Eup, 179) and township (Myon, 1260) whilst the spe-
cial city and direct jurisdiction cities are further di-
vided into Ward (Ku, 67) and sub block (Dong, 2104).
Traditionally, it is often told, the influence of cen-
tralised power over whole country has been dominant since
the medieval ages, and thus the role of government in di-
recting and intervening private sector has been widely
and readily accepted by the people. It is mainly due to
the strong tradition of Confucianism which takes great
emphasis on the hierarchy of social members. Under the
Confucian social structure, the state officials are re-
cruited from the scholar class which also forms major
part of the upper class, and thus the state officials
proudly considered themselves as the 'directors of soci-
ety' rather than as the 'servants of society'. According
to Lohmann, this tradition of Confucianism has a serious
impact on the contemporary welfare system as well.
The contemporary administration of Korean social
welfare, along with other aspects of public and/or
nonprofit administration have been heavily influ-
enced by the distinctive Confucian system of ad-
ministration with its formal emphasis upon merito-
cratic civil service examinations at times supple-
mented by informal emphasis upon other, non-meri-
tocratic factors .4
However, it should be pointed out that the deep-seated
tradition of Confucianism alone cannot account for the
4 R. A. Lohmann, 'The Organization and Administration of Korean Social Welfare: A Review
of the Literature', Papers of Social Policy (published in Korea), 2 (1989), p. 240.
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recent development of the centralised power in modernised
Korea, though it would provide a clue to further the de
bate. One of the most well-grounded arguments around
this subject would be to place the focus on the overflow-
ing of Militarism over whole society since the early six-
ties.
Quite simply, the main reason for the superiority of
centralised power over whole society, coupled with the
overflowing of militarism, is largely twofold. In order
to establish a strong anti-Communist fortress on the one
hand and to facilitate the economic development on the
other hand, the political regimes persistently have re-
quired the national unity and efficient administration.
5.1.1.2 Welfare Administration of the Korean Governments
Amongst twenty ministries of the Korean government, the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA) is directly
responsible for matters related to public health, endemic
prevention, public hygiene and sanitation, public relief,
emigration, family planning, and various social welfare
programmes.
The main tasks imposed on MOHSA are:
(1) To permit the establishment, dissolution and
annexation of social welfare corporations, (2) To
train the welfare service civil servants or social
workers, (3) To manage the social welfare fund,
and to supervise the Livelihood Protection fund,
(4) To set the criterion of the level of protec-
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tion declared performances of Livelihood Protec-
tion of local governments, (5) To guide, super-
vise, manage the welfare activities according to
the Welfare of the Disabled Act, Welfare for the
Aged Act, Welfare for the Children Act and the
Welfare for the Women Act (6) To manage the com-
mittees regarding welfare activities, (7) To guide
and superintendent the Korean Social Welfare Asso-
ciation.5
It also has six special committees of which function is
to assist, consult and supervise the welfare services of
MOHSA.6.
Under the planning and the supervision of the MOHSA,.
the local governments of provincial status have board of
Health and Social Affairs in charge of delivering welfare
services in its district. At the county level, there are
the department of social affairs and women and juveniles.
Meanwhile, the functional and administrative division
between the central government and the local government
has been very ambiguous, sometimes duplicated, not only
because the Local Authority Act defines the distinction
between original tasks and delegated tasks very compre-
hensively but also because the tradition of local author-
ity has not been settled down successfully. In case of
the delegated tasks, the state generally plans, guides,
supervises and expends the necessary outlay, whilst the
5	 Internal document of MOHSA (in Korean).
6 They are (1) Committee on Medical Insurance, (2) Committee on Disaster Relief, (3)
Committee on Social Welfare, (4) Committee.on Public Assistance, (5) Committee on Child
Welfare, (6) Committee on Public Relief. For more details of the roles and functions
of these committees, please refer to S. M. Seo, I. S. Choi and S. K. Kim (eds), The Re-
form of Social Welfare Delivery System and the Utilisation Policy of Professional Work-
force (Seoul: KDI, 1988), pp. 79-81 (in Korean).
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local government is directly responsible to operate
programmes.
The best way to single out the relationship of local
government to its counterpart would be to focus on the
expenditures of each government. The following table
shows steady increase of local government's expenditure.
<Table 5-1> The Structure of Government Expenditure
Unit: %
Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Central
Gove't 75.9 77.5 75.2 67.1 57.7
Local
Gove't 24.1 22.5 24.8 32.9 42.3
Source: Bureau of Local Financial Administration, Min-
istry of Home Affairs, ROK, Financial Yearbook of Local 
Government, each year (in Korean).
In a similar vein, the portion of the central govern-
ment expenditure of social development exceeds the local
government expenditure in scale as well. The following
table indicates the ratio of local government expenditure
in the sphere of social development in 1989.
<Table 5-2> Social Development Expenditure of Local
Government, 1989	 unit: %
Ratio to Whole Expenditure
Social Development 45.2
1. Health 51.7
2. Social Security & Welfare 29.3
3. Housing & Community Development 60.0
4. Other Community & Social Services 21.7
Source: The Bank of Korea, ROK, Economic Statistics Year-
book, 1990.
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5.1.2 Welfare Enactment and Welfare Expenditure
since 1960s
<Table 5-3> Welfare Enactment of Korea
Year No. of Enactment	 Contents
1960	 3	 Pension for Civil Servants
Acceleration of Employment for Disabled
Welfare for Mentally Retarded
1961	 4	 Special legislation for Adoption of
Orphanage
Law for the Protection of Juvenile
Child Welfare Law
Public Assistance Law




Social Security Committee Law
Special Relief Law for the Men of Merit
and North Korean refugees
Law for Sailors
Law for Public Health Centre




1967	 1	 Temporary Measures for Self-support
Programme
1970	 2	 Laws for Social Services
Amendment of Medical Insurance Law
1973	 3	 Mother and Child Health Law
National Pension Law (not enforced)
Pension Law for Private School Teachers
1977	 2	 Medical Insurance Law for Civil
Servants and Private School Teachers
Medical Insurance Law
1981	 3	 Child Welfare Law
Law for Welfare of Mental and Physical
Handicapped
Law for Welfare of Elderly Law
1982	 1	 Amendment of Public Assistance Law
1987	 2	 Amendment of Medical Insurance
Enforcement of National Pension
Source: Various sources
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The above table (Table 5-3) and the following figure
(Figure 5-1) show the number and contents of welfare
enactments and the general trends of welfare expenditure
of central government since the early sixties, which
would serve as the main source for an analysis of the
Korean welfare system.
<Figure 5-1>
Social Expenditure of Central Government
Ratio to Whole Gover't Expenditure
/ whole expenditure, %








Major Statistics of Korean Eoonomy, EPB,
ROK, 1990. Eoonomio Statistics Yearbook,
BOK, ROK, 1990.
Unlike the case of the welfare expenditure in Taiwan,.
this trends represents the percent of social security and
welfare expenditure to the whole government expenditure.
It would more vividly reflect the political intention em-







5.1.3	 Implementation of the Welfare Programmes
In this section, the practical operations of three main
welfare programmes: social insurance, public assistance
and welfare services, will be depicted very briefly.
5.1.3.1 Social Insurance
The very meaning of social insurance is defined as a
scheme designed to cover the certain happenings such as
unemployment, old age, and invalidity in return for
his/her contributions. The Korean social insurance scheme
in this understanding is best represented by two
prominent programmes: the national pension and the medi-
cal insurance.
These twin pillars of social insurance scheme are now
the backbone of the whole Korean welfare system and their
importance is getting more and more emphasised according
to the economic prosperity.
The National Pension System
The national pension programme is basically designed to
provide pension benefits to the insured persons and their
families in contingency of their old-aging, invalidity or
death of householders, in order to stabilize the living
conditions of citizens and eventually to promote the gen-
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eral welfare situation of whole country. It is run on
the basis of funded system, and the amount of contribu-
tions and benefits vary according to the insurants f in-
comes, ages, employment status, and health.
Like other social welfare system, the national pension
programme also has undergone laboured disputes and
adjustment since its creation. Furthermore, mainly due
to the vast amount of fund in the scheme, it has been
very sensitive political issue in the arena of the Korean
politics. For instance, it was widely indicated that the
underlying aim of the enactment of National Welfare
Pension Act in 1973 was to subsidize the heavy and
chemical industries, rather than to improve the general
welfare of recipients. However mainly because of the
weak fiscal infrastructure of the Korean Government, 7 it
has not been enforced until the mid-eighties, though the
Government intended to immediately carry the programme
into effect across the country when the National Welfare
Pension Act was firstly enacted in 1973. According to
the solid economic growth during the last two decades on
the one hand, and the upgrading of welfare needs of
people, the Government has attempted to review the
national pension system, and eventually promulgated the
National Pension Act in 1986. Moreover it can be argued
that the demographic changes and the changes of
employment	 structure,	 occasioned	 by	 the	 rapid
7 Its operation was cancelled by the President's emergency decree of Jan. 14, 1974.
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industrialisation and urbanisation, affect the enactment
of the Act.
According to the National Pension Act, every citizen
whose age ranges from 18 to below 60, who resides in the
Republic of Korea, is entitled to be covered by the na-
tional pension scheme except civil servants, regular mil-
itary personnel and private school teachers who have been
covered by their own pension programme. 8 In addition,
employees having foreign nationality are eligible to be
involved in this programme as well.
The insured persons are classified into three cate-
gories: the working place insurants, the community resi-
dents insurants and the voluntarily and continuously in:
surants, respectively. The working place insurants are
further divided into the compulsory insurants and volun-
tary insurants. Firstly, all employees and employers en-
gaging in the working places having ten or more than ten
employees regularly are covered by the programme
compulsorily. Those engaging in the working places
having more than five to less than ten employees
regularly can be insured by the programme on voluntary
base. Secondly, the self-employed persons including
farmers and fishermen also can be involved in the
programme voluntarily. Lastly and thirdly, those (over
sixty years old) whose insured term is less than twenty
years, but who want to continue the contribution can be
8 The civil servant Pension programme since 1962, the military personnel pension since
1962, and the private school teachers pension programme since 1973, respectively.
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consecutively involved in the programme until their age
of sixty five. Thus they can be largely grouped into two
separate ways, compulsory base and voluntary base.
The national pension programme provides three different
kinds of benefits and the payment of lump-sum refund.
They are the old-age pension, disability pension, sur-
vivor (bereaved) pension. Meanwhile, the old-age pen-
sion, as a main pension scheme which provides the stan-
dard of benefits to other pension schemes, is further di-
vided into five different categories: the basic old-age
pension, reduced old-age pension, old-age pension for ac-
tive seniors, early old-age pension, and special old-age
pension, respectively. Basically, the amount of benefit
is composed of the basic pension and the additional one.
The amount of basic pension functions as the guide-line
to all pensions, whilst the amount of additional pension
varies according to the health condition and number of
dependent.
The following table contains the conditions for each
categories of the old-age pension.
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<Table 5-4> Conditions for the Old-aged Pensions
1. Basic old-age pension : Payable to the person whose
insured term is 20 years and more, and who is not engaged
in the remunerative works at the age of 60.
2. Reduced old-age pension : Payable to the person whose
insured term is more than 15 and less than 20 at the age -
of 60.
3. Old-age pension for active seniors : Payable to the
person (over 60 and below 65) whose insured term is 20
years or more, but is engaged in the remunerative work.
4. Early old-age pension : Payable to the person (over 55
and below 60) whose insured term is 20 years or more, who
is not engaged in the remunerative work, and also wishes
the pension payment.
5. Special old-age pension : Payable to the person whose
age spans between 45 and 60 (1st, Jan. 1988), who has in-
sured for more than 5 years.
Source: MOHSA, ROK, White Paper of Health and Society,
1990, p. 253 (in Korean).
Unlike private pension schemes, the national pension is
basically designed to improve the distribution structure,
and thus the amount of benefit• is legally determined for
this purpose. However it is very hard to estimate how
effectively the unequal distribution would be improved
through the National Pension scheme. Be that as it may,
as is shown in the following calculating formula for the
basic pension, A (flat rate section) is basically devised
for income redistribution because the amount of basic
pension is calculated on the basis of the standard
monthly income of all insurants, regardless of each in-
surant's income level, whilst B (earning relative sec-
tion) aims to encourage the work incentives of insurants.
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below 18, or disabled
(2 children)
over 60, or disabled








Calculating Formula for the Amount of Basic Pension
X = 2.4 * ( A + B * 0.75 ) * ( 1 + 0.05n )
Where,
X : Amount of benefits
2.4 : a constant which determines the amount of basic
pension after 20 years of the insured term.
A : average of the standard monthly income of whole
working insurants in one year before commencing
year of benefit.
: average of the standard monthly income of each
insurant in the period of contribution.
0.75: a constant calculated on the basis of 40% of the
last remuneration paid to the insured persons who
retires after 20 years of the insured term and
whose monthly remuneration level indicates the mean
value of all amount of the standard monthly income
of all insurants.
0.05: adding rate to each one years after 20 years of the
insured term.
n: number of years after 20 years of the insured term.
Source: MOHSA, ROK,  White Paper of Health and Society,
1990, p. 250 (in Korean).
The additional pension is payable to the insurant who
has dependent family member, and the amount is decided on
the basis of the following table.
<Table 5-6> Additional Pension Payment	 Unit: Won*
Coverage	 Condition	 Amount
The exchange rate of Won to the British pound is
around 1,200, though it varies.
Source: MOHSA, ROK, White Paper of Health and Society,
1990, p. 252 (in Korean).
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The Medical Insurance System
The medical care system of Korea is largely divided into
three different programmes: the medical insurance, the
medical assistance and the medical aid, respectively.
Amongst them, the latter two programmes are provided for
the low-income families under the public assistance'
scheme.
Since the creation of the medical insurance programme
in 1977, it has developed very quickly so as to every
citizen resides in Korea is now covered by the system.
They are basically divided into three different groups:
the employees in the work shop, civil servants and pri-
vate school teachers, and farmers, fishermen and self-em-
ployed in urban area. The following table shows the level
of contributions according to the classified groups.
<Table 5-7> Level of Contributions 	 Unit: %
% of monthly income	 % of contribution
A	 3 - 8	 50 *
B	 4.6	 50**
C	 Varies according to income,
property, number of family, etc.	 50 ***
A: Employees in the work shop
B: Civil servants and private school teachers
C: Farmers, fishermen and self-employed in urban area
The rest of contribution is paid by employers
** The rest of contribution is paid by the government
*** The rest of contribution is paid from the general
taxation
Source: MOHSA, ROK, White Paper of Health and Society,
19 9 0, p. 203 (in Korean).
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In general, there are two kinds of benefits in the
medical insurance scheme: the basic benefits and the sup-
plementary benefits. 9 The former benefits contains the
medical care benefits and delivery benefits," whilst the
benefits for funeral and delivery expenses belong to the
latter category. The following table shows the level of
expenses paid by the patients in the medical insurance
system.
<Table 5-8> Level of Expenses Paid by Insurers
Clinic	 Hospital	 General Hospital
In-patient	 20%	 20%	 20%
Out-patient	 55%	 40%	 30%*
In case of below 10,000 Won, the insurers are supposed
to pay 2,000 Won in 1990.
Source: MOHSA, ROK, White Paper of Health and Society,
1990, p. 203 (in Korean).
5.X.3.2
	 Public Assistance
The basic aim of the public assistance scheme is to pro -
tect the poor and incompetent, and to guarantee the mini-
mum level of living, as is declared in the Constitution."
It comprises the livelihood aid for those who are un-
able to work and also have not any supporter of their
9 MOHSA, ROK, White Papers of Health and Society, 1990, pp. 202-3.
10 The delivery benefits are payable to the person who receive delivery care at a desig-
nated medical institutions. See Ibid., pp. 202-3.
11 The Constitution declares the basic human rights as follows:
(1) All citizens shall be entitled to a life worthy of human being,
(2) Citizens who are incapable of earning a livelihood due to a physical disability,
disease, old age or other reasons shall be protected by the state under the conditions
as prescribed by law (Article 34).
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livelihood (home care persons and institutional care per-
sons), the public assistance for self-support for those
who are suffering from the monetary shortages manly due
to disease or lack of proper education and tech-
niques(Self-Support Protection Persons), and the medical
aid for the low in come persons. The following table de-
scribes the overview of the Livelihood Protection Scheme.
<Table 5-9>









The person who belong to
family composed only of
those who are unable to work
because of disease or physical
disability, the aged (65 or
over), the children (18 or
younger), and the pregnant
women
Institu-	 The person who are under	 Same the
tional care protection of various social above
persons	 welfare institutions such as
homes for children or the aged.
Self-support The persons who are workable Self-support
protection	 but earning too small income Educational -
persons	 to, maintain their lives, thus
needing social assistance to
improve the level of their lives
Source: Social Welfare Long-term Development Committee,
ROK, Long-term Development Planning for Social Welfare in
Korea, Conference Paper, 1989 (in Korean); MOHSA, ROK,
Major Policies and Programme in Health and Social Welfare
Services, 1988 (in Korean).
The allocation of the public assistance scheme ' is op-
erated based on the principle of selectivism. The crite-
rion to provide the legal base on which the Government
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select the entitled recipients largely depends on the fi-
nancial capabilities of the Government and the minimum
level of living standards. For the selection of the en-
titled recipients, the Government sets some criteria
about per capita income of a family and the value of
household property, based on the nationwide means-test
for the low-income families. The criteria is modified
every year according to the changes of the economic
growth rate, budget of general government, increase rate
.•
of prices and so on.
5.1.3.3	 Welfare Services
Welfare services for the vulnerable groups such as the
aged, the disabled, the women and the children are ori-
ented toward improving their social lives, not only by
providing physical provisions, but also by encouraging
and developing their potentiality to be integrated into
normal social activities. However, mainly due to the
weak fiscal infrastructure of the Government, and partly
due to the lack of proper man power and organisation,.
personal social services has not developed in full-scale,
simply concentrating on the institutional care for the
aged, orphanages and disabled.
The well-being of the children (under the age 18) is
protected by the Child Welfare Law amended in 1981. How-
ever, mainly due to the lack of the financial support of
the government and the lack of numbers of specialists,
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the child welfare services are mainly limited to accommo-
date orphans to the child welfare institutions. Besides,
the government operates the technical and vocational
training for the grown-up orphans and the support for the
child-headed families.12
The government enacted the Aged Welfare Law in 1981 and
promulgated the Chart of Respect for the Aged in 1982 to
improve the spirit of respect for the aged. Main welfare
services for the aged is to provide the proper ac-
commodation for lone aged people. In addition, the gov-
ernment provides the free health examination, 13 and the
job-placement plan for the aged.
According to the survey in 1985, there are around
915,000 disabled people in Korea. However, most of them
are not properly accommodated in the special institutions
for the disabled. 14 Thus the enlargement of welfare fa-
cilities for the disabled are absolutely needed at the
moment.
12 Social Welfare Long-term Development Committee, Long-term Development Planning for So-
cial Welfare in Korea, Conference Paper, 1989, pp. 173-4 (in Korean).
.13 The priority is given to the aged with the low-income.
14 In 1990, there are only 131 institutions for the disabled nationwide. See, Social
Welfare Long-term Development Committee, Long-term Development Planning for Social Wel-
fare in Korea, p. 158 (in Korean).
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5.2 Major Factors Affecting the Adoption and
Expansion of Korean Welfare System
Like the case of the Taiwanese welfare system, the fac-
tors being examined in this section would be newly clas-
sified according to the social, economic and political
situations of Korea since the sixties, on the basis of
the arguments in the chapter two. Similarly, the most
significant variable in welfare enactment and welfare ex-
penditure will be singled out from the evidence of the
Korean welfare system. The results of this chapter would
lead us a conceivable conclusion about the origins and
nature of the welfare system in the region.
In specifying the proper factors for the case of the
Korean welfare system, the criteria rather similar to
that in case of the Taiwanese welfare system will be ap-
plied. They are:
1. Factors which are duly accorded to the
particular situations of Korea since the
early sixties.
2. Factors which have considerably and persis
tently influenced the social, economic and
political situations of Korea.
According to the above criteria, the factors relevant
to the case of the Korean welfare system will be selected
and duly classified into three contexts: Political-insti-
tutional context, Socio-economic context and Interna-
tional context. The first group is further divided into
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three factors: elections, indirect tax rate and coup.
Compared to the political-institutional context of Tai-
wan, the factor `coup' replaces the `battles with the
P.R.C.', whilst the first two factors are unchanging.
Unlike the Taiwanese politics, which has maintained rela-
tively stable political situations since 1949, the Korean
politics has been dominated by the subsequent coups since
the early sixties. This factor thus worths scrutinizing
for any attempts to analyse the Korean welfare system.
The second group includes age of population, economic
development and labour disputes. Amongst them, the newly
adopted factor in the second group is `labour disputes'
factor. Unlike Taiwan, there has been a strong tradition
of labour movement in Korea since the independence of
194d! Although the labour disputes had been strictly
prohibited under the authoritarian military regimes, the
late eighties witnessed a dramatic uprising of labour
disputes according to changes of political climates.16
The last context deals with the `openness' thesis.
Unlike the case of the Taiwanese welfare system, there is
a growing interest in the `openness' thesis for the study.
15 Evidence suggests that the labour movement just after the independence was organised
and guided by the communist organisations widely spread across the nation.
16 The dramatic increase of the labour disputes in the late eighties was occasioned by
the June Protest which ultimately drew the democratic proclamations addressed by the
then president candidate, Mr. Noh Tae-woo, of ruling party in 1987. In it, he declared
the democratic programmes including permission of the direct presidential election and
the pardon and political restoration of the strongest opposition leader, Mr. Kim Dae-
jung. Historically, its importance lays in the fact that the peoples' political power
towards democracy, which had been repressed under the subsequent military regimes, was
firstly realised on occasion of the June Protest.
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of social policy in general, mainly because the labour
movement has been very active since 1987.
On the basis of the framework of the three contexts;*
each specified factors will be closely examined, and the
most significant factor in accounting for the genesis of
welfare enactment and the trends of welfare expenditure
will be identified. The following figure displays the
conceptual framework of this section.
<Figure 5-2>
Conceptual Framework (Korea)
Welfare Enactment & Expenditure
Independent Factors	 Dependent Factors
• Elections
• Indirect Tax Rate
• Coup	 • Wefare Enactment
• Age of Population	 1111*
• Economic Development





The basic idea of the election thesis is that the elec-
tion candidates usually adopt a positive attitude towards
enactment of welfare programmes, and thus increase of ex-
penditure in order to garner the vote of the populace.
The precondition of this thesis, of course, is a repre-
sentative parliamentary democracy in which people can
freely exercise their political power into the policy
making processes. In this regard, the election thesis
merits particular attention for research into the nature
of welfare programmes in the East Asian countries, where
politics are typically under the control of authoritarian
regimes.
<Table 5-10> Elections in Korea since 1962
Number (Year)
National
Referendum	 4 (62', 67', 72', 80')
Presidential
Election	 4 (63', 67', 71', 87')
National Assembly
Election	 8 (63', 67', 71', 73', 78', 81',
85', 88')
Source: National Assembly Library, ROK, The Political 
Chronology of the Republic of Korea: 1945-1984 (in Ko-
rean), 1984; Dong-A Ilbosa, The Korean Year Book (in Ko-
rean), each year; Korea Newsreview, each week.
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Since the early sixties, there have been three national
referenda, four presidential elections," and eight
national assembly elections in Korea, as is shown in the
above table.
Compared with the Koumintang (KMT) in Taiwan which has
dominated domestic politics since its retreat from main-
land China, Korean ruling parties have changed several
times since independence. 18
 Interestingly enough, how-
ever, every national referendum gave ruling parties vic-
tory, and all of the presidential candidates of the rul-
ing party has defeated the opposition counterpart. How-
ever, at the tenth election for members of National As-
sembly, the Sinmindang (New Democratic Party) then oppo-
sition party, garnered 34% of votes, whilst the ruling
party has won only 32%. The dramatic changes has come
from the thirteenth National Assembly election held in
1988. The voting result has approved the ruling Minjong-
dang (Democratic Justice Party) to become a minority
party (125 seats), whilst three opposition parties won
136 seats including 10 independent seats. This political
situation resulted in the political merge of the ruling
party with the two opposition parties, the creation of
the new majority ruling party, Minjadang (Democratic Lib-
eral Party). Seen in this light, Korean politics has
been somewhat less stable than Taiwanese politics, where
17 Indirect presidential elections, based on the voting college, are not included. On
occasion of the October Coup (Siwol Yushin).
18 Jayudang (Liberal Party) was the ruling party from 1948 to 1960; Minjudang (Democratic
Party) 1960-1961; Konghwadang (Republic Party) 1962-1979; Minjongdang (Democratic Jus-
tice Party) 1980-1990; Minjadang (Democratic Liberal Party) 1990-up to now.
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the ruling Kuomintang has maintained around 70% of the
votes. Political instability in developing countries
from time to time is brought about by active political
participations and changes.
It seems very interesting that the following figure
proves that welfare enactments were actively made around
the election years. However, it is not likely that the
election has brought considerable increase of the welfare
expenditure, as is represented in the figure 5-4. It may
imply that corresponding expenditure was not entailed af-
ter the welfare enactment in election years.
<Figure 5-3>
<Figure 5-4>
Election and Welfare Expenditure
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5.2.1.2 Indirect Tax Rate
This thesis is closely related to the above election the-
sis. In general, voters who are also tax-payers tend to
expect more benefits through public services, but expect
to pay less taxes. Therefore election candidates are
likely to promise 'more benefits, less tax' in order to
garner votes. It really is a dilemma facing to public
officials as well as election candidates in a representa-
tive democracy.
Hence, as noted previously, the idea of indirect tax
rate thesis is based on the assumption that the public
officials are usually forced to conceal the costs of pub-
lic policies in election years, and it result in the in-
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crease of the indirect tax rate, which could avoid the
anger of tax-payers.
According to the premise of this thesis, the indirect
tax rate is largely expected to show positive trends, at
least if the welfare expenditure has increased year after.
year. As far as the welfare expenditure and indirect tax
rate in Korea since the early sixties are concerned, it
is clear that both has correlated to each other, as is
shown in the following figure.
<Figure 5-5>
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Like the politics of developing countries in the last
three decades, the Korean polity has been dominated by
the three coups happened in 1961, 1972 and 1980 respec-
tively.
The first coup was made by the general Park in the 16th
of May in 1961. After that, he has assumed the reins of
government until his death in 1979. The second coup was
made in October, 1972 by himself for the purpose of,
according to the proclamation of the coup, firstly more
competent defence against the North Korea and effective
economic development under the strong leadership of the
government. It is widely accepted that the prime
priority has given to defence and economic development
during his reign of 18 years, and thus the welfare sec-
tors has been relatively neglected. The third coup was
made in May, 1980 by general Chun, who represented the'
new military power, just after the assassination of the
president Park. He ruled the government until his resign
in 1988. The following figure shows the political crises
including the number of political prisoners and martial
law days, occasioned by the three coups.
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<Figure 5-6>
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Political Chronology of ROK, National
Assembly, 1984. Various Sources.
The issue at stake now is how much the political crises
like coups has affected the welfare state development in
Korea. This thesis is held central in any analysis of
the Korean welfare system since the political crises has
dominated almost every sector of Korea. The following
figure illustrates strong correlation between welfare
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<Figure 5-8>
Political Crises & Welfare Expenditure
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As is shown in the above figure, we can also find the
relatively strong correlations between the welfare expen-...
diture and political crisis.
5.2.2	 Socio-economic Context
5.2.2.1 Age of Population
This thesis arose from the assumption that nations with
more aged population are likely to spend more social se-
curity expenditure. In fact, 'the more aged population,
the more social security benefits' assumption has been
supported by the evidence from the Western welfare
states, which have become an aged society since the post-
war. Financially, increasing aged population has been a
great burden for all developed welfare states, since the
aged need more welfare spending. 19 Especially in the ben-
efits for pensioners which account for almost half the
total social security budget in Britain, the number of
pensioners is the main determinant of pension cost.n
It should be emphasized, however, more importance lies
in the fact that the age dependency ratio which
indicates the size of the aged population relative to the
working population has increase dramatically, and thus'
19 A wealth of evidence suggests that the cost of medical care in NHS for the old aged
(late eighties) is ten times as much as that of forty years old. See, Financial Times,
1 April 1993.
20 Reform of Social Security: Programme for Change, Volume 2, Cmnd. 9518 (London: HMSO,
1985), p. 3.
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intensified the financial burden to all Western
countries.
No one would doubt that this thesis may be suitable for
the explanation of the increase of welfare benefits in
the Western welfare state, though it is a matter of
debate whether the size of the aged population is the
sole determinant. However, the relevance of this thesis
should be sought in the kind and level of benefits for
the aged in individual countries.
In this regard, it is dubious that this thesis is rel-
evant for the explanation of welfare expenditure in Ko-
rea, since the national pension scheme was put into oper-
ation only a few years ago, and the benefit level of the
Old Aged Allowance, enforced in 1992, is too low to in-
crease of the living standard of the aged.21
Since the launch of the family planning activities, the
population policy of Korea has been estimated as one of
the most successful population policies amongst devel-
oping countries. Mainly due to the effective administra-
tion and active public relations of the military govern-
ment, population growth rate has fallen dramatically
since the early sixties. Moreover, life expectancy of
Korea has risen, owing to the improved medical service,
good nutrition and the increase of living standards.
Both the decreasing population growth rate and the in-
creasing life expectancy account for the steady rise of
21 The actual benefit of the Old Aged Allowance, payable monthly to the over 65, is only



















the age dependency ratio. The following table shows some
important indices for population change.
<Table 5-11>
Life Expectancy and Age Dependency Ratio of Korea
1960 55.3 n.a% 5.3%
1970 63.2 1.97% 5.7%
1980 65.8 1.57% 6.1%
1990 71.3 0.97% 6.8%
(Pop. 65 years old & over/ Pop. 15-65) * 100
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning
Board, ROK, Social Indicators in Korea, 1990; Major
Statistics of Korean Economy, 1990; Korea Development	 -
Institute, Statistical Data of the Korean Economy: Past 
and Present, 1992 (in Korean).
<Figure 5-9>
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When we compare the trends of welfare expenditure with
the increase of dependency ratio and population ratio of
over 65 years old, we can get the above figure. However,
it is not likely that trends of welfare expenditure well
correspond to the rise of the age dependency ratio. The
explanations of this lie in large part with the fact that
welfare for the elderly has been low on the government's
list of welfare priorities since caring for the elderly
is traditionally a family not a state responsibility.
Thus it seems clear that this thesis does not relevantly
account for the trends of welfare expenditure in Korea.
5.2.2.2 Economic Development
The logic of industrialism, which depicts the coming of
welfare state as a product of industrial development,
probably has been the most influential account of the de-
terminant of welfare programmes. According to this line
of thinking, the origins of the welfare state are largely
seen to lie in societal changes associated with the broad
processes of industrialisation and the destruction of the
traditional way of life which used to provide social pro-
visions and secure family life. 22 Seen in this light, it
seems clear that the level of economic development is not
only a prerequisite but the most significant variable for
welfare state development.
22 See, C. Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State?: The New Political Economy of Welfare
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 14-21.
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Being faithful in the Anglo-Saxon functionalist soci-
ology, this thesis has developed in the post-war affluent
periods and has reflected the 1 end of ideology' mental-
ity. According to Wilensky, probably the most influen-
tial and authoritative advocate, the political ideology
or party is not relevant for explaining the post-war wel-
fare state development, since the welfare state is truly
a by-product of the changing needs occasioned by the in-
dustrialisation, far from the political will of political
elites .23
This is of great interest for the analysis of the de-
terminants of welfare programmes in Korea, where the dy-
namism of capitalist development has been maintained, and
the traditional community has been destroyed very
quickly. In fact, the economic development of Korea
since the early sixties has been remarkable in all re-
spects. From the tradition-oriented agriculture country
in the early sixties, it has become a leading industrial
country in the Third World in the late eighties. Its an-
nual growth rate is amongst the highest in the world and
accordingly the GNP per capita increased from $82 in 1961
to $4968 in 1989. Moreover, unemployment rate has dra-
23 See H. L. Wilensky and C. N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York:
Free Press, 1965); H. L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and EquaIity: Structural and Ideo-
logical Roots of Public Expenditure (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1975). However, in his later study, he found that Catholic dominance in govern-
ment had affects on the social security expenditure, whereas the left party dominance
did not from the evidence of 19 advanced countries. See H. L. Wilensky, 'Leftism,
Catholism, and Democratic Corporatism: The Role of Political Parties in Recent Welfare
State Development , , in The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, ed. by
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matically fallen from 8.2% in 1963 to full employment
(2.6% in 1989) and the tax burden rate has steadily in-
creased.
When we compare the trends of welfare expenditure with
the indices of industrial development such as economic
growth rate, we can get a corresponding trends of both
indices.
<Figure 5-10>
Economic Growth & Welfare Expenditure
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Finance Statiatios, MOF, ROK, 1991.
It should be emphasized, however, that it is hard to
explain the fluctuations of the welfare expenditure of
each year, though we cannot deny that economic
development has been a requirement for welfare
expenditure. For example, this economic development
thesis cannot account for why the Korean government spend
8.52% of whole expenditure to welfare sector, which far
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exceeded the average percent of welfare expenditure, in
1982. Moreover, it cannot provide plausible accounts on
the different timing of welfare enactment and different
speed of expansion of welfare system amongst nations with
a similar level of economic development.
5.2.2.3	 Labour Disputes
There has been a strong line of thinking in the study of
social policy that the post-war welfare state development
can be accounted for as a process of accommodation be-
tween capital and labour mediated by the state. Accord-
ing to this line of thinking, the welfare state has de-
veloped as a social integration apparatus designed to me-
diate the demands of organised labour power in capitalist
society. As the political power of labour class has in-
creased so as to form left or left coalition governments,
frequently seen throughout sixties and seventies in the
Western European countries, they more or less were more
positive in adoption and expansion of welfare programmes.
Thus the basic assumption of this thesis is that the more
powerful the union is, the more welfare programmes will
be expected.
It is a realty that the Korean labour movement has been
strictly prohibited by the military government since the
early sixties, though there was a strong tradition of






the Korean War. The Korean government deeply and ac-
tively intervened in the labour union process with a view
to protect the industry. Thus the union membership rate
had been relatively low and, moreover, the number of
labour disputes had been extremely low before June 1987,„
when the democratisation programmes were declared by the
ruling party presidential candidate. On the occasion of
June Democratic Movement, it is very noteworthy that the
number of labour disputes rocketed in 1987 and 1988. The
following figure displays that the number of labour dis-
putes in 1987 outnumbered around ten times as much as the
average number, whilst the union membership rate did not
show parallel increase.
<Figure 5-11>
Labour Disputes & Union Membership Rate
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<Figure 5-12>
Labour Movement & Welfare Expenditure
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However, when we compare the trends of welfare
expenditure and the labour movement indices such as the
union membership rate and the number of labour disputes,
we cannot find any plausible correlation between them.
Thus we can represent the view that the labour movement
does not by itself influence on welfare expenditure in
Korea, irrespective of whether it appears as a serious
threat to the society or not. For such a labour movement
to be fruitful in welfare state development, the
existence of a party of the left, which advocates the
interests of the working class, may be vita1.24
24 Several attempts have been made to form a left-leaned party in Korea. However, mainly













As is explained in the last chapter, the basic idea of
the openness thesis is that nations with a highly depen.
dent economy towards world markets tend to operate more
universal welfare provisions. Mainly due to the severe
international competition, these nations usually have a
big conglomerates in order to concentrate limited re-
sources. These huge corporations inevitably bring big
and strong counterpart, labour unions. On the political
basis of these powerful labour unions, these nations more
often than not have left or left-coalition governments,
which are generally in favour of universal welfare provi-
sions.
This thesis merits particular attention for the analy-
sis of welfare system in Korea, since the export oriented
industrialisation has been the main strategy of the eco-
nomic development of Korea since the middle of sixties,
and its industrialisation has been led by huge corpora-
tion under the command of the state. 25 The following
table shows dependency of the Korean economy to world
market.
25 Compared to the Taiwanese economy, the economic share of huge conglomerates is domi-
nant in Korea. For example, the upper 30 biggest companies account for 37.2%, 33.2%
and 18.6% of the property, value-added products and employment respectively. See Korea
Institute for Economics & Technology (KIET), Industrial Structure and Economic Achieve-
ment of Korea and Taiwan (Seoul: KIET, 1989), pp. 62-72 (in Korean).
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<Table 5-12>
Foreign Dependency of Korean Economy






Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning
Board, ROK, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1990.
Moreover, the late eighties witnessed vast eruption of
labour movements as is shown in the figure 5-11. Thus we
can presume that Korean economy shares some preconditions
such as export oriented economy, high concentration of
huge conglomerates and strong labour movement, of this
thesis with Scandinavian countries from which it has come
into bloom.
<Table 5-13>







Source: The World Bank, World Development Report: 
Development and the Environment, 1992.
But when we compare the social security and welfare
expenditure of Korea with those of Scandinavian
countries, we can find huge gaps between them, as is
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shown in the above table. Now the question is what makes
them so enormously different in the social expenditure,
though some appearance of their economy, the precondition
of this thesis in other words, are similar.
First of all we can take the economic gap into account.
In fact, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are amongst the
highest income countries in the world and their GNP per
capita is generally three or four times as high as that
of Korea. However, as we has examined in table 5-13, the
level of economic development is not much to do with the
level of social expenditure of the government.
Secondly, the defence expenditure of Korea is much
higher than those of Scandinavian countries. The percent
of defence expenditure in Korea is 25.8% in 1990, whilst
those of Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1990 are 5.4%,
8.0% and 6.3% respectively. It surely contributes to
huge gaps in social expenditure between Korea and Scandi-
navian countries.
Thirdly, Korea has never had the left party which is
supposed to channel the voice of labour movement into
politics. Thus we can understand why the very existence
of left party or government is so important in welfare
state development.
In sum, this thesis give us a good clue as to why and
to what extent the Korean welfare system is different
from that of the Western advanced countries in general
and the Scandinavian countries in particular.
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5.3 Concluding Remarks
-From the evidence of the second section of this chapter,
it seems clear that political crises, amongst other fac-
tors, have had the most significant affect on the devel-
opment of welfare system, especially in the welfare en-
actment. Figure 5-7 presents strong correlation between
the political crises and welfare enactment. This
assumption is further justified by the fact that little
enactment was made in the relatively stable political pe-
riods.	 In addition, it also proves that election has
relatively associated with the welfare enactments (Figure
5-3). In terms of welfare expenditure, it is
comparatively related with the political crises (Figur6
5-8), though not so clear as in the case of Taiwanese
welfare expenditure, and also turned out to be related
with the trends of indirect tax rate (Figure 5-5).
However, other independent factors, such as age of popu-
lation, economic development, labour disputes and open-
ness, turned out to be less likely to accord with the ex-
planation of the development of welfare in Korea.
Accordingly we can draw our conclusion that the welfare
system of Korea is basically designed to cope with the
political crises, aiming to achieve the political
legitimacy of the regime. The result of this chapter
would give us a good starting point to recognise and
analyse as to how, why and to what extent the welfare
system of Korea is different from that of advanced
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welfare states. Now we can propose the `political crisis'
thesis which recognises the welfare system as a response
pattern of legitimacy crisis of the regime.
However, as is the case of Taiwan, this argument has a
limitation since this chapter did not scrutinise the
societal changes and their impact upon the welfare system
of Korea, and a full documentation of welfare
legislations of Korea has not been adequately made. This
argument thus should be limited to the question of what
kind of interpretation is possibly presented when
relating the timing of welfare enactment and the level of
welfare expenditures to the political crises in Korea.
Thus different approach would be needed to analyse the
welfare enactment and welfare expenditure after 1987. In
addition, we have to accept that it still is a matter of
debate whether we can apply this thesis, developed from
the evidence of the cases of the Korean and Taiwanese
welfare system, to the welfare system of other
authoritarian regimes in Third World countries.
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Chapter Six:
Arguments about the Development and Implementation of
Welfare in Korea and Taiwan
6.1 Industrialisation and Welfare: 'Aversion to
Welfarism l
 and 'Human Capital Development'
6.2 Politics and Welfare: Political Crisis Thesis
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Economic recession of the Western economies has increased
the scepticism about the welfare state throughout the
eighties and early nineties. In spite of ever-increasing
welfare expenditures, income inequality has widened and
large numbers of people are still in poverty. What is
worse, the number of those without work is supposed to
remain high for an indefinite period ahead. 1 These.
economies seemingly lost their faith in social advance
measures to cope with, or at best to prevent, such social
diseases of capitalism as poverty, inequality and
unemployment. This gloomy picture of the Western welfare
states in the last decade may present a discouraging
prospect to the developing countries that are now
attempting to establish Western-typed welfare systems.
However, as far as the Far Eastern countries are con-
cerned, it may not be such a disappointing episode since
they make up their own brand of welfare states. 2 In
these countries, there have never been widespread calls.
for Western-type social rights as in the Western welfare
states. It is in this regard that Japanese officials
were reluctant to introduce the social market system of
Germany, notwithstanding their great respect for German
achievements. Moreover, Singapore's governing socialists
1 T. Wilson and D. Wilson, 'Beveridge and the Reform of Social Security - Then and Now',
Government and Opposition, 28:3 (Summer, 1993), p. 353.
2 C. Jones, 'The Pacific Challenge: Confucian Welfare States', in New Perspectives on
the Welfare State in Europe, ed. by C. Jones (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 199.
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never sought to emulate the policies of Britain's post-
war Labour Government and the Hong Kong civil service did
not wish to see a British-style welfare state in Hong
Kong. Although American influence in Korea and Taiwan
has been tremendous since their independence, `America's
liberal `land of opportunity' welfare state was scarcely
calculated to appeal to Korea and Taiwan'. 3 It implies
the fact that different perspectives are absolutely
needed to analyse any aspects of the welfare systems of
the East Asian countries.
It is in this regard that this chapter will discuss two
prominent arguments ('aversion to welfarism' vs `human
capital development' and political crisis) concerning the
development of their welfare systems, on the basis of the
studies in chapters four and five, which examined the
welfare systems of Korea and Taiwan.
3	 Ibid., p. 207.
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6.1 Industrialisation and Welfare: 'Aversion to
Welfarism , vs 'Human Capital Development,
It is encouraging that some scholars have attempted to
analyse welfare systems of Korea and Taiwan in relation
to their unique industrialisation. To a large extent,
there are two leading views amongst the researches of the
welfare systems of Korea and Taiwan: 'aversion to
welfarism' and 'human capital development'.
6.1.1 'Aversion to Welfarism,
According to the 'aversion to welfarism' view, the po-
litical elites of Korea and Taiwan not only neglect the
necessity of welfare but resolutely oppose the expansion
of welfare. Some scholars pay attention to the commit-
ment of free market system prevalent amongst the
political elites who have guided the economic development
of these countries. In his review article concerning a
developmental state, Onis presents the view that a sin-
.••
gle-minded commitment of the state toward the private
market system is vital for economic development:
Economic development, ... , constitutes the fore-
most and single-minded priority of state action.
Conflict of goals is avoided by the absence of any
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commitment to equality and social welfare.
There is an underlying commitment to private prop-
erty and market, and state intervention is firmly
circumscribed by this commitment.4
He adds:
the [Korean] government's fiscal policies have
complemented its highly interventionist industrial
policies ... Yet the welfare state function has
been virtually absent. The state has assumed no
responsibilities outside the domains of production
and capital accumulation.5
Midgley presented a similar view in the following
paragraph:
The incrementalist style of social policy making
in the four Asian NICs has been congruent with a
marked reluctance on the part of political elites
to expand social programmes. They have consis-
tently affirmed their faith in the virtues of free
enterprise, self-reliance and hard work and fre-
quently declared an aversion to welfarism.6
According to this line of thinking, the political
elites of these countries have shown reluctance towards
welfarism since it was largely considered to discourage
foreign investment, work incentives and profit making.
In addition, mainly due to the high military tension of
the region, Korea and Taiwan traditionally have spent
more on the military expenditure than other developing
4 Z. Onis, `The Logic of the Developmental State', Comparative Politics, 24 (1991), p.
111.
5	 Ibid., p. 113.
6 J. Midgley, `Industrialisation and Welfare: The Case of the Four Little Tigers',
Social Policy and Administration, 20 (1986), p. 234. My emphasis.
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countries. 7
 Stated briefly, they have to spend a
considerable portion of government revenue on defense as.
well as concentrate national capital development.
Moreover, unlike other government expenditures such as
infrastructure, once the welfare programme has been put
into operation, its expenditure tends to increase year
after year.
As far as the welfare expenditure of Korea and Taiwan
is concerned, there is a strong empirical support for the
'aversion to welfarism i view. Compared to the upper-mid-
dle-income Latin American countries like Mexico, Uruguay
and Brazil, and former Eastern communist countries like
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the governmental expenditures
to social security and welfare of Korea and Taiwan have
lagged far behind. Moreover, this thesis gains support
from the fact that these aforementioned countries, as
compared in the following table, generally allocate a
greater portion of their government expenditures on
7 Many academic attempts have been made to assess the opportunity costs of the military
burden spending in terms of economic growth, social welfare expenditure and resource
allocation in developing countries. Benoit's can be appraised as one of pioneering
works. See E. Benoit, `Growth and Defence in Developing Countries', Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change. 26 (1978), 271-80. In it, the author, contrary to common
perception, leads the conclusion that military spending may have a positive influence
on economic growth. However, his findings have been under criticisms. Refer, for ex-
ample, to B. Biswas and R. Ram, `Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in Less De-.
veloped Countries: An Augmented Model and Further Evidence', Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 34:2 (1986), 361-72; S. Deger, Military Expenditure in Third World
Countries: The Economic Effects (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). In terms of
the influence of military burden on social welfare, Peter Hess from his own econometric
model concludes that `Larger military burdens may have been at the expense of improved
social welfare'. See, P. Hess, `The Military Burden, Economic Growth, and the Human
Suffering Index: Evidence from the LDCs f , Cambridge Journal of Economics, 13 (1989),
497-515.
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Countries GNP % of Total Expenditureper
capita ($,1990) 1972	 1990
Mexico 2490 25.4 13.0
Uruguay 2560 52.3 50.3
Brazil 2680 35.0 20.1
Hungary 2780 n.a 35.3
Czechoslovakia 3140 n.a 25.3
Korea 5400 5.9 12.2
Taiwan 7900 12.7 17.5
social security, despite their GNP per Capita being much
less than that of Korea and Taiwan.
<Table 6-1>
Government Expenditure on Social Security and Welfare
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report, 1992: 
Development and the Environment, 1992; Council for
Economic Planning and Development, ROC, Taiwan
Statistical Data Book, 1990; National Bureau of
Statistics, Economic Planning Board, ROK, Ma'or
Statistics of Korean Economy, 1990.
The above table implies that the 'logic of indus-
trialism' thesis, which maintains that welfare systems
tend to develop in accordance with industrial develop-
ment, has not adequately described the cases of Korea and
Taiwan. There has in fact been little room for welfare
in their economic development periods, though this line
of interpretation needs more empirical evidence.
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6.1.2 Human Capital Development
It should be emphasised, however, that the 'aversion to
welfarism' thesis does not inconsistent with the 'human
capital development' thesis. It is widely accepted that
the Korean and Taiwanese government's resolute determina-
tion to increase the condition of health and education
has been a success, in tandem with the national
prosperity.
This thesis begins with the fact that the East Asian
countries have spent more on education and health, as
their economies have adjusted to a high value-added
economic structure since the eighties. Accordingly, some
scholars focus on the industrial structure of these coun-
tries, and argue that social policy of the region is ba-
sically designed to serve the requirement of economic
development policy. Undisputedly, the main source of
economic development of these countries is nothing but
human capital, in contrast with other developing coun-
tries such as Latin American countries where natural re-
sources are abundant. Thus these East Asian countries
are generally expected to invest more on education,
health and possibly social services for the purpose of
developing the quality of human resources. As is clearly
argued by Deyo:
under a development strategy of human-resource-in-
tensive export oriented industrialization (EOI),
social and economic development goals are often
compatible and closely linked. East Asian social
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policy has been driven primarily by the require-
ments and outcomes of economic development policy,
unlike the situation in Latin America, where ex-
trabureaucratic political pressures have played a
more prominent role in shaping social policy.8
Thus. the 'human capital development' thesis is of
growing interest to those interested in the social devel-
opment of developing countries. We will discuss this
thesis focusing on education and health of Korea and Tai-
wan respectively.
6.1.2.1 The Case of Taiwan
In fact, the employment structure of Taiwan has trans-
formed into the Western type. The employment in the sec-
ondary industry sector (manufacturing, construction and
utilities) and the tertiary one (communications, trans-
portations and services) has increased, while the primary
production sector has steadily withered away, as was ex-
amined in chapter three.
Moreover, the economy has been transformed into a more
highly value-added industry structure. In the secondary
industry sector, the production index of heavy industry
has risen remarkably since the eighties, while the mining
industry, for example, has decreased as the following
table shows.
8 F. C. Deyo, 'The Political Economy of Social Policy Formation', in States and Develop-
ment in the Asian Pacific Rim, ed. by R. Appelbaum and J. Henderson (Newbury Park:
Sage, 1992), pp. 289-90.
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<Table 6-2>







1981 137.88 63.68 67.52 46.76
1982 123.93 62.93 69.26 45.83
1983 120.46 74.32 76.32 47.55
1984 116.45 84.72 84.71 48.22
1985 106.99 85.47 88.18 47.44
1986 100.00 100.00 100.00 48.22
1987 96.84 115.61 107.07 50.14
1988 94.77 126.07 105.45 52.68
1989 83.47 134.22 105.36 54.26
Source: Overall Planning Department, Council for Economic
Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, ROC, Taiwan
Economic Statistics, 1990.
The Taiwanese economy is now undergoing a
transformation toward a more advanced industrial
structure. It is noteworthy that medical care has
developed in tandem with this transformation. The fol-
lowing table indicates the rapid development of medical
care of Taiwan since 1970.
<Table 6-3> Availability of Medical Care
A* B* D* E*
1971 5.1 2087 4.6 1892 619
1975 3.9 1732 3.4 1492 526
1980 3.3 1624 2.7 1323 446
1985 3.0 1553 2.1 1130 258
1989 2.9 1639 1.7 965 232
• A: Average area served by each health & medical
facility (km2).
• B: Persons served by each health & medical facility
(person).
• C: Area served by each physician (km2).
• D: Persons served by each physician (person).
• E: Population per hospital bed.
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development,
ROC, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1990.
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In terms of education, the ROC Constitution requires
that no less than 15 percent of the national budget, 25
percent of provincial budgets, and 35 percent of county
and municipality budgets shall be appropriated for educa-
tion. 9 According to government datum, government'
expenditure for each student has increased markedly since
1970s, as is presented in the following table.
<Table 6-4>
Provincial Government Expenditure for Each Student
Unit: NT$
A* B* D*
1971-2 11752 4828 6140 2477
1975-6 21627 10190 11232 6523
1980-1 45223 20635 23789 14927
1984-5 • 58575 25380 33157 25891
1988-9 140452 37250 46257 22566
• A: Provincial colleges & universities.
• B: Provincial middle schools.
• C: Provincial vocational schools.
• D: Provincial elementary schools.
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development,
ROC, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1990.
Moreover, the late eighties witnessed a change in the
government's attitude toward welfare, as was illustrated
in the development strategy in economic development plans
of Taiwan.
9 Republic of China Yearbook 1991-2, p 267.
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<Table 6-5> Economic Development Plan of Taiwan
Contents	 Welfare Commitment in





Plan (1976-81) 	 To increase living standards (1st/5)*
8th Four-Year
Plan (1982-85) 	 None
9th Four-Year
Plan (1986-89)	 To expand public welfare (6th/6)*
presents the policy priority. For example, lst/5 means
that the policy ranked 1st out of five policies.
Source: KIET, Taiwan (Seoul: KIET, 1989).
The above table shows that there has been no welfare
commitment throughout the sixties and seventies. It is
only since the late eighties that the government's
commitment to welfare emerged in the economic development
plan of Taiwan.
It is a matter of debate, however, whether these com-
mitments were brought about by the requirements and out-
comes of economic development, as is noted by Deyo, in
accordance with the `human-resource-intensive export ori-
ented industrialisation'." Moreover, it should be empha-
sised, these commitments to welfare do not of themselves
establish the welfarisation of Taiwan. Being normative
by nature, the commitments should be put into a more
concrete form such as actual welfare programmes and
increases in welfare spending.
10 F. C. Deyo (1992), op. cit., p. 289.
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6.1.2.2 The Case of Korea
As is the case of Taiwan, it is widely accepted that the
main source of the remarkable economic development is an
abundant supply of highly educated human resources.
Mainly due to the extensive investment by the government,
pre-college school enrollment (primary, middle and high
school) is 95%," and adult illiteracy is less than 5%,
lowest amongst the upper-middle income economies.12
Additionally, there has been considerable improvement
in health indices since the sixties, as is shown in the
following table.
<Table 6-6>	 Improvement of Health in Korea
Persons per	 Persons per	 Coverage of





1980 1690 1001 29.8
1985 1379 549 57.7 **
1989 1066 452 100.0
Medical insurance has been enforced since 1977.
** 1986
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning
Board, ROK, Social Indicators in Korea, 1990.
11 As well, the number of students per teacher has considerably declined since the early
sixties. National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board, ROK,  Social Indica-
tors in Korea 1990. For more details of the development of education in Korea, refer
to chapter three.
12 The World Bank, World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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Even so, the Korean government has traditionally given
more weight on education than social welfare or health,
consistent with the Confucian teaching, which places
great emphasis on education. The following table shows
that the percentage of government expenditure on
education is the highest amongst upper-middle-income
countries, whilst that of health is relatively low.
<Table 6-7>





Mexico 16.4 13.9 4.5 1.9
Uruguay 9.5 7.4 1.6 4.5
Brazil 8.3 5.3 6.7 7.2
Hungary n.a 3.3 n.a 7.9
Czechoslovakia n.a 1.8 n.a 0.4
Korea 15.8 19.6 1.2 2.2
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1992: 
Development and the Environment, 1992.
As inferred from the above table, the Korean government
has been unwilling to finance traditional welfare sectors
such as health and social security, whilst a relatively
high portion of funds has been spent on education. The
basic priorities of the Korean government on social
expenditure are clear; they are ready to spend government
monies so long as it is concerned with economic
development, but are still very reluctant to enhance
welfarism.
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Despite this reluctance the portion of both health and
education among government expenditure has considerably
increased, while that of economic services has declined
since the early eighties when the economy 'began to be
restructured to highly value-added industries.
<Table 6-8>
Growth Rate of Expenditure on Health, Education and Eco-
nomic Services since 1980	 Unit: %
Health	 Education	 Economic Services
1980 1.02 14.63 25.99
1985 1.29 16.56 21.87
1989 2.18 17.50 16.98
Source: The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook,
each year.
Moreover, the Korean government has begun to recognise
the need of a welfare system since the late eighties,
according to the transformation toward highly value-added














<Table 6-9> Economic Development Plan of Korea
Contents	 Welfare Commitment in
of Plans	 Development Strategy (policy)
None
None
Social security and promotion




Increase government support for -
educating children of low-income
families (8th/14)*
Expand publicwelfare programmes
and improve redistribution of
income gradually so as to
maintain economic stability
(13th/14)*
presents the policy priority. For example, 8th/14
means that the policy ranked 8th out of 14 policies.
Source: S. A. MacManus, `The Three "E's" of Economic De-
velopment...and the Hardest is Equity: Thirty Years of
Economic Development Planning in the Republic of Korea
(I) 1 , Korea Journal, 30:8 (Aug. 1990), pp. 5-7.
Thus the Korean government is now recognising the need
of a welfare system in economic development (humaa
capital development thesis), despite having neglected or




In this section, we discussed two prominent views about
the development of welfare systems in Korea and Taiwan in
relation to their unique industrialisation. However,
these two apparently irreconcilable views are not
mutually exclusive. Rather, it would be fair to say that
both arguments are supplementary to each other, two sides
of one coin. Seen in the historical development of Korea
and Taiwan, the 'aversion to welfarism' view seems to be
of	 more	 interpretative	 value	 throughout	 the
industrialisation processes. It should be emphasised,
however, their welfare systems, especially health and
education, have developed throughout the eighties in
tandem with the growing economies. In other words, as
their economies have rested more and more heavily on high
value-added technology, the state has come to recognise
the importance of developing human capital, which may be
the only source of economic development of this period.
As a result, the political elites seem to reckon the
welfare systems to be a firm buttress for further
development of their economies.
In sum, we duly reached the notion that the 'human cap-
ital development' thesis provides a strong explanation
of the development of welfare systems in Korea and
Taiwan, though the 'aversion to welfarism' thesis is not
thereby contradicted. We can now maintain the view that
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their welfare systems have been driven primarily by the
requirements of overall economic development policy.
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6.2	 Politics and Welfare: Political Crisis Thesis
We concluded in the last section that we cannot emphasise
the importance of industrial development too strongly in
the welfare state development. A Welfare system may be
only the superstructural expression of industrial
development. Industrial development provides the basic
resources which make the ideas or commitment to implement
an actual programme. However, it does not by itself
result in direct welfare enactment and welfare
expenditures. It is thus necessary to examine more
plausible accounts on the development of welfare systems
in Korea and Taiwan. We turn our attention to political
accounts on their welfare state development: the
political crisis thesis.
Analysing the timing of welfare enactments and the
trend of welfare expenditure of Korea and Taiwan in
chapter four and five, we could find that both Korean and
Taiwanese governments were more active in enacting
welfare programmes and spent more on welfare programmes
when in serious political crises. It merits the atten-
tion of those interested in the welfare determinants
since it is a unique phenomena which can not be accounted
for by the existing accounts on welfare determinants.
Now is the time to propose a theoretical lens which fits
the unique development of welfare systems of Korea and
Taiwan. This research thus proposes a 'political crisis'
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thesis which might stand up well to the evidence of both
welfare systems.
The basic assumption of the 'political crisis' thesis
is that the regime is likely to introduce or enact
welfare programmes more actively, and tends to spend more
on welfare programmes, when faced with a serious politi-
cal crisis. Here we can raise the question of 'why does
the regime show a more positive attitude towards welfare
when in political crisis ?' The answer is closely
related to the problem of legitimacy.
6.2.1 Political Crisis as a Source of Legitimacy Crisis
Legitimacy is traditionally defined as the 'capacity of
the system to engender and maintain the belief that the
existing political institutions are the most appropriate.
ones for the society'. 13 In regard to this legitimacy
theme, Jones and Moran argue as follows:
... Control of the means of coercion is an impor-
tant guarantor of sovereignty. But the sovereign
power of a state depends not only on its capacity
to coerce: it also rests on the recognition by
citizens that the state has the authority or right
to exercise power over those live in its tern-
tory. This is commonly called legitimacy.u
13 S. M. Upset, `Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy' in Legitimacy and the
State, ed. by William Connolly (Oxford: Basil Blackwel(, 1984), p. 88.
14 B. Jones and M. Moran, `Introduction: Explaining Politics' in Politics UK, ed. by B.
Jones and Others (Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Philip Allan, 1991), p. 10.
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When in times of great societal transformation,
however, the legitimacy of the state is likely to be in
serious political jeopardy and accordingly a legitimacy
crisis may arise. A crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of
change, and it constitutes a crisis of state. 15 Binder,16
in his influential book, classified crisis into five cat-
egories, identity crisis, legitimacy crisis, partic -
ipation crisis, distribution crisis and penetration
crisis; whilst Habermas 17 grouped it into four categories:
the economic crisis, rationality crisis, legitimation
crisis and motivation crisis respectively. In addition
it has been called as the `crisis of accumulation' by
Offel8 or `Hegemony crisis' by Gramsc jr and so forth.
Meanwhile Grewa° describes the interrelationships among
five crises, from which we can assume that the
`legitimacy crisis' is held central amongst others, as
follows:
15 S. M. Upset (1984), op. cit., p. 89.
16 Leonard Binder, Crises and Sequences in Politica! Development (Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1971).
17 Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).
18 Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (London: Hutchinson, 1984).
19 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart,
1971).
20 Raymond Grew, 'The Crises and Their Sequences', in Crises of Political Development in















	 	 Strong Relation
4-0" Weak Relation
Thus the political crisis of a regime is best described
as the 'legitimacy crisis of sovereign power'. Quite
simply, we can argue that a legitimacy crisis would arise
when the state has impaired, for whatever reasons, its
own authority to govern the populace, and thus loses.
their political support.
Lipset illustrates two possible ways of a legitimacy
crisis occurring during a transition to a new social
structure as follows:
(1) the status of major conservative institutions
is threatened during the period of structural
change (2) all the major groups in the society do
not have access to the political system in the
transitional period, • or at least as soon as they
develop political demands. After a new social
structure is established, if the new system is un-
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able to sustain the expectations of major groups,
, a new crisis may develop. 21
Whilst the first case of loss of legitimacy is best de-
picted in the transformation of monarchies to democratic
republic, the second type of legitimacy crisis concerns
political participation. This 'entry into politics'
crisis is generally brought about by an absence of the
modernised political institutions which are expected to
embody political demands. 22 This crisis will be intensi-
fied when coupled with other crises such as an identity
crisis, a legitimacy crisis, a distribution crisis and a
penetration crisis.
As is mentioned earlier in chapter three, East Asian
countries necessarily foster labour intensive industries
because they lack sufficient capital and technology for
economic development. Since the Import Substitution
Strategy has failed, labour intensity of those industries
has been purposely strengthened to increase national
competitiveness, as these economies have been deeply
engaged in world trade. According to the demands of
world trade, labour-intensive industries have developed
with the assistance of their Government's financial and
political support at the expense of human rights,
democracy and so forth. It was assumed, at least by the
members of ruling group, that an export-led industrial
strategy , based on labour-intensive industries was the
21 S. M. Lipset (1984), op. cit., p. 89.
22 L. Binder and others, Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 55-63.
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only way to increase the national production, and ac-
cordingly to legitimatize their rule.
However, looking back to the history of Korea and Tai-
wan where political regimes traditionally retain reac-
tionary attitudes toward civil society, the legitimacy of
a regime depends not only on economic success but also on
the democratic institutions. Although they have de-
veloped their economies very rapidly, it does not neces-
sarily mean that these authoritarian regimes have enjoyed
a high level of legitimacy. As economic development has
improved the standard of living, civil society has de-
veloped and begun to demand the democratisation of all
sectors of the society, and to resist against the author-
itarian regimes which, in a certain level of development,
would inhibit the free expansion and self-development of
civil society.	 It has obviously caused a crisis of
legitimacy of the regime.
Moreover, when coupled with serious political crises
such as the coups of 1972 and 1980 in Korea and severed
diplomatic relations in Taiwan, the legitimacy crisis has
been exacerbated. We will now look •at the response of
this legitimacy crisis: welfare.
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6.2.2 Welfare as a Response of Legitimacy Crisis
When faced with the crisis of legitimacy, regimes often
take measures to restore or increase their legitimacy.
The responses of the legitimacy crisis, in large part,
are divided into two different ways, repression and
social integration. Whilst every political regime has
its own physical means of control which, directly or
indirectly, serve to keep social order, the social
integration function is of more importance, and has come
to be the main and more essential function for patterns.
maintenance. Poulantzas23 claims that two different state
apparatuses (repression state apparatus and ideological
state apparatus) are essential for modern states. Seen
in this light, it seems clear that the ideological state
apparatus serves the function of social integration, of
which the nationwide establishment of welfare state is a
component.
As far as the political situation of developing coun-
tries is concerned, repressive control is more frequently
used, and is regarded as a more effective way to manage
the legitimacy crisis. Moreover the frequent exercise of
repressive control itself may cause or intensify the
legitimacy crisis. However, the function of social
integration apparatus including social welfare system has
been of growing importance in the Third World polities.
23 N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), pp.
99-107.
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Most of the Third World regimes, whichever way they might.
use to seize the power, are claiming to stand for the
representative democracy which, at least in principle,
guarantees human rights, political liberty and a basic
level of living standards, in their constitutions. Hence
they usually utilize the social integration apparatus
equally with the repressive apparatus, and welfarisation
functions well as an apparatus for social integration.
However it still is matter of debate, first of all,
whether a welfare system contributes to political
stability and thus political legitimacy of regimes, and,
secondly, if so, the degree to which they enhance the
legitimacy of regimes.
It is widely accepted by students of social administra-
tion that social services might, at least in part, con-
tribute to political stability, and in turn the polity
accords legitimacy to the regime. Whilst this issue can
be traced back to the ages of the Elizabethan Poor Law,
the more apparent example can be found in the post-war
welfare state: the Beveridge Report. According to Jose
Harris, central to the Beveridge's thinking is the idea
that welfare programmes could contribute to social and
political integration. 24 Social insurance, for example,.
which served as a backbone of the post-war welfare state,
definitely contribute to the political solidarity in ways
to share the social risks with his fellows, 25 as is suc-
24 See, J. Harris, William Beveridge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 102-3.
25 Beveridge declared his central idea of social reform as 'Men should stand together
with his fellows' in 1942.
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cinctly described by Peter Baldwin as 'Once risks are
pooled, the individual faces uncertainty no longer alone
but as part of a larger group' .26
It should be emphasised, however, that this discussion
suffers from three central weaknesses, according to Vic
George and Paul Wilding:
1. terms are left undefined and the issues are
discussed at a level of generality which makes
it extremely difficult what it is that is
being discussed;
2. the argument has proceeded by assertion.
There has been little attempts to gather, let
alone review, evidence;
3. the value assumptions implicit in discussion
of social and political stability have been
left unexplored.27
We can easily guess how difficult it is to assess the
political influences of social services, because there
has never been a universally accepted instrument with
which to measure it. What is worse, we can not define or
measure political stability. 28 There is no universally
accepted indices or scales through which it can be
analysed. Nor can we satisfy any of them, even , if we se-
lect one.
Thus, in this discussion of the political impact of so-
cial services, the authors have suggested that 'the best
that can be done at the moment is to bring together what
26 P. Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare
State 1875-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), p. 2.
27 Vic George & Paul Wilding, The Impact of Social Policy (London: Routledge, 1984), pp.
187-9.
28 The authors define it as 'a situation in which there is general acceptance in society
.of the legitimacy of the existing economic, social and political system' Ibid., p. 188.
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little evidence is available, to show the connections
which can be plotted, albeit tentatively, between social
services and political order and to attempt a hopefully
constructive use of the sociological imagination'.29
Actually the 'sociological imagination' was originally
conceived by C. W. Millsm with a view to emphasize how
important the 'historical perspective' is to sociolo-
gists. By virtue of a sociological imagination, accord-
ing to Mills, a sociologist can recognise the interaction
processes between 'personal behaviour' and, 'historical
circumstances to which it belongs'. 	 His notion of
history (Historicism) is very similar to the principle of
historical relativism of Karl Marx, which postulates that
human behaviour i s confined to the historical and
material conditions, and henceforth social existence
depends on a particular form of social relation, though
Mill's major effort is oriented toward criticizing two
dominant intellectual methodologies of that time: 'grand
theory' and 'abstracted empiricism'. Thus the application
of the sociological imagination without the exploration
of history could be a plausible excuse for social
scientists to escape the methodological impasse which
they face, but is not a desired direction.
Seen in this light, it is not quite evident whether the
'impacts of social services on political stability' has
been fully appreciated within a historical analysis by
29 Ibid., p. 188
30 C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: O.U.P., 1959).
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the authors, but the following five ways in which social
services contribute to political stability may provide a
good starting point to explore the relationship between.
the `polity' and "welfare' in capitalist societies.
1. the easing of potentially disruptive problems,
2. their adoption of definitions of social
problems which do not challenge the economic
and social order,
3. the way they encourage, reward and punish
certain values and certain forms of behaviour,
4. the support they provide for authority and
hierarchy in society,
5. the way in which they help transform class
conflict into less threatening group
conflict 31
In general we can say that welfare systems increase
political stability. In other words, why have the post-.
war Western states launched and maintained very expensive
welfare system, if it has not contributed much to its
political legitimacy ? However, it still is not quite
clear how much they overcome the problems of the three
central weaknesses of the discussion. For example, we
have no ascertainable answers to simple questions like
`how much social services contribute to political
stability, even if we accept that they do?' or `can it be
applied to all types of political regimes?' or `what sort
of social services can contribute to social services most
significantly?', and so forth. It is thus that a
documentation of each historical context is needed in
order to analyse the impact of social services on
31 V. George and P. Wilding (1984), op. cit., p. 188.
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political stability. In other words, the assumption that
welfare systems would contribute to social and political
stability, and thus to enhance the political legitimacy
of the regime should be examined by the historical
documentation of individual cases.
According to the evidence from the cases of two
prominent East Asian countries, Korea and Taiwan, the
'political crisis' thesis turns out to be a solid inter-
pretation of the determinants on the development of their
welfare systems. In terms of the welfare state develop-
ment of Taiwan, the severed diplomatic relationship has
had significant influence on the timing of the welfare
enactment and the trend of welfare expenditures, as was
examined in chapter four. The interpretation on the de-
terminants on the Korean welfare state development is.
somewhat similar to that of the Taiwanese welfare state
development. When faced with serious political crises
occasioned by the coups of 1972 and 1980, the Korean gov-
ernment became active in the enactment of welfare pro-
grammes, though did not spend much more on welfare
programmes after the coups. It means that the 'political




It has been persistently argued that the main weaknesses
of the study of social policy are `lack of theory' and
`parochialism'. In this regard, this research is basi-
cally designed to cope with the two shortcomings of the
discipline through the study of the welfare systems of
two prominent East Asian countries: Korea and Taiwan.
In fact, the cases of the two East Asian countries
merit the attention of those interested in the develop-
ment of the discipline by virtue of the fact that they
offer a unique opportunity to gain insights into the de-
velopment of welfare in rapidly industrialising soci-
eties, as societies which have maintained the dynamics of
capitalism for decades. 1 Moreover, to study their wel-
fare systems would provide a good starting point to over-
come the two shortcomings of the discipline in ways;
first, to test the objectivity and relevance of the theo-
ries developed in the Western cultural context, and sec-
ondly to widen academic attention beyond the Western cul-
tural context. It is in this regard that this research
focuses on two prominent themes in relation with the
development of welfare systems in Korea and Taiwan:
`industrialisation' and `politics'.
In terms of the former theme this research examines
first the industrialisation processes of Korea and Tai-
wan, and proposes two main arguments about the relation-
1 J. Midgley, `Industrialism and Welfare: the Case of the Four Little Tigers', Social
Policy and Administration, 20:3 (Aug. 1986), p. 227.
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ship between industrialisation and welfare: `aversion to
welfarism' and `human capital development'. It provides
the general context within which welfare systems of Korea
and Taiwan have developed and been implemented. Sec-
ondly, in order to probe into the relationship between
politics and welfare, this research attempts to identify
the most significant variable in accounting for welfare
enactments and welfare expenditures of Korea and Taiwan,
and propose the `political crisis' thesis. It will pro-.
vide an explanation as to why, how and to what extent
their welfare systems different from the welfare systems
of other countries.
Looking back to the origins of the post-war British
welfare state, as was examined in chapter two, the war-
time idealism, widely shared by the whole population, has
turned into the Beveridge Report, which has served as the
backbone of the welfare state since its publication.
Mainly due to the post-war consensus of the British
polity, the Beveridge-Keynesianism orthodoxy has remained
virtually intact in the British society and thus the wel-
fare state has been ever expanding until the emergence of
the new right government in 1979.
Since the early eighties, the new right ideology has
dominated whole sectors of the society, and public policy
especially has gone through a complete transformation.
Market enhancing measures like privatisation were widely
applied to the traditional public sectors including the
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welfare system. The welfare state has encountered stiff
criticism on account of its excessive costs, ineffec-
tiveness and encouragement of welfare dependency. Of
late, the far right ideologues and politicians allow the
welfare system only to the extent it does not conflict
with the principle of the market economy. It surely is a
great change from the Beveridge-Keynesianism orthodoxy
based on social democracy.
In this regard, it is fair to say that the Reform of
Social Security2 published in 1985 is a true reflection
of this new right ideology. In it, individual
responsibility has been emphasised and efficiency
enhancing measures have been widely implemented.
Overall, this report vividly illustrates how political
ideas get turned into actual policies.
-We can now draw some implications from the historical
experience of the British welfare state. It is possible
to argue that political factors like war and ideology
have decisively affected the development of the welfare
state. In other words, politics tells us much about the
development of the welfare state: its experiment, consol-
idation, expansion and retrenchment.
Roughly speaking, it further implies that the complete
removal of the existing social order such as through war
or revolution is conducive to the making of the welfare
2 Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), Reform of Social Security (London:
HMSO, 1985).
339
state as a form of social reform, 3 whilst the change of
political climates would bring the change of social pol-
icy in peace time. It surely is of analytical value to
analogise the Korean and Taiwanese welfare system with
the historical development of the British welfare state.
In the cases of Korea and Taiwan, however, it should be
noted that too little attention has been paid to their
welfare systems. Though there have been plenty of social
science literatures dealing with their industrialisation,
political system and cultural tradition in accordance
with their rapid economic development, they have not been
dealt in full in the study of social policy, mainly be-
cause major academic achievements of the discipline have
been exclusively focused on the Western welfare systems.
This research hopefully will contribute' to widen the
scope of the study of social policy as a academic disci-
pline.
Reviewing the historical context of the development of
welfare in Korea and Taiwan, and examining their welfare
systems in more detail in chapter four and five, we could
find that their welfare systems have developed in accor-
dance with their unique industrialisation. Another ap-
proach, however, is needed to account for timing of wel-
fare enactments and trends of welfare expenditures of Ko-
3 Kathleen Jones supports this view that 'War had unexpectedly turned out to be a great
engine of social advance. There was a new altruism, and a new passion for social jus-
tice , . See K. Jones, The Making of Social Policy in Britain 1830-1990 (London:
Athlone, 1991), p. 121. Total upheaval of the existing social order such as through
war and revolution is conducive to a social reform which might not be realised by con-
ventional political processes in peace time. For more details about the war-time soli-
darity among the British people, refer to chapter two.
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rea and Taiwan. In chapters four and five, we demon-
strated that the existing account of welfare determi-
nants, developed in the Western societies, do not ade-
quately explain the case of the two welfare systems.
This research proposes instead the 'political crisis'
thesis, and argues that it stands up well to the evidence
of both welfare systems.
The basic assumption of the 'political crisis' thesis
• is that the regime is likely to introduce or enact wel-
fare programmes more actively and tends to increase wel-
fare expenditures when faced with the serious political
crisis. Accordingly, this research argues that politics
is the most significant factor to the changes of welfare
systems. According to the evidence from the cases of the
two prominent East Asian countries, Korea and Taiwan, the
'political crisis' thesis turns out to be a solid inter-
pretation of the determinants on the development of wel-
fare system in the region.
In terms of the welfare state development of Taiwan, it
is very clear that the severed diplomatic relationship
has had the most significant influence ' on the timing of
the welfare enactments and the trend of the welfare
expenditure (Figures 4-11 and 4-12). It is noteworthy
that the interpretation of the determinants on the Korean
welfare state development is somewhat similar to that of
the Taiwanese welfare state development. It means that
the 'political crisis' still endures in the case of Ko-
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rea, especially in the timing of welfare enactment
(Figure 5-7).
It should be pointed out, however, that the welfare
expenditure of Korea correlates rather imprecisely with
political crises when compared to the case of Taiwan.
Whilst the portion of social expenditure among total gov-
ernment expenditure posted 5.88% in 1963, two years after
the 1961 coup, and that of 1982, also two years after the
1980 coup, represented 8.52%, there were no salient
changes in the trend of welfare expenditure during or af-
ter the 1972 coup (Figure 5-8). It is mainly due to the
historical nature of the coup itself. Whilst the 1961
and 1980 coups were typical military uprising to over-
throw a de jure government, the 1972 coup was more in
line with the Royal coup.
Interestingly enough, the trend of welfare expenditure
is closely related with the indirect tax rate in Korea.
Compared with the reversed relationship between them in
Taiwan (Figure 4-6), both are strongly correlated to each
other (Figure 5-5). It is mainly due to the political
situations of Korea since the early sixties. Compared
with the Taiwanese election, in which the ruling Kuom-
intang garnered over seventy percent at every level of
elections, the Korean eleaftons have shown intense com-
petition between the ruling party candidates and the op-
position counterparts. Thus party programmes, most of
which were connected with community development of the
constituency, were largely trumpeted to the electorate.
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It is for this reason, too, that the indirect tax rate
has increased just before and during election years.4
We duly reach the conclusion that politics not only
matters but influences the timing of welfare enactments
and the trend of welfare expenditure in the cases of
Korea and Taiwan. To put it succinctly, the East Asian
regimes have been more active in both welfare enactment
and welfare expenditure when in serious political crisis.
This is supported by the fact that welfare enactments
were not actively made and welfare expenditures were
generally lower during the politically stable periods.
Implicit in this conclusion is the idea that welfare
systems were politically utilised by the regime to
tranquillise political crises, irrespective of whether it
contributes to political stability.
However, it is dubious whether this thesis is applica-
ble to other developing countries, especially to the sec-
ond wave NICs in the South East Asian region. Historical
documentation of each country is needed to test the ap-
plicability of the thesis. I will leave this subject
open for further research.
In sum, this research does not aspire to devise or de-
velop any type of theoretical model sufficiently abstract
to be universally applicable to other countries, nor does
4 For more details of the relationship between election and indirect tax rate, refer to
chapter two.
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it attempt to test the existing theories concerning Korea
and Taiwan. It instead attempts to probe what sort of
explanations can be proposed when the welfare enactments
and welfare expenditure of Korea and Taiwan are examined.
The main findings of this research provides an explana-
tion as to why, how and to what extent their welfare sys-
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